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Notes on Language and Terminology
As my aim in this project is to understand the meaning of many of these sensitive terms
such as alien, illegal alien, coolie, and immigrant, I feel it is necessary to begin with the
genealogy of these terms. As I will be repeatedly referencing Elliot Young’s Alien Nation:
Chinese Migration in The Americas From the Coolie Era Through World War II and Mae M.
Ngai’s Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and The Making of Modern America, I find it
appropriate to use their definitions and terminology. Many of these terms carry derogatory
connotations and I have no intention of echoing racist stereotypes. Rather I aim to understand the
creation and development of these words and their meanings.
Following Ngai, I use alien and illegal alien in its original American usage, which refers
to that which belongs to another person or place. Alien as a legal subject in American law, is a
person who is not a citizen or is a noncitizen. While, an illegal alien is an alien who is unlawfully
present or who commits a deportable offense, sometimes referred to as a criminal alien. Since
this research is centered on Chinese immigrants in Mexico, Extranjero, meaning foreigner, is the
closest Spanish translation to alien. According to Young, Chinese migrants in Latin America
were referred to as colonos asiaticas (Asian colonists) or extranjeros asiaticos (Asian
Foreigners) or most commonly chinos (Chinese). Frequently throughout the chapters, I will refer
to anti-Chinese supporters in the Spanish word, antichinistas. Likewise, anti-Chinese campaigns
and anti-Chinese sentiments will be referred to in the Spanish word antichinismo.
The term coolie has no legal definition, but is a pejorative term that is affiliated with lowstatus workers from China and India. Coolie was espoused by politicians, journalists, and antiAsian activists to describe submissive and indentured laborers. I subscribe to Young’s usage of
coolie, “in using this term is not to ascribe these characteristics to the Chinese migrants who
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were thus labeled but to more accurately represent how certain Chinese laborers were viewed”.
The term Chinese, describes vast nineteenth and early twentieth-century cultural and linguistic
differences that encompassed China. Migrants coming from China were viewed within the
framework of the nation-state, despite the fact that most immigrants came from Guangdong and
spoke Cantonese, they were regarded as Chinese.
Illegal aliens may also be referred to as “undocumented migrants.” The term
undocumented was developed under a modern era of immigration restriction, in which
documents are required for lawful admission. As noted by Ngai, there are other types of unlawful
presence or grounds for deportation, “not all illegal aliens are illegal because they lack
documents.” Immigrant is a legal status that refers to an alien who comes for permanent
settlement, a legal permanent resident” and even naturalization as a citizen. There is a legal
distinction between immigrants and “nonimmigrants”, those who are visitors, foreign students,
temporary workers, and tourists. Unless referencing a precise legal status, I will use the general
term migrant, since not all migrants are immigrants. Migrant is defined as one who participates
in permanent, short, and long-term sojourns in one-way or repeated movements across nationstate boundaries. As this project concerns diasporic transnational movement and mobility, the
term migrant serves to not privilege permanent settlement above other forms of migration.
I use Chinese Mexican as shorthand for all Chinese who were naturalized Mexicans, in
other words, Mexican citizens of Chinese descent. Chinese proper names and phrases will be
written in pinyin or written as names appear in legal records in transliterated Cantonese.
In regard to the U.S Immigration and Naturalization Service, that will be discussed
throughout this study, I will refer to the agency by the name used at the time of the period under
discussion. In 1891, congress created the Bureau of Immigration under the Department of

3
Commerce and Labor, which later was maintained under the Department of Labor in 1913.
Border Patrol established by Congress in 1925 was a unit of the Immigration Service, the field
organization of the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration and Bureau of
Naturalization merged in 1932 to become the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). INS
was moved under jurisdiction of the Department of Justice in 1940.

4
—Preface—
The drive from Los Angeles to Mexicali is about four and half hours; three of those hours
are spent on two-lane desert highways. It’s difficult to not sense the eeriness of the desolate U.S.Mexico border. Its hollow valleys hide more than they reveal. The border usually evokes an
image of weary Mexicans who trail across blistering deserts, in order to scale walls that divide
two nations. Migrants who, in desperation to reach the U.S., enlist the services of coyotes, human
smugglers who promise passage to the land of opportunity. These images reveal much about
what is included in history, and what is chosen to be forgotten.
As soon as I turned onto Imperial Ave. heading south towards the Mexican border, I
began reading signs for Yum Yum Chinese Food and Golden Dragon Chinese. My intention for
driving to Mexicali was to research La Chinesca and the Chinese of Mexicali so I tried to take
notice of all things Chinese. Aside from a couple of Chinese restaurants, the terrain down
Imperial Ave. was a continuous stretch of strip malls surrounded by a vast empty desert.
Large letters spelling “MEXICO” appeared as I continued driving down Imperial
Avenue. I had arrived at the Mexican border, in which my grandmother and I quickly crossed.
No passport scan, no questions, no problem. Crossing the border into Mexico could not be more
different than my experience a couple days later crossing the border back into the United States.
I wondered if I would find a city that resembled the Chinatowns of New York and San
Francisco, a city filled with the traditional Chinese multi-inclined roofs, or a Mexican pueblo
embedded with their Spanish architecture and Catholic residue. My imagination proved limited,
Mexicali was none of these. Mexicali has been carved and shaped by its geographical
relationship to the U.S - Mexican border. It is a city that has been drawn by lines of inclusion and
exclusion.
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In 1902, a syndicate of Los Angeles businessmen organized the Colorado River Land
Company, and acquired nearly 850,000 acres of the Mexicali Valley. Throughout the early
twentieth century, the Mexican government attempted to resettle Mexican families in Baja
California in order to integrate the region more closely with the rest of the country.
Unfortunately, resettlement plans consistently failed to attract Mexican settlers, as better
opportunities were just across the border.1 Therefore, Chinese agricultural labor became the only
practical alternative to meet demands in a depleted labor market that faced chronic shortages. By
1919, 50 Chinese-owned cotton farms came to occupy almost 75,000 acres, producing 80% of
the cotton grown in the Mexicali Valley. Once the irrigation and clearing projects were
completed, many Chinese laborers congregated in a section of Mexicali; founding what is now
known as La Chinesca.
The distinctive development of northern Baja enabled the Chinese to assume diverse
economic roles, ranging from rural laborer to urban capitalist. Strong demand for labor coupled
with low native competition, provided ideal conditions for the new immigrants.2 There were so
many Chinese-owned stores, that in the local language to go to the store was to visit “el chino on
the corner.”3 Yet despite a highly visible Chinese presence, Mexican residents had high opinions
of Chinese businesses, as they often allowed people to purchase goods on credit.4 The newspaper
El Excelsior noted that Mexicali was “an entirely Chinese city. The streets, traveled only by

1

Duncan, Robert H. “The Chinese and the Economic Development of Northern Baja California, 1889-1929.” The
Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 74, no. 4, 1994, p. 615., doi:10.2307/2517494.
2
Ibid.
3
Gonzalez, Fredy. Paisanos Chinos: Transpacific Politics among Chinese Immigrants in Mexico. N.p.: U of
California, 2017.Print
4
Ibid.
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Chinese, the restaurants, filled by Chinese, the fieldwork, absolutely dominated by the Chinese.
Everything, everything is completely Chinese in Mexicali.”5
As the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920) swept through Mexico, the district of Northern
Baja was one of the few areas to find employment and relative safety. Therefore, Baja’s Chinese
residents weathered the Revolution virtually undisturbed. The sheer lack of antichinismo in
Mexicali, destabilizes the conventional correlation between economic success and persecution.
By 1920, Chinese residents had outnumbered Mexicans 10,000 to 700. Currently, there are an
estimated 5,000 people of Chinese origin in Mexicali. However, the Mexican cities of Tijuana
and Mexico City, actually outnumber Mexicali in terms of their Chinese populations. Yet, there
is something distinct about Mexicali.
In my interview with Jorge Lee, the president of the Asociación China de Mexicali’s
(Chinese Association of Mexicali), he explained, “Mexicali is the only Mexican border city that
was founded and created by foreign hands, in this case the Chinese, it is not the Mexican city
with the most Chinese, but it is structure of the social fabric more than anything.” To this day,
Chinese continue to migrate to Mexicali as it’s seen as a distinctly Chinese-Mexican city.
Towards the end of my interview with Lee, I asked him how he envisioned his identity. Lee
responded,
We definitely have the local, oriental, Mexican, American influence, there is still a
lot of pochismo. Obviously in mindset, what you eat and your thoughts, there is a
mix, because I am as the gringos say ‘Chino-Mexicano’ or ‘Mexicano-Chino’, I
believe that yes, there is mix. But we can’t forget our origins and we can not deny
that we still look at ourselves in the mirror and we are Chinese.6

5
6

Duncan, Robert H. Northern Baja California.
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Lee’s honest response highlights the limitations of national identities and the
inherent confusion of belonging to two worlds. In this case, perhaps even three worlds.
Did it not matter that Lee was born in Mexico, spoke fluent Spanish, and was the
president of a Chinese association about to celebrate its 100-year anniversary? At the end
of the day, when he looked in the mirror, he saw someone Chinese, not Mexican. Lee’s
response speaks to how the nation, nationalism, and history have worked to exclude the
Chinese from Mexican history.
A few days later, I began the trip back to Los Angeles. Trying to find the entrance back
into the U.S. required half an hour of circling around the edge of Mexicali and frequently asking
pedestrians where the border was.
Donde esta la linea?
It wasn’t until we came upon the rows of hundreds of cars, that I realized my
grandmother wasn’t asking people where the border was, but where the line was. A tip for
crossing the border: bring snacks and cambio (pocket change). Snacks because you will most
likely be waiting in your car for an hour or more, and change because as you’re sitting in your
parked car impoverished men and women with disabilities and sorrow faces move between the
rows of cars, where arm's reach out to drop monedas (coins) into their paper cups. I am not
trying to highlight the fact that there is poverty in Mexicali, but that individuals who have been
forgotten and excluded by the state, find innovative ways to survive and circumvent their
exclusion. This research is dedicated to those who are not only forgotten, but intentionally
excluded.
The edge of Mexicali, where rows of cars line up to cross the border, is actually a
bustling center of commerce. In addition to those who have found a strategic way to make a
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living amongst the trapped cars, countless vendors arrange their products along the edges of the
road. While you’re waiting to cross the border, you can buy more than just paletas and candy but
a two-foot tall sculpture of Jesus! Lining the steel 15-foot fence that marks the physical edge of
Mexico, are rows and rows of Jesus and Mary statues (Fig. 1).

Figure 1: U.S.-Mexico Border, photo by author.

When we finally reached the front of the line I couldn’t help but feel slightly anxious.
While the officer at the U.S. Customs and Border Protection checked our passports I wondered:
would they look at my Mexican grandmother in the passenger seat and get suspicious? Do they
know I’m Mexican too? Mae Ngai, in her book Impossible Subjects, explains how the large
presence of illegal populations in Latino communities has served to construct an identity of these
communities as illegitimate, criminal, and unassimilable. U.S. Immigration laws in maintaining
national membership, draw lines of inclusion and exclusion to articulate a desired composition of
the nation.7 My fears of course were unfounded, as my grandmother has dual citizenship and I

7

Ngai, Mae M. “Illegal Aliens: A Problem of Law and History.” Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making
of Modern America, Princeton University Press, 2014, pp. 1–20.
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am a U.S. citizen. Yet, as intimidating officers walked through the cars being pulled by massive
canines, I couldn’t help but feel uneasy. In the United States, immigration laws have produced
alien citizens, those who were born in the United States but are assumed to be foreign.8
After a few anxious minutes the officer finally returned our passports and lifted the gate
so we could continue driving. As I drove across the border back on to Imperial Ave, I felt
relieved. Although this was just my experience of crossing the border, it revealed to me how I
too, closely associate undocumented immigration and the U.S.-Mexico border, with the
movement of Mexicans. Once back in the safe confines of Los Angeles, being the over-analytical
student that I am, I quickly searched online for the “U.S. Customs and Border Patrol.” I
wondered when this fear-instilling institution was created, and why even with my U.S. passport I
felt uncertain about my American-ness? The official website reads:
CBP’s top priority is to keep terrorists and their weapons from entering the
U.S. while welcoming all legitimate travelers and commerce. CBP officers and
agents enforce all applicable U.S. laws, including against illegal immigration,
narcotics smuggling and illegal importation. CBP deploys highly trained law
enforcement personnel who apprehend more than 1,000 individuals each day for
suspected violations of U.S. laws.
1,000 individuals every day.

8
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—Introduction—
Chinese immigrants were this country’s first illegal immigrants, long before Mexican
immigrants came to fill this role in contemporary American discourse. As means of resisting and
circumventing the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, entrepreneurial Chinese became the architects
of undocumented emigration from Mexico.9 The entrepreneurial Chinese of San Francisco and
Latin America organized a transnational commercial orbit to facilitate the lucrative business of
immigrant smuggling and contract labor recruitment. They devised techniques that utilized
“coyotes”, corrupt immigration officials, the transportation industry, and legal loopholes in
immigration policy.10 A 1901 House Committee report on Immigration states that approximately
20,000 Chinese were smuggled across the Mexican border into the United States each year.
Illegal Chinese migration from Mexico throughout 1880 - 1940, fundamentally transformed
America’s relationship with the Mexican border. Although the Chinese practically invented
illegal immigration from Mexico, the history and discourse concerning U.S. immigration, is
overwhelmingly concentrated on Mexicans and Central Americans. Preoccupation with this
single case maintains a close relationship in American minds between race and illegal status in
the United States.11
For many Chinese immigrants, Mexico was not only a strategic backdoor into the United
States, but a land of opportunity. More than 15,000 Chinese would settle in Mexico by 1910.
Once in Mexico, the Chinese built communities, supported various infrastructure projects,
married Mexican women, and filled vital roles in the developing Mexican economy. Although

9

Romero, Robert Chao. “Immigration and the Chinese Diaspora.” The Chinese in Mexico: 1882-1940, University of
Arizona Press, 2011, pp. 13-29.
10
Romero, Robert Chao. The Chinese in Mexico, 191-197.
11
Ngai, Mae M. “Illegal Aliens: A Problem of Law and History.” Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the
Making of Modern America, Princeton University Press, 2014, pp. 1–20.
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Chinese immigrants were vital for various development projects and state-building, they remain
absent from Mexican history. In addition, despite their attempts to become part of Mexican civil
society, they remained permanent foreigners. By 1940 almost two-thirds of the Chinese
population in Mexico fled or were forcefully expelled.
Due to various wars, colonization, and high competition for low and middle wage jobs,
Mexico has never been a large receiver of immigrants. However, the small numbers of
immigrants who did arrive in Mexico, had a large influence on their host country. Historian
Jürgen Buchenau contends, “Mexico followed a pattern of “qualitative” rather than
“quantitative” immigration.”12 Therefore, not only do standard narratives of Mexican identity not
account for the long-standing Chinese presence, but Chinese immigrants also complicate the
discourse that deems the country as a xenophilic “mother of foreigners and stepmother of
Mexicans.”13
Most historians who have written on the subject thus far characterize the anti-Chinese
campaigns and the expulsion of all Chinese from Sinaloa and Sonora as a by-product of U.S.
anti-Chinese rhetoric. Others, such as Robert Chao Romero, relegate the anti-Chinese campaigns
to economic nationalism. Although it may appear that Mexican anti-Chinese campaigns were a
reiteration of U.S. Sinophobia—the unfounded fear and intense dislike of Chinese persons—
Mexican antichinismo was the result of various circumstances, contingent on more than just
exclusion from the United States. Other historians such as Grace Pena Delgado, argue that
antichinismo was a product of the post-revolutionary Mexican racial ideology, mestizaje. I do not
dispute that mestizaje nationalism contributed to the eventual expulsion campaigns (1931-1933),

12

Buchenau, Jürgen. “The Limits of the Cosmic Race.” Immigration and National Identities in Latin America,
University Press of Florida, 2014, pp. 66–87.
13
Ibid.
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but mestizaje cannot account for earlier expressions of antichinismo. I argue that mestizaje
nationalism has been detrimental to the incorporation of Chinese in Mexican national narratives.
In other words, mestizaje nationalism not only encouraged the eventual expulsion of Chinese
from Mexico, but their expulsion from history as well. Historical nationalism accounts for why
the Chinese have been omitted from both Mexican and the U.S. national narratives. The U.S.
expelled the Chinese because they did not fit within the desired racial composition of the nation
and thus their stories have been omitted from the American narrative. Untangling the Chinese
experience in Mexico, requires incorporating various histories of imperialism, colonialism, and a
parallel process of Mexican national identity formation. When this this history is unraveled,
various forms of Chinese othering are exposed.
But first, why has the history of Chinese immigrants in Mexico only recently begun to be
told and why is so much still unknown? Two arguments run throughout this project, each
contingent on the other. First, the rise of anti-Chinese campaigns and the eventual expulsion of
20,000 Chinese from Mexico was the culmination of various processes of othering, that began
with their introduction into Mexico under Porfirian colonization and modernization projects.
Chinese immigrants were introduced into Mexico as a disposable labor force under Diaz, from
then on, they would always be associated with Porfirian policies and seen as a threat to the
revolutionary and post-revolutionary state. Second, I argue that the omission of Chinese from
Mexican national narratives is a consequence of history, the nation-state system, and
nationalism.
History and the nation-state are intrinsic to one another, which had been detrimental to
the unveiling of transnational histories. Moreover, even as the Chinese become more visible in
academia, they appear exclusively within the context of nation-centric histories, such as
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American Studies, Asian American studies, or Latin American studies. Yet these narrow
frameworks cannot accurately account for the transnational nature of Chinese migration and
settlement. Transnational migrants demand re-examination of concepts such as history and the
nation-state.14
In Silencing the Past Michel-Rolph Trouillot argues that the production of historical
knowledge involves power and that this power often determines what history includes and what
history neglects. This is especially apparent in the prevailing historiography on race in Mexico,
which maintains that national identities were forged from the racial mixture of Europeans and
indigenous peoples. Buchenau contends, “Mexicans have not imagined their country as a nation
of immigrants…Mexicans imagined themselves as the products of the Spanish sexual conquest
of indigenous Mesoamerica.”15 Therefore, Mexican national identity or mexicanidad has been
contingent on the mestizo, which is the product of miscegenation of Spanish and Indian.16 When
post-revolutionary leaders sought to distance themselves from Porfirian racism, they
consolidated the state by incorporating indigenismo into their official ideology.17 While native
populations were assimilated into Mexican society, blacks and Chinese were deemed unfit for
this new mestizo national image.
Trouillot claims that theories of history underestimate the size, relevance, and the
complexity of the overlapping sites where history is produced; therefore, the task is not to
determine what history is, but how history works.18 Trouillot urges the necessity of unveiling the
processes and conditions that produce narratives, in order to reveal how power produces certain
14

Hall, Stuart, et al. “The Question of Cultural Identity.” Modernity and Its Futures, Polity Press, 1993, pp. 599–
632.
15
Buchenau, Jürgen. Cosmic Race, 68.
16
Ibid.
17
Knight, Alan, “Racism Revolution and Indigenismo Mexico 1910-1940.” The Idea of Race in
Latin America, 1870-1940, University of Texas Press, 2004, pp. 70–102.
18
Trouillot, Michel-Rolph. Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History. Beacon Press, 2015.
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narratives and silences others. Trouillot explains that silences enter the process of historical
production at four crucial moments: the moment of fact creation (the making of sources), the
moment of fact assembly (the making of archives), the moment of fact retrieval (the making of
narratives), and the moment of retrospective significance (the making of history in the final
instance).19 Any historical narrative is a result of various processes of silencing.20 Utilizing
Trouillot’s method, I reposition evidence to generate a new narrative, in order to reveal the
silences that buried the story of the Chinese in Mexico.
Omission from history is only the first challenge, the second challenge is found in nationcentric history. Prasenjit Duara offers the first systematic account of the relationship between the
nation-state, nationalism, and the concept of linear history. His critique of nation-centric history
argues that the writing of history is a project of modernity. Although he focuses primarily on
China and India, Duara argues that many historians of postcolonial nation-states have adopted a
linear, evolutionary history of the Enlightenment-colonial model. Therefore, it is necessary to
incorporate contestation, appropriation, and the repressed subject into accounts of the past. Duara
urges scholars to rescue history from the nation, by re-evaluating how pre-national identities
shaped national ones, “Nationalism is rarely the nationalism of the nation, but rather marks the
site where different representations of the nation contest and negotiate with each other.”21 The
backlash against such nation-centric histories has resulted in the tendency to view the past as
largely constructed, imagined, or invented. Duara offers another possibility beyond “imagined
communities” and redefines history as a series of multiple conflicting narratives produced
simultaneously at national, local, and transnational levels.

19
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Ibid.
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The concept of nationalism as a modern form of consciousness became prevalent through
the works of Karl Deutsch, Ernest Gellner, and Benedict Anderson.22 National identities are seen
to offer membership to the political nation state and identification through the medium of
national culture, which attempts to override identities such as religion, race, language, class,
gender.23 The nation as a form of identity is debated among three approaches: primordialist,
constructivist, and instrumentalist. The primordialist conception of the nation postulates that
nations are real and not imagined, wherein national identity is immutable.24 Duara explains how
the primordialist view is intertwined with Social Darwinism, which “tended to fix upon race-that
combination of biology, environment and culture-as the repository of those attributes which
enabled (or prevented) a group to evolve toward civilization.” He further highlights how Social
Darwinism not only offered justification for colonialism, but represented a closed discourse of
history, nation, and race, in which the only justification for nationhood was whether a race could
advance historically. Therefore, a nation was able to progress in history if it reflected the
qualities of a civilized race. Mexican President Porfirio Diaz would subscribe to this
understanding when he pushed for European immigrants to bring Mexico into the modern era.
Constructivists argue that nothing is fixed or predetermined in the concept of the nation. In a
study of states and nations Hugh Seton-Watson writes, “that no 'scientific definition' of a nation
can be devised. All that I can find to say is that a nation exists when a significant number of
people in a community consider themselves to be a nation.”25 National identity is therefore
subjective, dependent on psychology rather than biology.
22

Gellner, Ernest. Nations and Nationalism. Blackwell Publishing, 1983.
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24
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25
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Finally, instrumentalists argue that social linkages are shaped specifically for political
and material advantage. National cultures produce definitions of the nation that we identity with,
constructing national identities through imagined communities, as argued by Benedict Anderson.
Anderson argues that the differences between nations is rooted in the different ways the nation is
imagined. Narratives of the nation emphasis tradition and heritage so that political culture
appears to be a natural progression of history.26 Heritage or notions of “original” peoples are
commonly employed to articulate the origin of the nation. This process includes myths and
heroisms, while massacres and human atrocities are conveniently forgotten. Traditions are
emphasized and invented, in order to mold and bind a nation’s imagined collective identity.
Nations are narrations, created, nourished, and sustained through the telling and re-telling of
their pasts.27
Stuart Hall, in Modernity and Its Futures, argues “People are not only legal citizens of a
nation; they participate in the idea of a nation as represented in its national culture.” Hall resists
the idea that national cultures are composed of only of cultural institutions, but instead are
emphasized by various discursive strategies such as narratives of the nation and foundational
myths. Hall argues that national cultures function as systems of representation; a product of
negotiation that attempts to unify through race or ethnicity. Despite the power of national
narratives Hall and Duara dispute the notion that national identities are cohesive and stable. First,
nationalism registers difference even as it claims a unitary or unifying identity.28 In other words,
the nation is a historical configuration in which the national “Self” is defined in relation to the
“Other.” Therefore, modern nations seek cohesion by employing narratives of the nation that

26
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privilege a particular community and represses others. Hall proposes national cultures should
instead be viewed as discursive devices that represent difference as unity or identity. Second,
nationalist consciousness is not a unique or unprecedented mode or form of consciousness. Hall
considers that national cultures also serve as structures of power, “Most modern nations consist
of disparate cultures which were only unified by a lengthy process of violent conquest - that is,
by the forcible suppression of cultural difference.”29 Duara highlights that historians have been
generally concerned with the process whereby national identities are formed and have neglected
that this is the same process whereby other identifications and alternative narratives of the nation
are repressed and obscured.30
Finally, Duara offers that the novelty of modern nationalism is not political selfconsciousness, but the world system of nation-states. As the state claims to represent the people
of the nation it has steadily expanded its role in society, but at the expense of local authority
structures.31 However, even when such unification has been temporarily achieved, the nation is
represented and voiced by different—often contradictory and opposing—self-conscious
groups.32 Nevertheless, national cultures have dominated modernity, even if they often fail to
unify. The nation-state system has expanded across the world, thereby sanctioning the nationstate as the only legitimate form of governance.
This brief theoretical overview destabilizes the notion that the nation or national identity
are homogenous or unified. Despite this, historical nationalism has been influential and
simultaneously detrimental to the experience of Chinese in Mexico. I will quickly summarize a
few of the central consequences of historical nationalism. First, nationalism dominates historical

29
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discourse therefore transnational narratives, such as those of migrants, are either missing or
inaccurately told. Second, history works to unify the nation though foundational myths and
national narratives, but theses narratives privilege a particular system of representation such as
race or ethnicity over others. Thirdly, the production of history involves power and this power
determines what history includes. Chinese contributions to state-building and the Mexican
economy were substantial relative to their population. Yet, the impact of Chinese contributions
in shaping Mexican national history remain to be fully assessed or incorporated into the
conventional national narrative.33 This research aims to unveil how nationalistic history has
silenced Chinese narratives. Additionally, I traverse Mexican history to reveal how various
circumstances such as imperialism, colonialism, and nation-state building guided a process of
Chinese othering. Through Duara’s recipe, I incorporate the repressed subject into accounts of
the past in order to reevaluate how pre-national identities shaped Mexican national identity. Each
chapter tackles a different era in Mexican-Chinese history, exposing a process of Chinese
racialization that culminated in the expulsion of almost the entire Chinese population from
Northern Mexico.

—Overview of Chapter Contents—
In order to destabilize Mexican national narratives, the first chapter explores the origins
of Chinese migration during the colonial and coolie period. Chinese migration to Mexico is by
no means a recent phenomenon, and began much earlier than the mid-nineteenth century. The
arrival of Chinese to Mexico dates back to as early as 1635. However, most historians claim
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Mexico was not a primary destination for immigrants of the Chinese diaspora until after the
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. The first chapter also sheds light on the Chinese Diaspora and
the subsequent coolie era. Between 1847 and 1874, 225,000 Chinese arrived in Peru and Cuba
through the coolie trade or la trata amarilla.34 The initial arrival of Chinese goods and migrants
to the region was the result of the Spanish colonial trade network. China’s vast population
became a limitless source of labor, and centuries-old migration networks were already in place to
facilitate Chinese labor.35 The regions labor demands for various agricultural and industrial
development projects led governments to initially recruit the Chinese.
The depiction of Chinese migration to Mexico as a consequence of U.S. laws maintains
Mexico as an emigrate location. Moreover, it supports the narrative that Mexican anti-Chinese
campaigns were a reiteration U.S. sinophobia. Mexican antichinismo was a culmination of
various circumstances, dating far earlier than Chinese exclusion from the United States. The
second chapter explores the active recruitment of Chinese laborers as motores de sangre to
Mexico during the Porfirian period. The recruitment of Chinese laborers to fulfill capitalist
desires and not as settlers, was the crux of antichinismo. Moreover, it reflected a criollo
(Mexican-born Spaniards) ideology that saw the native Indian population as unfit agents of
modernization. Although originally recruited for agricultural colonization projects, the Chinese
of Mexico achieved a high level of economic success. By means of transnational trade networks,
Chinese immigrants integrated into various levels of the Mexican economy.
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Historian Theresa Alfaro-Velcamp contends that the hegemony of national
historiographies persists at the expense of transnational and other histories, hindering the
exploration of the many connections between nation building and migration.36 The second
chapter further explores Mexican and U.S. immigration laws in relation to one another, in order
to destabilize the notion that Mexican immigration laws were more liberal or open than that of
the United States. A closer look at Mexico’s ‘open’ immigration policies reveal that they were
intended to attract European settlers in order to whiten the population. Unraveling Mexico’s
immigration policies exposes the interwoven legacies of Spanish colonial rule. Various historians
have explored thoroughly how nationalism lead to the formation of immigration laws in the
United States, but how did nationalism lead or not lead to the formation of immigration laws in
Mexico?
Emphasis on law and government policies are recurrent throughout all four chapters, as
the law reveals social structures and social behavior. Every change in social behavior has an
impact on law and every major change in law is rooted in social behavior.37 The legal system is
not autonomous, but it does work to influence society and society influences law. Law follows
social change and adapts to it, yet the legal system also crystallizes social change. Moreover, the
emphasizes on immigration laws and policies destabilizes the nation-state, since immigration and
the nation-state work in tandem to construct an “us” that excludes an “other.” Finally, this
chapter explores how undocumented Chinese immigration transformed the U.S. into a
gatekeeping nation. After the 1882 Exclusion Act, an entire bureaucracy was created to enforce
Chinese exclusion, including inspectors, judges, jails, residency certificates, and interpreters.
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The third chapter attempts to untangle a complicated history of the Mexican Revolution
and the unspeakable violence directed at the Chinese, in which many historians still cannot
explain. This transitional period in Mexican history is essential for understanding the rise of
organized anti-Chinese campaigns and the eventual deportation of thousands of Chinese.
Particular attention is given to the massacre of Torreon, in which more than three hundred
Chinese were murdered in 1911. Unlike the anti-Chinese campaigns of the United States,
Mexico’s sinophobia was tied to revolution, reconstruction, and reworking rule and consent. The
Chinese were racialized through battlefield violence, economic nationalism, and later by means
of mestizaje nationalistic discourse to legitimize the post-revolutionary state. Moreover, this
chapter explores how the Mexican state and intellectuals were re-evaluating racial thinking and
indigenous assimilation, through the formation of mestizaje. Indigenismo sought to redeem and
appropriate the heritage of Mexico’s indigenous populations, incorporating the “Indians” into
Mexican society rather than restoring their lands.38
By 1940 the Chinese population of Mexico had decreased by almost two-thirds, largely
due to the organized anti-Chinese movement that targeted the Chinese of various states such as
Sonora, Sinaloa, Nayarit, and Tamaulipas. Chapter four examines how the coolie era, Porfirian
colonization, revolutionary violence, and organized campaigns culminated in the expulsion of
virtually the entire Chinese population from the state of Sonora in August of 1931. During a
post-revolutionary scramble to define state authority and national identity, antichinismo gained
greater legitimacy and provided a sense of national coherence. Antichinismo was a versatile form
of nationalism that offered rationale for state power and allowed Mexicans to perform racial
superiority through a state-endorsed identity.
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Additionally, this chapter revisits Mexican and U.S. immigration laws and the vital role
of government policies in the institutionalization of antichinismo. Synchronized anti-immigrant
measures indicate that North American was responding to a global economic crisis, resulting in a
transnational xenophobic movement.39 Chapter four also situates the antichinista campaigns
within the context of an official nationalist campaign, hemispheric economic depression, and the
repatriation of thousands of Mexicans from the United States. Particular attention is given to
Chinese associations and the ways in which Chinese communities resisted harassment and
discrimination. This concluding chapter provides the most visible examples of historical
nationalism’s consequences. Mexico neglects the presence and role of immigrants in the history
of Mexico’s transition to an independent nation-state. Indifference to Mexico’s immigrants
served the needs of a state-building project that reinforced the official indigenous mestizoSpanish triad. Although this research ends with a Chinese exodus in the 1930s, this does not
signify that the Chinese presence in Mexico disappeared. The conclusion of this project recalls
my interview with the president of the Chinese Association in Mexicali and demonstrates the
various ways Chinese-Mexicans have survived, adapted, and transformed themselves and
Mexico. This project is a humble attempt to uncover one of the many missing narratives from
history.
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Chapter I
Between Freedom and Slavery :
The Coolie Era (1635-1882)

—Introduction—
Stateless, alien, extranjeros. Chinese migrants left the ports of Southern China in search
for stability and economic success. Sailing aboard massive ships across international waters,
Chinese laborers transcended beyond the nation-state. Pull factors such as economic
opportunities in New World markets, coincided with various push factors in China during the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The international Chinese diaspora lead thousands of Chinese
migrants on multinational travels throughout Cuba, Mexico, and the United States. Chinese
transnationalism is illustrated by Lee Kwong Lun, a Guangdong native, whose journey is
highlighted in Robert Romero’s book, The Chinese in Mexico: 1882 - 1940. Lee first emigrated
to Cuba, as Cuba’s coolie trade made it a popular destination for Chinese immigrants. After
learning Spanish in Cuba, Lee immigrated to San Francisco, where he started a family. He then
migrated to Sonora, Mexico, serving as a middleman between Chinese merchants of Mexico and
Chinese wholesale suppliers of San Francisco. After 10 years in Mexico he returned to the
United States and settled in Arizona.
—Chinese Migration During the Colonial Era—
Though most historians regard 1882 as the starting point for Chinese migration to
Mexico, their presence in Mexico began almost 200 years earlier. Ever since the 10th century,
the Chinese had been trading with the Philippines, which they regarded as Xiao Lusong or Little
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Luzon.40 When Spain acquired the Philippines, they subsequently entered into an extensive South
East Asian trade network. Accordingly, colonial transcontinental trade resulted in Chinese
migration to Mexico. Chinese merchants stationed in the Philippines traded Chinese luxury items
for Mexican silver dollars with the Spanish. Mexican silver coins or bullion, remained important
to China’s monetary system even after Mexican independence from Spain. Then large Spanish
galleons transported fine Chinese silks and porcelain merchandise from the port of Manila to
Acapulco, Mexico. From Spanish ports in Mexico, Chinese goods were to be distributed through
all of Spanish colonial Latin America.41 The importance of China as a trading partner would be
revealed centuries later, as despite frequent anti-Chinese protests to abrogate the treaty with
China, the Mexican government hesitated. The necessity of Chinese immigrants posed a constant
battle between Mexican capitalist interest and a desired racial composition of the nation.
Although there are some (mostly unsupported) speculations of ancient Chinese contact
with the 1200 B.C Mexican Olmec civilization, it was the colonial appetite that established
contact between China and Mexico. The oldest and largest widespread distribution of Asian
immigrants in Latin America were the Chinese, whose presence was documented in Lima as
early as 1613 and in Mexico in 1635.42 Asian slaves arriving from the Philippines were of
diverse origins. Regardless if a slave was Japanese, Malaysian, Filipino, Timorese, or Chinese,
they were all regarded as Chino, meaning Chinese.43 This community of diverse male Asians in
Mexico were called “los indios chinos” by the Spanish. 44
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With the arrival of Chinese goods in Mexico, small numbers of Chinese immigrants came
to colonial Mexico as Spanish slaves and servants. Chinese entered into a racial order in which a
creole minority was dedicated to maintaining their dominance in a multiethnic majority.45 At the
top stood the peninsulares, native-born Spaniards who were the only recognized immigrant
group.46 In the middle, were those of Spanish-indigenous descent, or the mestizos. Eventually, in
1828 after independence from Spain, the government would expel all peninsulares from Mexico.
When Spanish merchants sailed back to Mexico, they often brought their Chinese
servants or slaves with them, and left them in Mexico.47 However, there were cases of Spanish
merchants who brought their Chino slaves from Mexico to Spain; since owning and showing off
a Chino slave was viewed as a symbol of high class. The objectification and exoticization of
Chinese slaves illustrates “the peculiar mix of xenophilia and xenophobia that has always
characterized Mexican attitudes toward outsiders.”48 Those of the Chinese immigrants who were
left in Mexico, resided in segregated areas of the city; working primarily as tradesmen, barbers,
and shopkeepers.49 Mexico became to be known as Da Lusong or Big Luzon (大鲁松), among
the Chinese.50
By 1635, there were 20,000 Chinese in Spanish Manila (Philippines), since the Spanish
depended on the Chinese for food and services.51 In addition to Spanish Manila, slaves were
obtained from Portuguese slave traders at Portuguese colonial possessions and outposts of the
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Estado da India.52 However, this first wave of Chinese migrants was miniscule in comparison to
Chinese migration to Mexico during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The
majority of Chinese migration to the Americas took place during the decline of slavery and the
development of markets for New World cash crops, minerals, and other raw materials.53
Throughout the seventeenth century the Chinese who were brought to Mexico, worked as barbers
and slaves as well as in silver mines and textile factories. There was also a small number of
Chinese mariners who worked in Acapulco and other Mexican ports. However, there are little
historical records concerning the situation of the Chinese during the colonial period in Mexico.
— The Coolie Trade —
Within South China, the trading of British commodities and Spanish silver for South
Asian opium developed a durable system of illegal drug trafficking in the early nineteenth
century. Years later, these same systems would evolve into trans-Pacific migration networks to
facilitate the labor needs of transitioning empires and national economies.54 During the early
nineteenth century social and political pressures led to the abolition of the slave trade throughout
European nations. Britain’s abolition of the use of slavery in 1833 yielded to pressures from the
Caribbean planter class to retain cheap labor to maintain profits. To restore profitability, while
also appeasing antislavery advocates, British authorities turned to so-called coolie labor.55 The
term coolie came to be understood as an indentured laborer, particularly one who worked on a
plantation. Beginning in the 1820’s, British brokers and merchants developed a slavery-like
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system in primarily China and India. For purposes of this project, the coolie trade will refer to
exclusively the Chinese coolie trade. Spain then exploited the British coolie network, not for
humanitarian reasons, but to increase profits by adding the Chinese to their existing force of
African slaves.56 Soon Cuba’s plantation economy, became heavily reliant on imported Chinese
contract laborers.57 Between 1847 and 1874, 225,000 Chinese arrived in Peru and Cuba through
the coolie trade or la trata amarilla (the yellow trade).58
Neither nation-state’s nor imperial governments maintained complete sovereignty over
the coolie trade, revealing how coolies and their movements operated beyond the purview of the
nation-state. The British and Spanish system worked in tandem with private individuals who held
no national or imperial allegiances.59 The recruitment and transportation of coolies and the
selling of contracts were in the hands of private firms operating within the logic of slave societies
such as French, American, Portuguese, Cuban, Peruvian.60 Emigration was banned by the Qing
government, therefore Chinese migrants and coolies relinquished their national citizenship and
any state protection along with it. As soon as emigrants departed from China’s southern shores
they were stateless and thereby, vulnerable to exploitation.
Early Qing official statutes declared emigration for work illegal or trade punishable by
beheading.61 Chinese emigrants were abandoned by their national government, revealing another
facet of their statelessness. Chinese diplomatic letters that tried to defend the rights of coolies
referred to them as “pigs.”62 Abandoned by their government, coolies would never enjoy the
same rights as citizens in the places they traveled too. Though a product of the colonial era,
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coolies reveal a common predicament of the nation-state system; the tension between the
universal inalienable rights of man and the rights of citizens.
In 1864, Edgar Holden wrote “A Chapter in the Coolie Trade” for Harper’s New Monthly
Magazine, an article memorializing the mutiny that erupted on the ship Norway in 1859. Young
highlights Holden’s article in Alien Nation, as it provided a rare detailed first-hand account along
with drawings of the scenes he witnessed. Circulating during the height of U.S. Civil War,
Holden’s article sought to expose the vulnerability and dangers of the slave labor system.
Frequent coolie rebellions aboard ships and protests by Chinese townspeople in coastal cities,
compelled many journalists to equivocate the coolie trade with the African slave trade. In all
regards, the two were similar: the Chinese were branded, sold at auction blocks, and renamed by
their employers. However, the portrayal of coolies as slaves and victims of powerful labor
brokers strips migrants from their agency in migration.
Although it is not clear if the 1,037 coolies migrating from China to Cuba were taken
against their will, Norway had all the makings of a slave ship.63 Prior to departure aboard the
Norway, a government official asked the passengers if they were unwilling emigrants. Only one
Chinese passenger stepped forward and was released accordingly. No doubt, coercion and
misinformation were commonplace in recruiting coolies, but emigrants’ unwillingness to leave
the ship suggests that they were somewhat willing participants.64 Young articulates the
complexities of unraveling the coolie trade, “In between the poles of free and voluntary emigrant
and slave, there was a vast complex gray zone. That is the space the coolies occupied.” Sailing
from Macau to Havana, an organized coolie rebellion erupted aboard the Norway. As the coolies
lit fires below and tried to pry hatches open, seamen shot them and eventually threw tarpaulins
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over the hatches to trap the smoke and suffocate the coolies. When Norway had arrived in
Havana, 130 coolies had died, 70 of them killed during the mutiny.
Holden’s article makes a case for coolies’ likeness to slavery, but by denying Chinese
agency from their migration, coolies are rendered subordinate. Moreover, Holden’s
condemnation of the coolie trade is juxtaposed with visual racialization’s of Chinese migrants.
Throughout Holden’s article Chinese emigrants are referred to as “barbarians”, which speaks to
his accompanying drawings that construct the Chinese as savage, uncivilized, and threatening.65
Coolies are drawn shirtless and barefoot, which indicate the extent to which Holden saw them as
inferior and barbaric (see fig. 1). Chinese faces were drawn in a coarse style with their queues
(ponytails) floating in midair or grabbed by the crew in attempt to restrain them, “holding the
Chinese by their queues was a way to physically overpower them, but graphically it also
represented cultural domination.”66 Crew members were drawn fully clothed, differentiating
them as civilized in comparison to the coolies. Despite Holden’s racist imagery, his article is one
of the few first-hand narratives that describes the life of coolies on the high seas. More than
4,000 Chinese emigrants were killed during coolie voyages and one out of eleven coolie ships
erupted in mutiny or tragedy.
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Figure 2: Edgar Holden, “A Providential Mischance”, Harper’s New Monthly Magazine, 1864.

Some historians contend that the mutiny aboard the Norway and similar mutinies were
not spontaneous but carefully planned revolts led by Chinese pirates, who signed up as coolies.67
Frequent throughout the unraveling of Chinese migration is the contentious accounts of what
happened and that which is said to have happened. Rare first-hand accounts such as that of
Holden’s article are important, but arguably biased and part of the production of narratives that
render the Chinese as both inferior and threatening.
Insofar that it was a planned revolt, the mutiny aboard the Norway was an International
incident: the ship and captain were U.S. citizens, Macao was a Portuguese territory, Cuba was a
Spanish colony, and the coolies were Chinese subjects.68 Coolies inhabited spaces both beyond
and between nations, where sovereignty was often contested. In 1858, William Reed,
representative for American Legation in China, complained that he was unable to prevent U.S.
citizens from engaging in coolie trafficking. With no legal authority, Reed argued that the 1818
U.S. Slave Trade Act applied to the Chinese because they were “people of color”, but U.S. and
Spanish captains rejected his complaints. The Spanish consul claimed that the trade was just and
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legal, consisting of contracts made between one free man with another free man.69 Although the
United States and Britain were condemning coolie slavery in Spain’s colonies, their businessmen
continued to profit from the coolie trade.70 Despite U.S. protests, almost 400,000 Chinese
continued to arrive in US and Canada during the coolie era.
The Chinese coolie trade was if anything, a lucrative business. Yet the inability of nation
states to assert their sovereignty and regulate the coolie trade made it increasingly dangerous and
therefore less lucrative. Fear began to form among merchants and ship captains. Even Francis
Bowen, a notorious U.S. slave captain returned to the comparatively safe illegal African slave
trade, after a rebellion erupted on his coolie ship. Despite the fear of captains and merchants, the
risks of traveling to the Americas was much higher for Chinese migrants. Young argues that the
risk of Chinese coolies setting out for Latin America rivals the Middle Passage of African slaves.
Coolies not only risked death from rebellions and mutinies, but from disease, unsanitary water,
and lack of food as well. Mortality rates for Chinese on the passage to the America’s was about
12%, almost equal to that of African mortality on the Middle Passage. If 12% seems low,
compare it to the 1-1.5% mortality rate of European emigrants traveling to New York or South
Africa.71
Despite the promotion of coolies to fill labor demands in their colonial territories, Spain
began implementing discriminatory policies directed at Chinese immigrants. Spain and China
entered into a treaty that banned the immigration of Chinese contract laborers into all Spanish
territories in 1877. However, by the time Spain and China had entered into agreement, the Qing
government was making attempts to dismantle the coolie system and the harsh abuses that went
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along indentured labor.72 Earlier in 1864, Spanish barbers in Mexico protested to the Governor
that they could not compete and asked that the Chinese be expelled. Though the Chinese were
not expelled, severe limitations were put on their numbers.73 While Spanish colonial Mexico
began to generate exclusively anti-Chinese policies, the U.S. would also soon implement policies
aimed at removing the Chinese.
—The Chinese Diaspora and La Trata Amarilla—
The collision of the British Empire and the Qing Dynasty generated new arrangements of
power that remade South China into a locus of transoceanic migration.74 However, Chinese have
moved seasonally or permanently to other parts of Asia and the rest of the world long before
European colonists arrived on Chinese shores.75 Between the nineteenth and twentieth century
the Chinese diaspora generated 8,190,815 emigrates, that were scattered internationally.
Diaspora, as defined by Romero “is the scattering and migration of minority groups who have a
common ancestral homeland, reside in foreign areas, share a common culture, hold similar
beliefs and aspirations, and maintain some sort of linkage with a homeland.” Most Chinese
emigrants were from Fujian and Guangdong, who traveled through ports such as Hong Kong and
the Portuguese seaport of Macau; for the United States, Mexico, Cuba, Peru, Australia, Thailand,
the Philippines, and South Africa.76 Despite being referred to as a Chinese diaspora, Young
argues “it is more accurate to call it a Pearl River Delta Cantonese migration rather than a
Chinese one.” Almost all Chinese who migrated to the Americas were from the Pearl River delta
region of the Guangdong Province and spoke Cantonese.
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Overpopulation, the commercialization of agriculture, nascent industrialization, western
imperialism, peasant rebellions, and natural disasters collectively constituted a “migrant-prone
situation in Guangdong.”77 Between the years of 1741 to 1851, relative peace and increased food
supply augmented the population in China from 143 million to 432 million. Population explosion
resulted in land pressures in the southern and southeastern regions. However, demographic
growth failed to persuade the Qing government to initiate land reform or new agrarian policies.
Moreover, the shift from subsistence farming to the production of cash crops forced many to sell
their land.78 Land shortages, reduced standards of living, and increased commercial agriculture
lead to peasant socioeconomic displacement and the subsequent diaspora.79
Domestic demographic and economic pressures were compounded with the consequences
of the British victory in the Opium Wars of 1839 to 1842. The Treaty of Nanjing, which ended
the Opium Wars, forced China to unlock commercial seaports such as Guangdong, Shanghai,
Fuzhou, Xiamen, Ningbo, and Hong Kong.80 Therefore Chinese cloth producers, merchants, and
boatmen were put out of business after cheap British textiles flooded Chinese markets. The
Treaty of Nanjing transformed the Chinese empire into a semi-colonial state and ended Chinese
hegemony in the intra-Asian trade. 81 However, British semi-colonialism presented the huashang
class, merchants who had dominated the intra-Asian trade, with new opportunities to become
European trade partners. The huashang class would become vital in meeting New World labor
demands by recruiting Chinese laborers.82 In addition to opening the Chinese economy,
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European imperialism opened the floodgates of China’s massive labor supply. Chinese
immigration had been previously banned in 1718, but European diplomatic pressures forced the
legalization of Chinese immigration in 1860.83 Romero characterizes the significance of these
changes in facilitating the Chinese diasporic movement,
In response to western colonial pressures, the Chinese government reversed its
centuries-old prohibition against emigration and legally sanctioned the recruitment
of immigrant laborers for overseas western territories and possessions. One of the
most important effects of European colonialism upon trends of Chinese emigration,
therefore, was not only to encourage emigration through the creation of socio
economic dislocation in South China but also to promote wide-scale diasporic
movement through the legalization of emigration and the opening of transpacific
networks of migration and labor recruitment.
Western Imperialism and socio-economic pressures initiated a series of rebellions in the
Guangdong province. The Christian inspired Taiping Rebellion erupted in Guangdong, which
transformed into a bloody civil war that lasted from 1851 to 1864. Taiping, which attempted to
create an egalitarian “Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace”, inspired another peasant rebellion:
The Red Turban Rebellion of 1854. Upwards to a million sympathizers and participants were
killed in suppression by the imperial authorities.84
Shortly after the rebellions, ethnic conflict broke out in Guangdong between Punti
“locals” and members of the Hakka “minority” group.85 Hakka-Punti land disputes claimed the
lives of thousands, and contributed to Cantonese socio-economic instability and dislocation.86
Moreover, the region experienced frequent floods and droughts, and received no disaster relief
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from the Qing government. Additionally, constant military conflict prevented peasants from
maintaining their lands.87 Threats of starvation and famine, in conjunction with overpopulation,
imperialism, and political unrest pushed many Chinese away from their homelands.
Chinese emigrants such as Lee Kwong Lun, were lured by prospects of peace and
economic opportunity to the America’s.88 Moreover, the abolition of slavery led to labor
shortages in British, Spanish, Portuguese, and Dutch colonial possessions, generating overseas
economic opportunities for the Chinese. Chinese immigrants were recruited for positions such as
mining, farming, skilled workers, merchants, and shopkeepers.89 Moreover, white planters and
officials saw Asians as less threatening and more economical than Africans.90 Additionally, they
hoped Asians would adopt their European values, “thereby ensuring the continuation of the
colonial enterprise by forming a class “in-between” whites at the top and Africans and
Indigenous peoples at the bottom of society.” 91 Acting as the middleman minority allowed for
the Chinese to work in various positions but within a colonial racial caste structure. The concept
of the “middleman minority” has been employed to understand minority groups whose historical
experience, although marked by discrimination, is not characterized by continuous and extreme
subordination.92
Although the literature is not consistent in defining the fundamental characteristics of the
middleman-minority, it is usually defined as certain ethnic groups who occupy a special niche in
a society, between those of dominant and subordinate groups.93 The middleman minority

87

Romero, Robert Chao, The Chinese in Mexico, 13-29.
Ibid.
89
Ibid.
90
Hu-deHart, Evelyn, and Kathleen López, Asian Diasporas in Latin America and the Caribbean,
91
Ibid.
92
O'Brien, David J., and Stephen S. Fugita. “Middleman Minority Concept: Its Explanatory Value in the Case of the
Japanese in California Agriculture.” The Pacific Sociological Review, vol. 25, no. 2, 1982, pp. 185–204.
93
O'Brien, David J., and Stephen S. Fugita, Middleman Minority, 185–204.
88

36
position is a product of structural impediments that permit certain groups from pursuing
mainstream occupations, while special capacities of that particular ethnic group grant them with
a competitive advantage in small-scale entrepreneurial pursuits.94 Sociologist David O’Brien
offers four broad categories of the middleman minority: middle position in the stratification
system, sojourner orientation, distinctive cultural and social characteristics, or distinctive
economic traits with concentration in entrepreneurial roles. O’Brien contends the third category
is typically used to describe minorities, such as the Jews, the Chinese, and the Japanese. The
Chinese have been attributed with the middleman minority because they hold “cultural norms
regarding obligations toward kin and other ethnic-group members, as well as strong, ongoing
familial and communal social-organizational mechanisms for carrying out cooperative
activities.”95 Moreover, the middlemen functions as a buffer between elites and masses by
deflecting the peasants' hostility to the middleman minority. During periods of economic crisis,
the middleman serves as a convenient scapegoat that ensures the survival of existing economic,
political, and social institutions.
By 1882 half a million Chinese had come to the America’s, with another 400,000 arriving
in North America even after the exclusion period (1882-1940).96 Latin American records show
340,000 Chinese entries from the 1840’s through the 1940’s. Most migrated to Anglo North
America, as wages and opportunities were greater than in Latin America in the post-coolie
period.97 Once in the Americas, many Chinese went from Mexico and Cuba to the U.S., but
traffic also flowed in the opposite direction.
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—Chinese in California and Anti-Chinese Sentiments—
Like many others, Chinese immigrants were lured to California with the “get rich quick”
promises of the Gold Rush. Prior to the gold rush, the Chinese population in the west was
minimal and for the most part tolerated by Anglo-Americans who had also migrated westward.
However, the California gold rush, not only led to a steep increase in the white American
population but also in the Chinese population. Chinese gold seekers were joined by a small group
of Cantonese merchants who served as passage brokers, labor contractors, and supply merchants
for Anglo and Chinese miners.98 These merchants gained massive wealth by laying the
foundations for a transnational commercial orbit, that Mexican businesses would later use.99
These businessmen further illustrate the position of the Chinese as the middleman-minority.
They occupied a middle-rank position in the stratification system and functioned as middlemen
in the movement of goods and services.100 They developed the “credit ticket system”, which was
essential for Chinese migration to both California and Mexico. Chinese passage brokers
advanced funds to cover immigration expenses for emigrant laborers, who in turn sold their
services to designated contractors in order to pay back loans with monthly interest rates.101
Credit should be granted to the Central Pacific Railroad for the further arrival of Chinese
immigrants between 1847 and 1870. Chinese laborers held a reputation for being cheap and
reliable which made them originally welcomed by officials and capitalists. Their willingness to
work for low wages, enabled Chinese immigrants to work in a wide range of jobs and by the
1870’s they comprised one-fourth of all labor in California.102 During the years of 1868 and
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1867, Chinese migrants found opportunities in manufacturing, railroads, and California’s
agricultural sector. Chinese workers became to be known for their willingness to take
occupations Anglo-Americans refused to take. However, their dependability ensured their use as
replacement workers, furthering hostility and racial prejudice.103 Moreover, once the railroads
were completed, white-Americans feared the Chinese would compete with them for jobs.
Anti-Chinese legislation appeared soon after employment opportunities for natives and
Europeans evaporated. The rise of anti-Chinese sentiment can be attributed to the previously
described middleman scapegoating tactics, in which Californian officials employed during a
period of economic crisis to ensure the survival of existing economic and political institutions.
Anglo fear of replacement was expressed through bigoted newspaper articles, protests by white
labor unions, and political smear campaigns by the Democratic party. The Democratic party
successfully harnessed white working class anti-Chinese sentiment and thereby won
governorship and a majority in the California state assembly.104 Moreover, the success of antiChinese rhetoric led to the approval of explicitly racist laws. “The Yellow Terror in All His
Glory” (see Fig. 5) reveals how political cartoons constructed the Chinese as a threat to AngloAmerican identity and security. Developed in the early nineteenth century —Yellow Peril,
Yellow Terror, and Yellow Specter— are all racist color-metaphors that combine Western
anxieties of sex, racism, and the alien other. Moreover, the Yellow Peril constructed psychocultural perceptions of vague hordes of yellow people opposite the Western world.105
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Figure 3: “Yellow Peril” in California, Newspaper cartoons, The Wasp, 1877-1882.

Countless newspaper cartoons depict not only Anglo-American fears of replacement but
an existential anxiety of an other. Economic nationalism and Yellow Peril xenophobia were
legalized with the Page Act of 1875, the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, and the Geary Act of
1892. However, the California Legislature’s introductory aggression towards Chinese
immigrants began in 1852 with the passage of a foreign miners’ tax that imposed a three-dollar
monthly tax on foreign miners in the state.106 The Act to Discourage the Immigration to this State
of Persons who cannot Become Citizens Thereof, was passed by the California legislature in
1855, requiring all Chinese over the age of 18 to pay a $2.50 tax per person if they did not pay
the foreign miners’ tax.107 A series of discriminatory taxes directed at Chinese miners and
fishermen were later launched in the 1860s. Later, the 1870 Naturalization Law, denied the
ability of Chinese immigrants residing in the United States to become naturalized citizens. This
law was an amendment to the Nationality Act of 1790, which was first statute in the United
States to codify naturalization law. Early on, the United States defined citizenship through the
Naturalization Law of 1790. The Naturalization Law of 1790 limited the access to citizenship to
106
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white persons, but placed no restrictions on immigration. Congress went further by amending
naturalization requirements in 1870 and extending naturalization eligibility to “aliens being free
white persons, and to aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent.” Other nonwhites were not included and continued to be excluded from naturalization. A few years later,
the United States passed the first federal immigration law, the Page Act of 1875. The Page Act
prohibited the entry of immigrants considered as “undesirable” which was essentially any
individual coming from Asia to be a contract laborer.
The most famous piece of anti-Chinese legislation was the U.S. 1882 Chinese Exclusion
Act, “Whereas in the opinion of the Government of the United States the coming of Chinese
laborers to this country endangers the good order of certain localities within the territory
thereof.” The 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act provided deportation procedures for illegal Chinese,
but did not explain whether “Chinese” indicated race or nationality. Throughout the latenineteenth and early-twentieth centuries the definition of whiteness would be tested in a series of
court cases, in which the Japanese, Chinese, and East Indians would be repeatedly ruled to be not
white and therefore “aliens ineligible for citizenship.”
Chinese exclusion laws, distinguish the Chinese as being the only group ever to be
excluded from immigration into the United States explicitly by race.108 Barred from entry and
the ability to acquire naturalized citizenship, the Chinese were America’s first illegal aliens and
its first alien citizens. Mae M. Ngai, in her book Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the
Making of Modern America, argues how 1898 Supreme Court rulings legitimized Chinese
exclusion through the alleged inability of assimilation of the Chinese. Ngai further explains how
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Chinese Americans remained marginalized from mainstream society as Anglo-Americans
perceived them as permanent foreigners.
Despite issuing small groups of teachers, merchants, and students “Section Six”
identification certificates, all skilled and unskilled Chinese laborers were barred from
immigrating to the U.S. for ten years. However, Chinese exclusion laws (1882-1943) did not
completely pause all Chinese immigration into the United States. Throughout the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries the Chinese challenged and circumvented exclusion laws. One of the most
common methods of circumvention was by crossing through Mexican and Canadian borders, or
what Emily Ryo defines as the “backdoor” method. U.S. Chinese exclusion laws made Chinese
immigrants America’s first illegal immigrants, long before Mexican immigrants came to fill this
role in American discourse.109
Some Chinese laborers crossed Mexican and Canadian borders, while others used
fraudulent certificates posed as persons who were legally admissible. Exclusion laws provoked
widespread practices of illegal Chinese immigration, most commonly through the “paper sons”
method. Paper sons were those Chinese who entered the United States by posing as the sons of
naturalized Chinese Americans.110 The destruction of the San Francisco Hall of Records in the
1906 fire, allowed many Chinese to assert native-birth citizenship because no records exist to
contradict them.111 71,040 Chinese entered the United States as derivative citizens between 1920
and 1940. Further estimates indicate that at least twenty-five percent of the Chinese population in
1950 were present in the United States unlawfully. Congress later would go on to strengthen
exclusion laws with the passage of the Scott Act of 1888 and the Geary Act of 1892. In response
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to Chinese immigrant smuggling trade, the Scott Act barred the re-entry of any immigrant
laborers, while the Geary Act required official registration of all Chinese laborers. Additionally,
Congress indefinitely extended the Exclusion act, thereby permanently barring Chinese
immigration in 1904.
—Conclusion—
This broad introductory chapter serves to contextualize the following chapters that work
to unravel the complicated story of the Chinese in Mexico. Economic opportunities and labor
shortages in New World markets, coincided with various socio-economic and political issues in
China during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The subsequent Chinese diaspora lead
thousands of Chinese migrants on multinational travels throughout Cuba, Mexico, and the United
States. Throughout the colonial and coolie period, Chinese migrants traveled to the Americas to
work on plantations, infrastructure projects, and various other economic ventures. Whether as
slaves, coolies, or contract laborers, Chinese migrants inhabited spaces both beyond and between
nations, rendering them stateless and at times vulnerable. However, Chinese entrepreneurs
brought their trade networks to the Western Hemisphere, allowing them to move into other
sectors of the economy. Occupying special niches in the economy and society, Chinese migrants
came to fill the position of the middleman minority. Although conducive to economic
integration, the middleman position solidified the Chinese within a racial hierarchy. Substantial
waves of Chinese migrants to Mexico were a product of not only U.S. restrictions but the
unraveling of the coolie trade.
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Chapter II
Motores de Sangre Only:
Chinese Migration and Recruitment to Mexico Under Porfirio Diaz (1876 - 1910)

— Introduction —
Chinese immigration illustrates how migrants render a universal predicament across
different times, places, and forms of government.1 When the coolie trade was abolished
throughout the America’s, governments and capitalists were forced to reconcile the need for
Chinese labor with racial anxieties and working-class hostilities.2 Both Mexico and the United
States were positioned for economic development, but industrialization depended upon the
availability of labor. Moreover, both nations were clear in their preferred racial makeup of their
populations, with Mexico preferring European descent, and the United States enforcing its
Chinese exclusion laws.3 Although both nations shared similar views on Chinese migrants, their
policies and practices regarding the Chinese were starkly different. In the United States, the postemancipation American working-class was vocal in protecting its livelihood from the threat of
the Chinese, and politicians were inclined to meet their demands.4 On the other hand, Mexican
politicians would have to compromise racial desires with the need for labor.
The stark contrast of the United States’ and Mexico’s immigration policies, obscures
from their parallel foundations and rationales. Immigration law is not solely concerned with the
exclusion of foreigners, but with the simultaneity of excluding some foreigners while
incorporating others.5 As the United States enacted legislation to restrict the entry of Chinese,
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labor demands encouraged liberal immigration laws in Mexico. The controversy over indentured
servitude and coolieism did not instruct Mexican’s views, rather their objections were derived
from miscegenation. The editors of Gaceta International, a Mexico City newspaper, warned
“[The Chinese] have perverse tendencies... Any race mixture like those in Cuba and Peru will
produce a generation whose quality we will have to leave to the judgement of ethnographers.”6
Other newspapers such a La Libertad and El Monitor Republicano, claimed that because the
Chinese would come to Mexico as single men, miscegenation, therefore race contamination
would occur.7 Therefore, the Mexican government was particularly interested in recruiting
European immigrants to jumpstart industrialization. Leading cientifico and Social Darwinist,
Justo Sierra to argue, “For only European blood can keep the level of civilization... from
sinking.”8
As Mexico City newspapers debated during the 1870s on whether or not to recruit
Chinese laborers, Matias Romero, the senator of Chiapas, optimistically argued for the pragmatic
and economic benefits of Chinese immigration. Romero held the opinion that the indigenous
population were unfit for modernization and therefore pushed for immigration of the industrious,
submissive and cheap Chinese labor. Appealing to the belief that wherever the Chinese filled
plantations and railroad camps, progress occurred, “it seems to me, that the only colonists who
could establish themselves of work on our coasts, are Asians, primarily from climates similar to
ours, primarily China.”9 Furthermore their politically powerless country posed little threat of
direct intervention on their behalf. He conveyed his plans in two essays that were circulated in
Mexico City based newspapers, arguing that the “Chinese labor would be ideal for railroad
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construction, as well as for ventures in tropical agricultural exports.”10 After President Diaz
appointed Romero as the Mexican finance minister in 1882, he was finally given the opportunity
to promote Chinese immigration. However, Romero did not account for the overlapping empirestates and nation-states that would structure and delay the arrival of Chinese into Mexico.11
Mexico and China would not form a formal treaty until 1899, twenty-four years after Romero
first advocated for Chinese immigrants.
The historiography of immigration in the cases of Mexico and the United States is
burdened with historical nationalism in different ways, a more integrated examination of both
Mexican and United States immigration laws reveals methodological nationalism in the history
of each country.12 Jason Oliver Chang has performed the large part of the initial research
concerning the independent formation of antichinismo in Mexico. Change is one of the first
scholars to attempt to understand the production and articulation of the racialized Chinese
migrant in Mexico. Chino: Anti-Chinese Racism in Mexico, 1880-1940, examines the ideological
construction of the Chinese racial figure in Mexican culture and politics. His book is the first to
consider the connections between Mexican antichinismo and the romantic nationalist ideology of
indigenismo. His approach is centered on the process by which racialization is connected to the
self-preservation strategies of the state. Chang argues that changes in the Chinese racial form or
the path to antichinismo is indicative of the degree to which revolutionary governance depended
upon the social and political effects of a racial state. Chang theorizes that, “anti-Chinese and promestizo political discourses argued for the necessity of the state by providing reasons for consent
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and subjection to ruling institutions.” This chapter deconstructs the ways in which the Mexican
government introduced the Chinese as racialized instruments of policy in order to deepen the
power of the state.13

— Economic Development Under Diaz —
While the U.S. was closing its borders to the Chinese, Mexican officials were enacting
national colonization programs in which Chinese migrants were pragmatically welcomed.
However, as literature on Chinese migration to Mexico has only recently been written, there is
less clarity to why anti-Chinese sentiments arose in Mexico or the means by which Mexican state
dealt with Chinese migrants. No doubt, Chinese immigrants experienced similar racialization’s
in Mexico and in the United States, but anti-Chinese prejudice in Mexico was not simply
spillover from the United States. Comparing state architectures and ideologies of rule
contextualizes to what extent U.S. racial discourses influenced the how the Mexican government
dealt with its Chinese immigrants. Recognizing the fundamental differences between U.S. and
Mexican racial formations, destabilizes the argument that anti-Chinese prejudice was borrowed
from the United States. One of the major differences in their racial formation was the
relationship to indigenous people. The United States was a dominant white settler majority.
While, Mexico was composed of an Indian majority with a white criollo ruling class.
Furthermore, Mexican national ideology has always been a state project fixed to colonial origins,
“wherein sovereign authority rested on making the nation relevant to the majority Indian
population.”14 In other words, the security and legitimacy of the Mexican state has been
contingent on the consent or subjugation of the majority peasant and indigenous inhabitants.
13
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Mexico’s “liberal” immigration laws contrasted with U.S. restrictions, is a poor measure of how
immigrants were received in Mexico, since all states seek immigration policies that reinforce
foundational racial inequalities.15 The absence of immigration laws was an attempt to promote
the immigration and settlement of White Europeans, in order to undermine indigenous resistance
to national colonization.
General Porfirio Díaz rose to power after leading a successful coup in 1876 against the
French ruler Emperor Maximilian. Díaz and his allies, a group of technocrats known as
científicos, would govern Mexico for three and half decades. The Porfirian regime brought
stability to Mexico after decades of conflict, in addition much needed modernization through
increased foreign investment. Foreign capital flowed freely into Mexico, which built an
impressive railroad network and modernized Mexico’s urban infrastructure.16 Porfirian liberal
modernization redefined the country’s approach to immigration, which Buchenau contends, was
a desire for foreign investment rather than more immigrants.17
Despite being an authoritarian ruler, Diaz attempted to maintain a facade of liberal
democracy by maintaining the semblance of elections.18 The Porfirian government combined a
legacy of colonial legislation with the political rights formed from the liberal revolution.
Electoral processes such as the direct vote in municipalities generated new forms of leadership,
but this leadership was interwoven within traditional structures of power composed by extended
families and shared loyalties.19 Moreover, states retained the power to interpret the meaning of
citizenship, allowing for different forms of suffrage in different regions. Eventually increased
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limits were placed on political participation and representation, while the political class began
distancing itself from the population. The lack of an accountable political class allowed caciques
(local political bosses) to re-invoke traditional rights to manage the political, social, and material
resources of local communities.20 The consolidated Mexican nation was able to integrate
commercially into the world, but the subsequent uneven distribution of wealth would lead to the
Mexican Revolution a few decades later.
Increased authoritarianism was justified as a means to accomplish industrialization, while
the needs of colonization directed national policy.21 New railroad systems allowed for the growth
of new urban centers by connecting these sites to national and international markets. Moreover,
new dynamic sectors such as mining and construction brought prosperity to new regions of
Mexico. Prosperity and job opportunities in new sites of industry compelled migration from the
South to the Northern and Central states.22 Some of these flourishing cities were Torreon,
Coahuila (1895), Ensenada, Baja California and Cananea, Sonora (1900). Additionally, informal
settlements sprung up around farms, cattle ranches, industrial and mining centers, construction
sites, and railway stations. These settlements had no municipal administrations and lacked public
services such as schools, self-government, and services.23 Additionally, the fragility of Mexico’s
markets, judicial system, and trading systems impeded much needed economic and social
development. Mexico not only lacked specialized professionals, but Mexican capitalists were
discouraged from domestic investment, further preventing the formation of an entrepreneurial
class.24
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Unequal distribution of wealth and increased authoritarianism was attached to Porfirian
land reform and immigration policies. Land reform operated in two detrimental ways: first,
hostile groups were stripped of their titles and given to white settlers, second, compliant groups
were rewarded by honoring previously held titles. This produced a geography of discontent that
dictated the path of Mexican colonization and the Mexico’s reception of immigrants.25 Mexico’s
immigration policy was influenced by the idea that Mexico was potentially wealthy but the
native population was unfit for modernization, subscribing to the myth of the lazy native.26
Moreover, during Mexico’s phase of liberal state building and capitalist economic development,
Europe was experiencing the height of Social Darwinism. These ideologies influenced Mexican
policymakers that the “Indian” was anti-national and the white European was superior.27 Diaz
believed Europeans would fill labor shortages in the northern sierras and facilitate modernization
through cutting-edge production methods.28
The Porfirian model of development found its roots in colonial precedents, as many
Indian peasant communities were dispossessed of their land. Diaz, in line with the contemporary
elites of Argentina and Brazil, viewed the ideal immigrant as European and preferably Catholic.
Immigration was understood as a way of whitening a heavily miscegenated population as well as
developing the Mexican frontier. In this way, immigration policies were employed not to restrict,
but to attract white settlers. However, Buchenau argues that “the Porfirian idea of whitening
involved cultural rather than a strictly biological construction of race and ethnicity, contributing
to an emphasis on foreign investments over immigration.”29 Buchenau contends that Diaz was
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instead influenced by French positivism, that emphasized cultural and economic development
through infusion of European money, education, and customs into the countryside.30 Although
Diaz may have been influenced by French positivism in terms of European influence, his
recruitment of Chinese as disposable laborers reveals the prominence of Social Darwinist
thought as well.
Domestic legislation speaks to the racial dynamics of Mexico more than the absence of
restrictionist immigration laws. For example, in attempt to modernize by building railroads and
developing the Northern territory, Diaz passed legislation that allowed foreigners the right to
own land and subsoil resources.31 The 1883 Law of Fallow Land, permitted private investors to
appropriate property declared public, land that was mostly held by indigenous communities. To
further attract foreigners to immigrate and invest in Mexico, the government passed la ley de
Extranjería y Naturalización. This law established ius sanguinis, a guiding principle of Mexican
citizenship for the children of foreign nationals. The 1883 colonization law dictated the rights of
colonos blancos. The law recognized colonos as Mexican citizens and granted them freedom
from military service and taxation. An additional colonization law in 1896 allowed Mexicanborn children of foreigners to retain their father’s citizenship.32 These laws were intended for
“white” immigrants, those of European descent who would westernize and homogenize Mexico.
The fear of undesirable social integration contradicted the desperate need for labor,
compelling the Mexican National Congress to reform naturalization laws.33 In 1886, the national
congress passed the Immigration and Naturalization Law of 1886 (Ley de Extranjería y
Naturalización de 1886), that intended to solve concerns over racial mixing, while fulfilling
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industrial desires. Enforced until 1934, the law regulated foreigners and developed certain
consequences. For example, Article 3 deprived Mexican women of citizenship if they married
foreigners. Mexican women would remain denaturalized even after becoming widows and the
children of such marriages would also be registered as foreigners. However, the law removed
certain obstacles to immigration, as foreigners who owned property were considered Mexican
citizens unless they expressed their intent to keep their foreign nationality.
However, new legislation and land grant initiatives failed to entice European laborers.
With the abundance of opportunities in the United States, there were very few Europeans willing
to migrate to barren deserts of Mexico. Moreover, Americans and Europeans who did migrate,
tended to move to urban centers with higher wages or were capitalists with railroad and mining
companies, who brought coolie labor instead of European laborers. Failed attempts to entice
European settlers directed Diaz and his científicos to turn to a class of disposable workers as a
pragmatic way to fulfill their capitalist desires. Mexico’s political elite sought to revive trade
with the Chinese as a way to stimulate the country's stagnant economy, expand the labor force,
and increase territorial sovereignty over areas distant from the capital.34 Even before the United
States banned the entry of Chinese laborers, Mexican capitalists were recruiting Chinese laborers
for mining, farming, and various infrastructure projects.
Throughout the 1870s, Mexican industrial newspapers like Minero Mexicano began to
use the term “motores de sangre” to explain the labor needs of Mexican colonization; which
distinguished coolie labor from colonos. Imported labor occupied a transitional site between
slavery and free labor, which allowed capitalists to pacify needs for cheap disposable labor.
Before the 1880’s, public works projects were built by unpaid and unreliable labor such as
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military conscription, convicts, and drafted labor.35 The term motores de sangre signified that the
Chinese were disposable yet necessary for modernization and subsequently helped shape a
racialized image of the Chinese as a non-settler population.
Although policies directed towards Chinese immigrants developed independently and
differently in Mexico and the United States, they both initially welcomed the Chinese as a
disposable labor force. Mexico and the United States simultaneously viewed Chinese immigrants
as laborers; never to be permanent political subjects, nation builders, or citizens.36 However, the
emphasis placed on the similarity of the initial welcoming of Chinese, distracts from the reality
behind why the Mexican government promoted Chinese immigration. Diaz’s national
colonization policy introduced the Chinese as capitalist tools into regions with social conflict.
Less populated areas such as Sonora and Yucatan had the greatest amounts of Chinese by 1900;
states with the most hostile indigenous-state relations.
Eventually, Romero’s push for Chinese immigration would materialize in the creation of
a direct steamer line from China. In 1884, The Mexican Development Ministry signed a contract
with the Mexican Pacific Navigation Company to conduct regular voyages between Mexico and
the Asia.37 The company would receive a subsidy of sixty-five pesos for each European
immigrant and only thirty-five for each Asian immigrant. The contract listed Europeans as
immigrants and Asians as laborers, clearly illustrating how Europeans were valued over Asian
immigrants. This contract highlights how Europeans were sought to settle and become part of
Mexican society, while Asians were simply motores de sangre. The promotion of non-settling
Chinese immigrants reveals how Chinese immigrants were positioned racially and seen
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economic and political tools of the Mexican state. However, the recruitment of Chinese laborers
as motores de sangre did not go according to plan. Transnational networks enabled Chinese
immigrants to acquire predominant roles in the dry goods trade and lending in northwestern
Mexico.
—Diplomatic Relations Between China and Mexico—
As discussed in Chapter 1, almost all emigrants from China in the mid-nineteenth century
were stateless because the Qing government did not officially recognize the right to emigrate and
was itself under siege by foreign and domestic enemies.38 Despite prohibitions on emigration, the
Qing rulers began convening treaties with various countries. In an attempt to tie overseas
Chinese to the homeland, the official ban on emigration from China ended in 1893. Later, in
1909 the Chinese government recognized all children born to Chinese fathers as Chinese
nationals. However, there was no robust diplomatic system abroad and official representation of
Chinese emigrants remained weak into the twentieth century. Chinese migrants abroad continued
to be vulnerable even after the official end of the coolie period, “as quasi-stateless people,
Chinese migrants did not enjoy the right to have rights.”39
The vast majority of Chinese immigrants arrived after the 1899 Treaty of Amity and
Commerce that established diplomatic relations between Mexican and Chinese governments.
Before the signing of the treaty, only 1,023 Chinese were registered living in Mexico. Many
Chinese entered Mexico ahead of a formal treaty, reflecting the agency of Chinese brokers and
migrants to seek economic opportunities. The treaty opened an additional pathway for
independent migrants and merchants, illustrating that the Mexican state could achieve the desire

38
39

Young, Elliott. Alien Nation, 97-128
Ibid.

54
racial management of the country through the absence of legal instruments rather than through
explicit laws.40
Romero’s requests for diplomatic relations with China did not materialize until after a
diplomatic controversy in 1884. In 1884, a Mexican company ship transporting Chinese
passengers was blocked by British officials in Hong Kong. The Mexican Pacific Navigation
Company petitioned the Mexican Foreign Ministry to intercede, yet all attempts by the Mexican
Foreign Ministry failed.41 Other companies, such as the Win Woo Company, interested in
exporting laborers to Mexico, also petitioned the Mexican Foreign Ministry to establish
diplomatic relations with China. In 1885, the Chinese government allowed one shipment of
Chinese laborers from Hong Kong, but by then the Mexican Pacific Navigation Company had
already disintegrated. In 1890, the Compania Maritima Asiatica Mexicana (Mexican Asian
Maritime Company) managed to transport 500 Chinese from Macau to Mexico. In order to
recruit a sufficient number of Chinese laborers, Mexico was pressured to establish diplomatic
relations with China and a direct steamer line, due to increased U.S. restrictions on the ability of
Chinese to transfer through U.S. ports.
In 1885, Romero began to pressure the Chinese government to establish diplomatic
relations. From his post at the Mexican Embassy in Washington, Romero approached Zheng
Zaoru, the Chinese ambassador to United States, to establish a bilateral treaty. However, China’s
Ministry of Foreign Affairs instructed Zheng to decline establishing a treaty with Mexico. The
trauma of The Opium Wars and Western imperialism had pushed the Qing government to pursue
isolationists policies. Moreover, the Chinese government was taking part in a campaign to
protect Chinese laborers abroad, specifically against the kidnapping and abuse of Chinese
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laborers by Western countries. Romero continued to request Zheng for a treaty, promising not
repeat the mistakes of the United States and Spain.
However, the prohibition of further Chinese immigration into the United States,
generated thousands of Chinese migrants to Mexico, hence the need for diplomatic protection for
Chinese migrants. As the situation became more pressing, the Chinese government was forced to
reconsider previous attitudes. A memorandum to the Chinese crown from Zongli Yamen states:
In recent years, because the United States have been prohibiting the immigration of
Chinese, other ways must be opened up for the emigration. There are less
population and more mines and lands (in Mexico). That country wants to employ
Chinese laborers to work there and to have trade with us, as well as to let Chinese
acquire lands there, which is different from the cases in Cuba and Peru.42
Zongli Yamen and Chinese officials examined conditions in Mexico and began
negotiations in 1894. Domestic issues in each country temporarily paused negations until 1896,
but negotiations were resumed by Chinese Minister Wu Ting Fang, Yang Yue’s successor, and
Romero.43 However, the following year when the treaty was to be signed, Romero died suddenly.
Manuel de Azpiroz, Romero’s successor and Wu Tingfang finally completed the text of
the treaty in 1899. Chinese voluntary immigration was authorized with the bilateral 1899 Treaty
of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, signed in Washington, which gave Chinese immigrants in
Mexico the same legal rights as Mexican nationals. The treaty stated that nationals of each
country were free to live, travel and reside in Mexico and China. Moreover, both countries
appointed diplomatic officials with full immunities and privileges and merchant vessels were
granted freedom to frequent Mexican and Chinese ports. This treaty ensured diplomatic
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protection for Chinese immigrants and also established official most-favored-nation status
between the two nations:
perpetual, firm and sincere friendship between the United Mexican States and the
Chinese Empire, as also between their respective citizens and subjects. They shall be at
liberty to freely go to the respective countries of the High Contracting Parties and reside
therein. They shall there have complete protection in their persons, families and property
and they shall enjoy all the rights and advantages with are granted to the subjects of the
most favored nation.
The treaty established a code of conduct, as well as establishing embassies in Mexico and China.
Article XVII states, “Chinese subjects in Mexico shall have free access to the judicial tribunals
of the country for the defense of the legitimate rights. They shall enjoy, in this respect, the same
rights and concessions enjoyed by Mexicans or by subjects of the most favored nation.”
Therefore, Chinese immigrants in Mexico were able to use Mexican courts to handle disputes
and guarantee their own protection. Article XVII would be actively employed by Chinese in
Mexican courts to fight various discriminatory practices. Unlike previous Chinese diplomatic
letters that dehumanized Chinese immigrant laborers, Articles V, XIV, XVII express the Chinese
government’s concern for the treatment of its national abroad. Despite the treaty’s protectionist
language, the Chinese government did not appoint a diplomatic representative in Mexico until
1900, or establish an embassy until 1905.

—Recruitment of Chinese Laborers—
The recruitment of both free and contract laborers into the America’s was organized by a
system of networks that employed coercive tactics. These networks often conflated free labor
and slave labor, consequently forming the perception of Chinese labor in Mexico as that of
coolies, not free laborers.44 Following the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882,
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Chinese immigrants began to circumvent exclusion by traveling through Northern Mexico. They
were in search of both employment opportunities and the chance to get smuggled back into the
United States. Chinese immigrants developed vast smuggling networks throughout Mexico,
China, Cuba, and various cities throughout the United States. Chinese labor recruitment to
Mexico became part of a larger transnational smuggling business. The leading patron of illicit
Chinese immigrant trafficking was an immigrant organization based out of San Francisco called
the The Chinese Six Companies. 45 First established during the mid-nineteenth century, The
Chinese Six Companies represented and defended the socioeconomic and political interests of
the Chinese immigrant community. The organization was originally developed to provide a
consolidated voice of the Chinese immigrant community, but eventually became involved in
sophisticated import-export ventures.46 The Six Companies, directed by Chin Pinoy in Havana,
Cuba, maintained institutional connections with companies such as the Pacific Railroad
Company, the Morgan Steamship Line, and the Ward Steamship Company. The U.S. Treasury
Department estimates that four-fifths of the Chinese immigrants who entered the U.S. illegally
throughout the 1890s, were transported by the companies working with Chin.
Thousands of Chinese illegally entered the United States between 1876 and 1911 as a
result of various schemes and techniques developed by the Six Companies. A common method
to circumvent exclusion laws, was the transportation of Chinese immigrants via Sonora and Baja
California. Upon entering the U.S., immigrants were given new identities of Chinese citizens
born in the United States. In the case that they were taken to court due to suspicion of
immigration officials, the The Chinese Six Companies would hire false witnesses to corroborate
their stories. Another strategy utilized by the Six Companies involved Chinese immigrants
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arriving by steamship in San Francisco, where they would travel by train to Torreon. Once they
arrived in Torreon, they were met with an agent of the Six Companies, who would distribute
them to strategic points on the U.S - Mexico border. The principal method of verifying the
legality of Chinese once they entered the U.S. was to check their residency certificates.
Inspectors would have to decide based on the suspects ability to produce certificates as well as
their proficiency of English, whether the Chinese should be apprehended.47
The transnational orbit was in place not only to smuggle immigrants into the U.S., but to
bring Chinese laborers to Mexico. Although Chinese migration involved cases of abuse and
kidnapping, most Chinese came to Mexico by their own accord. The most common mechanism
of Chinese migration to Mexico were impersonally organized migration and familial chain
migration.48 Impersonally organized migration is defined as immigration that is coordinated by a
foreign national government, shipping businesses, or employers of the host country. Once
diplomatic relations were in place, the Mexican government solicited the Chinese merchants of
San Francisco to organize the recruitment of Chinese immigrant laborers. The Chinese Six
Company collaborated with Mexican businessmen and Ramon Corral to generate a system of
Chinese contract labor recruitment.49 Chinese merchants of California would then contract
Chinese laborers at port cities such Hong Kong and Shanghai. Tong agents covered immigration
costs for laborers in exchange for repayment at steep rates of interest.50 The arrangement
between merchants and migrant laborers resembles credit ticket schemes utilized to recruit
Chinese to California. It is likely that some Chinese merchants may have served as passage
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brokers and labor contractors for the recruitment of Chinese laborers in both California and
Mexico.51
Aside from representing a strategic location for organized immigrant smuggling ring,
Sonora had abundant employment opportunities. Negotiations between the American owned
Cananea Consolidated Copper Company, Mexican politicians, and local Mexican elites resulted
in expansive railroad and mining ventures throughout Sonora. Chinese were drawn to industrial
towns in Sonora such as Cananea, Nacozari, and Magdalena, which offered them an abundance
of jobs and access to the smuggling networks of the “copper borderlands.”52 By 1910, 4,486
Chinese had settled in Sonora, making it the state with the largest Chinese population in
Northern Mexico. With access to transnational capital and wholesale suppliers, the Chinese were
able to fill vital commercial niches and soon came to dominate the grocery and vegetable trades.
Although not near the United States, Chinese immigrants settled in commercially vibrant cities
of Mazatlan and Veracruz as well as pueblos and smaller cities of Tabasco, Campeche, and
Guerrero.
Since the signing of the treaty in 1899, Chinese immigration to Mexico increased
considerably. In 1902, Wu Xue Huang and Huang Xingguo, founded the Maoli and Steamship
Company for transporting Chinese to Mexico. With a direct line in place, Chinese immigrants
could travel directly to Mexico without passing through U.S. inspections in San Francisco. In
addition, British, Portuguese and French were also active in transporting Chinese to Mexico.
Many Chinese were brought by U.S companies from both the U.S. and China to build railroads
in the tierra caliente and to work in Northern Mexican mines and cotton fields.53 Chinese
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immigrants mostly arrived as free laborers in Mexico, while some were brought through
contracts to work on plantations and railroads.
Although the 1899 treaty protected Chinese migrants, Chinese were continuously
deceived by foreign traffickers and found scant protection from Mexican authorities. Young
argues that Chinese immigrants had more success defending their rights in American courts than
in Mexico. In 1899, a group of 480 Chinese workers brought from Hong Kong to Canada and
were then kidnapped and brought to Tampico, Mexico. The 480 workers wrote a petition to the
Mexican government, explaining that Ma Kang-Chok of the On Wo Company had recruited
them with promises of thirty-dollar a month earnings to work on railroads in Vancouver.54
Written in the form of a legal complaint the petition provides a first-hand account into the
recruiting process, “That we were deprived of liberty, driven to desperation and intimidated with
fear for our lives; That we were forced to take the cars to Tampico, Mexico and were set to work
building railroads.”55 The petition further describes the abusive overseer and the poor conditions
they experienced. The railroad company denied these accusations and argued that the laborers
were upset over the deductions from their pay for food and housing.
San Hing, the Chinese labor contractor, wrote to President Diaz, and blamed the incident
on an unnamed Chinese worker who spread rumors among the laborers. Unable to determine the
validity of the laborer’s claims, the Mexican government simply referred the workers to the
courts. In 1906, at Chinese ports such as Fuzhou and Shanghai, various cases were reported of
Chinese who were kidnapped and forced by French and British merchants to work at Mexican
mineral companies.56 Additionally, Chinese immigrants were transported from Hong Kong to
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Mexico’s Pacific ports by foreign companies who promised to smuggle them into the United
States. These Chinese were forced to carry out their two-year contracts at Mexican labor sites;
usually only paid a peso a day.
Although Chinese laborers were somewhat welcomed to Mexico, without robust
diplomatic support they lacked substantial protection against abusive employers or unfair
contracts. Moreover, the Mexican government rarely stepped in to support the claims of Chinese
immigrants and even Chinese Mexican nationals. Chang argues that the Porfirian period of
Chinese migration illustrates a system of labor recruitment that as akin to the coolie trade. These
sentiments are revealed early on in a letter from Secretary Mariscal to the Mexican ambassador
in 1882. The letter notes that the Chinese were to be specifically used in colonization projects in
unpopulated areas and not supposed to intermingle or compete with the domestic population.
This letter also speaks to the construction of Chinese racial identity as motores de sangre;
recruited to fulfill a strategic function in Mexican colonization.

—Transnational Commercial Networks—
Whereas Romero and the científicos envisioned a Chinese labor force that would work
under the harshest conditions far removed from Mexican citizens, the reality proved to be quite
different.57 During the early period of Chinese immigration, most settled in the Northern and
Pacific states of Mexico, such as Sonora, Chihuahua, Sinaloa, Oaxaca, and Baja, California.
Small numbers did venture to the central and Gulf regions of Mexico. The patterns of
geographical distribution illustrate how Chinese immigrants choose to settle in particular states
based on accessibility to the United States as well as commercial opportunities.58 Backdoors into
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the U.S. such as Sonora, Chihuahua, and Baja California had the highest amounts of Chinese
foreign nationals in 1910, totaling 6,662.
Asians, the majority of which Chinese, became Mexico’s fastest-growing immigrant
group, exploding from about 1,500 in 1895 to 20,000 in 1910. These numbers reflect active
campaigning by Romero and the development of diplomatic relations between China and
Mexico. By the end of the Porfiriato regime, the Chinese had distinguished themselves as a new
social class, the petit bourgeoisie, in Mexico’s rapidly urbanizing export-oriented economy. 59
Chinese immigrants were overwhelmingly men (98%) and between the ages of 15 and 29
according to the Registro Nacional de Extranjeros (National Foreigner Registry).
In circumventing and resisting the Chinese exclusion laws, Chinese immigrants
cultivated a transnational commercial orbit that facilitated the illicit and licit movement of people
and goods. Chinese immigrants soon turned from labor to commerce, starting their own small
enterprises. By the time of the Mexican Revolution, a number of Chinese merchants had
considerable influence in new markets created by the railroads and mines, especially in Sonora.
Moreover, in Sonora the Chinese became vital to the development of retail and money-lending
sectors in.60 Chinese businesses were concentrated in Sonora and Baja California, but
entrepreneurial opportunities brought Chinese into other places such as Nogales, Torreon and
Monterrey. After some time, Chinese were able to accumulate enough capital to participate in
other economic activities, opening restaurants, laundry, shoe and clothing factories, and grocery
stores.61 For example, Yun Kui, the owner of a general store became one of the most prominent
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businessmen in Baja California. In Sonora, Fon Qui and Juan Lung Tain opened dozens of
wholesale grocers and dry goods businesses.

— Borders, Nations, Immigration Laws —
In 1879, Lee Sing became one of the first Chinese to settle in Tucson, Arizona after
initially arriving in Sonora. Financial connections with prominent Jewish Businessman aided
Sing in establishing a dry-goods business. The success of his business prompted him to expand
into the production and sales of shoes in Nogales, Arizona. His ventures flourished within the
context of the burgeoning economy along the border. Sing eventually married a Mexican
woman, liquidated his assets, and moved to Sonora. After his wedding in Mexico, Sing
established stores throughout the state of Sonora. With financial and familial ties in both Mexico
and the United States, Sing lived in a transnational world. However, during a routine trip north in
1893, Sing was detained by Arizona border inspectors, as they questioned his status as a
merchant. Even when Chinese became naturalized Mexican citizens, U.S. customs officers
treated them as ethnic Chinese and not according to their national citizenship as Mexicans. Sing
called on American and Mexican officials, in which they verified his ciudadania (citizenship),
his eleven years of residency in Mexico, his marriage to a Mexican woman, his three Mexican
children, and his annual income of eight to ten thousand pesos. His overwhelming record of
settlement held sway and officials permitted Sing to pass freely across the border.62 It’s
interesting to compare his situation to that of Mexicans, who were relatively free to cross the
border during the 1890s. Unlike for the Chinese, proof of citizenship or nationality was not
required for Mexicans to travel to the United States. Chinese residents of Mexico were almost

62

Delgado, Grace. Making the Chinese Mexican, 104–129.

64
always stopped at the border, “under assumption that they were aliens in the region.”63 Historian
Grace Delgado argues that the assertions of mexicanidad (Mexicaness) by Chinese border
crossers “indicated that membership in the Mexican polity had not yet assumed the narrow and
ethnically confining requests associated with the post revolutionary identity of mestizaje.”
On the other hand, Chinese who had Mexican nationality continued to perplex
immigration and customs officials attempting to enforce inefficient exclusion laws.64 In 1892,
three Chinese men who were naturalized Mexicans tried to cross at Eagle Pass, Texas. They
were arrested by U.S authorities since the Mexican consul did not support the validity of their
Mexican citizenship. Mexican authorities frequently questioned the motives of Chinese who
were crossing the border in the United States. Additionally, also in 1892, Wong Foon Chuck was
arrested in San Antonio, Texas for not having the correct paperwork. Wong was a wealthy
merchant who claimed to be a Mexican citizen, and had lived in the U.S since he was twelve
years old. Texas did not allow him to pay a bond to be released, because authorities concluded he
was Chinese and therefore should be excluded from the United States. There is no information
about whether or not the Mexican consul intervened, but the case of Wong illustrates how
Chinese-Mexicans posed a dilemma for U.S. immigration laws. In 1895, the United States
Attorney General clarified that the Chinese exclusion laws rested on moral and racial objections,
not citizenship status: “the Chinese citizens of Mexico and Canada, although members of the
exempt classes, were refused admission.” 65 Moreover, U.S citizens of Chinese descent were not
guaranteed entry into the U.S with passports and visas alone, they needed to obtain a “return
certificate” before returning to the U.S.66
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Much of the focus on Mexican and United States immigration has been concerned with
Mexican laborers migrating to the United States and the loss of Mexican rights during migration.
There is little focus on how both countries are recipients of immigrants. The dialogue concerning
United States - Mexico relations is focused on Mexican emigration; therefore, Mexican
immigration laws rarely receive meaningful consideration. Mexico’s immigration laws and the
ways in which Mexico responded to U.S concerns produced meaningful consequences for the
United States and Chinese immigrants. The mere fact that these neighbors shared thousands of
miles of land and sea resulted in confrontation of their economic and immigration policies.67
Immigration is concerned with simultaneously excluding some foreigners while
incorporating others, often founded on conflicting principles. The federal government assumed
direct control of inspecting, admitting, and rejecting all immigrants seeking admission to the
United States through the Immigration Act of 1891. The 1891 Act also expanded the list of
excludable classes, barring the immigration of polygamists, persons convicted of crimes of moral
turpitude, and those suffering loathsome or contagious diseases. The law also established The
Bureau of Immigration under the Treasury Department to federally administer all immigration
laws (except the Chinese Exclusion Act). Because naturalization remained a judicial function,
the courts were left to decide who was or was not a white person, an alien of African nativity, or
person of African descent.
Unable to block the clandestine entry of thousands of Chinese, the U.S. was not only
reliant on Mexico but blamed Mexico for the ineffectiveness of its immigration policies. Without
the cooperation of Mexico, the United States Chinese immigration ban was rendered ineffective.
In 1888, the United States attempted to enlist the help of Britain and Mexico through a treaty that
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would prevent the Chinese from crossing the northern and southern borders into the United
States. Matias Romero, the Mexican ambassador to the United States, refused to enter into such a
treaty by citing Article 11 of the Mexican 1857 Constitution. The clause in Article 11 states, “All
men have the right of entering and leaving the Republic, of traveling through its territory, and of
changing their residence without the necessity of letters of security, passports, slavo-conducto, or
other similar requisite.” Mexico asserted the absolute freedom to move into, through, and out of
Mexico regardless of race or nationality, maintained the right of individuals to migrate.
However, simply considering immigration laws, or the lack thereof is one of the main obstacles
to accurately determine how the Mexican government handled migrants. Too much emphasis has
been placed upon the significance of U.S. immigration laws rather than independent actions of
Mexico that shaped those very same laws.
The 1905 U.S Supreme Court ruling of Ju Toy prompted and encouraged the rapid
growth of Chinese immigration to Mexico between the years of 1905 and 1910. Before the 1905,
Ju Toy ruling, thousands of Chinese immigrants managed to successfully resist the immigration
officials through habeas corpus judicial review proceedings in the federal courts.68 The ruling
eliminated habeas corpus proceeding as a possible method of circumventing exclusion. It was the
lack of uniformity among naturalization courts and the ensuing fraud, that drove for the
establishment of the U.S. Naturalization Service by the Basic Naturalization Act of 1906. The
law placed the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization in “charge of all matters concerning the
naturalization of aliens,” with the general purpose of promoting uniform naturalization practices
nationwide. These reforms to federal immigration laws in 1906 introduced considerably more
uniformity to immigration processes. Additionally, Congress expanded the authority of the
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Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, and issued standardized lists of foreign sovereignties
and their rulers for use by petitioners and clerks, in the preparation of declarations of intent to
naturalize.
Young provokes the notion that the U.S immigration bureaucracy owes its existence to
the clandestine Chinese migrant. Likewise, clandestine Chinese migrant also fundamentally
changed how the U.S would view the Mexican border. As Mexico refused to cooperate with U.S
immigration authorities to stop clandestine Chinese immigrant smuggling, the U.S began to shift
its attention to the Mexican border. Increased Chinese migration to Mexico had a direct impact
on U.S efforts to control Chinese entry. U.S. inspectors repeatedly tried to get permission to
enter Mexico in order to prevent Chinese from crossing the border. U.S. newspapers saw
Chinese migration from Mexico as an invasion, while Mexican newspapers saw the U.S. attempt
to impose restrictions on Mexico as interference in their country’s affairs.69 Preventing the
Chinese from crossing the border into the United States would not only violate Mexico’s
constitution but the country lacked resources to patrol the 2,000 miles border. Efforts to stop
clandestine smuggling of Chinese gave birth to the border patrol, as well as justifying the
dramatic expansion of the entire immigration bureaucracy.70 For example, in 1900 there were
only three official ports of entry on the Mexican border: El Paso and Eagle Pass in Texas and
Nogales in Arizona. By 1908 there was twenty-one stations along the Mexico border.
Though the Diaz regime held the notion that liberal immigration policies would foster
economic development, after 1900 the Mexican government grew more sympathetic to antiChinese sentiments that were surfacing throughout Mexico. As early as 1886, anti-Chinese
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sentiments began pressuring the Mexican government to restrict and manage immigrants. When
a false report claimed that a steamer from San Francisco would bring 600 Chinese to Mazatlan in
1886, the townspeople attacked Chinese homes and drove the Chinese out of town. The
newspaper El Trafico, from Guaymas, Sonora published a series of articles criticizing Chinese
immigration in 1899. One article from El Trafico stated:
The Chinese is not exempt from vices and defects; he is a gambler, a fatalist, a
smoker of opium, and he lacks patriotism. He will never gain affection for the
country to which he emigrates, and he rejects the traditions and customs of his
adoptive country.
The newspaper further proposed a boycotting of Chinese businesses, noting how the United
States brought the Chinese to build the railroads and then banned them from coming once they
began to compete economically. It is not clear whether the articles published by El Trafico were
representative of Mexican societies views towards Chinese immigration as a whole, but these
sentiments were at least on the rise in Northern Mexico.71 Despite the government’s encouraging
policies towards Chinese immigration, the articles published by El Trafico speak to the
upcoming anti-Chinese movements. The newspaper denounced Chinese miscegenation, stating
that mixing with the Chinese meant, Mexican would “become a nation of dwarves.”72 Moreover,
the magazine blamed “degenerate” Mexican women for mixing with wealthy Chinese men.
Finally, the newspaper claimed that the Chinese were vectors for disease and therefore a threat to
the public. El Trafico recommended moving all the Chinese to ghettos, in which the police could
watch over them and prevent diseases from spreading.
Since there is so little primary evidence in regard to the Mexican public’s early views on
Chinese migration, much of the El Trafico articles are cited here. The articles published by El

71

Ibid.

69
Trafico express how Mexicans were beginning to wonder why Mexico was accepting the
Chinese rejected by their Northern neighbor:
It is Mexico’s turn to apply the restrictive laws for Chinese immigration in the
United States; the fetid wave has overflowed us with its entourage of lepers and
gamblers, opium smokers and black plague contagions, converting our cities into
an immense pagoda that absorbs everything.73
Eventually, the rhetoric of El Trafico would materialize into anti-Asian organizations,
many resembling the Canadian Anti-Asiatic Exclusion League formed in 1907. Moreover, by the
early twentieth century Mexico began to control its border as well and the immigrants who
sought entry. A common method to control immigration utilized by Mexico and the United
States was through “remote control.”74 In 1903, pressures to enforce sanitary restrictions
resulted in admissions criteria that regulated health conditions on ships arriving in Mexico. Each
Chinese migrant was required to present a medical affidavit confirming a clean bill of health, and
steamship companies were required to have a disinfecting apparatus to sterilize baggage and
clothing.75 Remote controls operated through disease restrictions, which regulate immigration by
inspecting immigrants on ships and vessels before they arrived. In 1891, the United States
Congress required immigrants to undergo health inspections before departures and upon arrival
at United States ports of entry.
In 1903, the Consolidated Commercial Steamship Company established the first direct
line from Hong Kong and Yokohama to Mexico, leading to a new wave of Chinese migration. In
response to increased foreign and domestic pressure to control the entry of Chinese immigrants,
President Diaz developed a federal commission in 1903 to investigate the socioeconomic impact
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caused by the massive influx of Chinese.76 Lead by Genaro Raigosa, the commission concluded
that Chinese were racially incompatible with Mexicans and suggested restricting any further
immigration. In 1904 the commission met with Ramon Corral, recommending a permanent ban
on Asian immigration, preference for Japanese over Chinese as temporary economic migrants,
and stricter regulations for contract labor. 77 Not only did the government not act on the findings
of the report, but the commission was quickly disbanded. The lack of government response,
indicates the extent to which the Porfirian regime was compelled to recruit Chinese labor to
further economic progress. Furthermore, it was unlikely the government would suppress Chinese
immigration, as high-ranking politicians such as Ramon Corral had profited off of recruiting
Chinese laborers.78
Explicit promotion of Chinese laborers began to weaken during the final years of the
Porfirian era. In 1907, during a meeting between U.S Immigrant Inspector Marcus Braun and
President Diaz in Mexico City, Diaz mentioned that “anyone not good enough for the United
States ought not [to] be good enough for Mexico.” 79 It is not clear whether Diaz was attempting
to respond to the growing hostility towards the Chinese, or if he was feeling pressure from the
United States to control Mexico’s borders. However, the establishment of the Mexican
Immigrant Inspection Service on September 22, 1908, reflects Mexico’s desire to restrict those
deemed undesirable.80 Buchenau suggests that by the end, Diaz grew weary to foreigners as his
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immigration project “had vastly increased foreign influence without leading to more
prosperity.”81
Diaz established another immigration law in December 1908, further highlighting the
shift in attitude among the Diaz regime towards immigrants. This law codified a list of diseases
that made potential immigrants unable to Mexico, including the bubonic plague, cholera, yellow
fever, meningitis, smallpox, tuberculosis, leprosy, and trachoma. The law addressed on more
general terms who could enter at Mexican seaports and other ports of entry, yet there is hardly
any evidence that demonstrates whether this law was implemented in a systematic way prior to
the Mexican Revolution. Theresa Alfaro-Velcamp argues that the law was probably intended to
prohibit foreign workers from migrating to Mexico, in order to protect Mexican workers from
the threat of the 1908 economic crisis.

— Conclusion —
This chapter disentangled a point of origin; in which the United States 1882 Exclusion
Chinese Act coincided with economic ventures of the Mexican government. A moment that has
been overemphasized by historians, as the “beginning” of Chinese migration to Mexico. By
labeling 1882 Exclusion as the start of Chinese migration, historians largely miss how the
Chinese were vital to various Mexican colonization schemes. U.S. immigration laws were not
only synchronized with Porfirian policies, but they also served to reinforce Mexican capitalist
economic development.82 The histories of Chinese migrants in Mexico and the United States is
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hindered by narrow nationalist historical frameworks. In order to challenge conventional national
narratives and foundational myths, Mexican and U.S immigration policies must be read not
comparatively but in recognition of each other’s validity. Explored in later chapters, the Chinese
in both Mexico and the United States would encounter similar fates of expulsion, racism, and
persecution. However, differences in national ideologies and political legitimacy reveal how the
United States and Mexico racialized the Chinese with varying intents and outcomes.
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Chapter III: Myth and Mystery
The Mexican Revolution (1910-1920)

—Introduction—
On May 15th, over three hundred Chinese and five Japanese were slaughtered by
Maderista revolutionary soldiers under the command of Jesus Castro, Sixto Ugalde, and Enrique
Macia. The massacre of Torreon was the worst act of violence committed against any Chinese
community in the Americas during the twentieth century.1 Almost half of Torreon’s Chinese
community was brutally murdered during on that tragic day. Yet, countless lives of Chinese
residents were also saved by Mexicans. When Maderista troops attempted to enter Hermina
Almaraz’s residence, she responded that “they could only enter the house over her dead body.”2
The troops never entered her house, and the lives of the eleven Chinese hiding inside were
spared.
“Official” Mexican history, characterizes the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920) as a
heroic, patriotic, social and political movement that eradicated the imperialist Westerners from
Mexico. Unsurprisingly, the more than 800 Chinese who were brutally murdered during the
Revolution, remain absent from revolutionary narratives. Therefore, little is known about their
role in the Revolution, and what is known is often conflicting. The biggest mystery: why were
the Chinese specifically targeted, murdered, and terrorized during the Revolution? Moreover,
how did the violence that occurred during the Revolution transform into the organized antiChinese campaigns of the 1920’s? Are they two sides of the same coin?
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Historian Robert Chao Romero argues that factions of the Revolution saw the Chinese as
foreigners who had grown rich by exploiting the Mexican people, therefore, “sinophobia
developed into a patriotic expression of the Mexican Revolution, and the Chinese became open
targets for murder, robbery, looting, boycotts, invidious legislation, and ultimate expulsion from
the state of Sonora in 1931.” While Jason Chang contends that anti-Chinese violence—carried
out by civilians and soldiers—was a social experience crucial to the formation of a postrevolutionary national identity, “when eyes were transfixed on the spectacle of anti-Chinese
violence, men and women stood shoulder to shoulder, class divisions evaporated, and interethnic
tensions dissolved.” On the other hand, Grace Delgado argues that violence was “the culmination
of a nationalistic campaign that played on anxieties that Mexicans harbored about their own
economic security, their racial integrity, and their role in the revolutionary project.”
These conflicting explanations raise the question: to what extent was the Mexican
Revolution a heroic, patriotic, social and political movement? This social revolution actually
derived itself from various economic changes accumulated during Diaz’s thirty-five-year
dictatorship. For example, rural and agrarian Mexico had undergone rapid commercialization,
which expanded the haciendas (large estates), and expropriated peasant landholdings.3
Therefore, on the onset of the Revolution, agrarian Mexico was demanding a reversal of
Porfirian political centralization and agrarian commercialization. Peasant demands often desired
a more radical challenge to Porfirian policies, than that of the demands posed by Madero’s
political liberals.4 Despite conflicting motives, popular rural rebels found common ground with
their urban bourgeois allies in a mutual respect for Mexico’s liberal heritage, such as free
elections and municipal autonomy. Thus, it was patriotic liberalism that could rally a diverse
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range of Mexican classes. Therefore, the revolutionaries of 1910, regularly invoked the past as
they overthrew Porfirio Diaz’s dictatorship; “Revolution was justified less as a leap into an
unknown future, than as a restoration of a preferred status quo ante.”5
Speaking on the Revolutions centennial, Mexican economist Macario Schettino wrote,
“The Revolution which marks the [twentieth] century . . . never happened [nunca existio].” Alan
Knight further contends, “So, the Revolution - as a 'real' historical process - never happened; it is
a myth, created from above, by a myth-making state, albeit on the basis of some original raw
materials.” Knights article, The Myth of the Mexican Revolution, considers the rise and fall of the
myth of the Mexican Revolution and argues that the formulation of the myth occurred much
slower than assumed and the myth itself was not as successful as many believe. Although the
Mexican Revolution ushered in major structural societal changes, it did not repudiate the past,
“There was no 'invention of ideology'...The Revolution began, as Arnaldo Cordova notes, ‘with a
burning defense of the past’ - chiefly, of the liberal-patriotic past associated with Benito Juarez
and his generation.”6 The Mexican Revolution had no great founding fathers, no Utopian vision,
it’s inspiration was national history.7 Revolutionaries yearned to return to the “glory days” of the
Restored Republic, the early Porfiriato, and even the Reforma.
When the Revolution ended, there was hardly any consensus on its meaning. Members of
the revolutionary elite were simply interested in maintaining power; whether it be through
coercion, clientelism, or social reform.8 It proved much easier for the revolutionary elite to
change institutions in comparison to ideas. During the revolutionary reconstruction period (19201940), leaders who gained power through the armed revolution, consolidated their power,
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implemented some social goals of the Revolution, and strove to develop a hegemonic
revolutionary myth.9 The key function of a myth is to mobilize and generate legitimacy. The
mobilizing myth that arose from the revolution—which played some role in the regime’s
legitimization—is what Knight characterizes as that of land and labor reform, indigenismo,
education and economic nationalism. These constitute the ‘project’ of the Revolution, along with
images, icons, heroes, songs and anniversaries. However, when it came to creating and
disseminating the myth of the Revolution, things moved more slowly. Knight contends that
Mexican people formulated their own notions, memories and myths. Moreover, the “bottom-up”,
local and popular view of the Revolution tended to be episodic and shapeless.10 In this way, the
popular myth of the Mexican Revolution speaks to how the Revolution progressed, often
clientelist motivations tended to supersede ideological attachments.11
Therefore, if the revolution was motivated by a yearning for a pre-Porfirian past; antiChinese violence can thus be understood as the popular association of the Chinese as agents of
Porfirian agrarian commercialization. In other words, violence was a reaction against decades of
Porfirian immigration policies that had recruited Chinese labor to fill industrial and agricultural
worker shortages. Throughout the Revolution, anti-Chinese violence manifested in both
organized and unplanned ways; both reflected local hierarchies and tensions between differing
factions. The specific targeting of the Chinese population materialized in three ways: mass
killings in uncoordinated assemblies, tactical assassinations, and other violent rituals.12 Mass
killing symbolized a rejection of Porfirian colonization, coordinated assassinations illustrated
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how battlefield tactics contributed to making anti-Chinese violence legitimate, and violent rituals
such as the looting revealed how violence transformed Chinese stores into wartime assets.13
— The Revolutionary Project: Indigenismo —
The revolution would leave the Mexican state fractured, giving new encouragement for
the project of nation building. Mexico was tasked with creating a coherent nation, giving rise to
the cult of the mestizo. Post-revolutionary administrations promoted a program of cultural and
racial nationalism that could incorporate and redeem the heritage of the indigenous population.14
Revolutionary individuals shared a common belief in the need to integrate the Indian, but not by
means of Porfirian coercive integration. From the 1910s until present, indigenismo proponents
adhered to the principles of “enlightened, planned, noncoercive integration.”15 Porfirian racist
ideology gave way to a new anti-racist orthodoxy, in which Mexican’s concluded racism was
gone.16 The formulation of indigenismo and mestizaje by later thinkers such as Manuel Gamio
followed Andres Molina Enriquez, who offered a diagnosis of Mexico’s problems stressing the
rise and domination of the mestizo, in Grandes Problemas Nacionales (1909). The Mexican
population could build nationhood and Mexico could achieve unification through the mestizo, or
the “dissolving of the Indian into the mestizo.”17 Mestizaje became synonymous with
nationhood.
While the Porfirian era was one of Indian repression by means of unofficial and official
racism, the Revolution was said to have eliminated this racism.18 In Racism Revolution and
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Indigenismo Mexico 1910-1940, Alan Knight argues that the Revolution was fought with
considerable Indian participation “but in the absence of any self-consciously Indian project.”
With the exception of the Yaqui Indian rebellion in the Northeast, the Revolution reflected both
Indian and peasant demands. The conscious indigenismo that came into political discourse after
the Revolution was not the product of direct Indian pressures.19 The later post-revolutionary
indigenismo would also be another white and mestizo construct, “Indian themselves were the
objects, not the authors of indigenismo.”20
Gamio and Jose Vasconcelos were the key architects of mestizo nationalism. Gamio an
anthropologist, believed the revolution was a racial coming of age and through his 1916
Forjando Patria: Pro-Nacionalismo, he perceived revolution as a political movement that
inspired a national race capable of modernization. According to Gamio, centuries of Spanish
colonization had led to the formation of diverse Mexican nationalities composed of Europeans,
Indians, and mestizos. He argued for a nationalism that could redeem the Indian by incorporating
their cultural heritage into “patriotic sentimentalism.” However, Asians and Africans were
excluded from his national imaginary. In contrast to Gamio, Vasconcelos an educator and
philosopher, saw the revolution as providing the ideal conditions for the emergence of a national
mestizo race. Vasconcelos book, La Raza Cosmica (The Cosmic Race), articulated biological
notions of race by means of positive eugenics that were not explicitly white supremacist, but also
disavowed Asian and African people from participating in mestizo racial progress.21 In the early
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1920s, Vasconcelos argued in favor of restricting Chinese migration to Mexico for economic as
well as biological reasons.
Mestizo would become the ideological symbol of the new regime, as post-revolutionary
elites recognized its nationalist and mobilizing power. Moreover, it allowed them to distance
themselves from the past. Indigenismo, however, continued to operate within a racist paradigm
where race was maintained as an independent biological factor. Instead of making clear that
“race” denoted a social category. Knight contends that through the perpetuation of this discourse,
both the notion of race and the practice of racism was maintained. Moreover, the positive
rehabilitation of the Indian and Mestizo carried negative impacts for other races, such as the
Chinese. Indigenista nationalism functioned to perpetuate Sinophobia, “that is, the racist
tendencies of indigenismo/ Indianism manifested themselves - logically - in derogations of nonIndian or mestizo races.”22
Originally entering as cheap laborers, the Chinese gained economic success, establishing
profitable liaison with the big U.S. mining companies such as Cananea Company. They also did
well in retail sectors, selling to the urban poor therefore making them vulnerable to populist
persecution was the economic situation was poor. “Competitive” racism that affected the
Chinese, differed from the racism that had historically affected Mexico’s Indians.23 Moreover,
Mexican sinophobia maintained irrational prejudices that claimed the Chinese were parasitic,
overly successful, and diseased. In the aftermath of the Revolution, “just as nationalism sought to
forge the nation by integrating the Indian, so it also sought to cleanse the nation by expelling the
Chinese… Sinophobia was the logical corollary of revolutionary indigenismo.”24
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Although the ideologies of Gamio and Vasconcelos were represented in antichinista proraza discourse, various racial discourses were circulating within the public sphere during the
revolution. Even though they voiced anti-Chinese concerns, their ideas were rejected by Calles
and his cronies.25 Political enemies of Calles, Gamio and Vasconcelos26 returned to serve under
Cardenas administration. The ideologies of Gamio and Vasconcelos ran as parallel streams, at
times overlapping with antichinismo. However, antichinismo maintained an independent
political life from that of Gamio and Vasconcelos, existing through Mexican public life before
either returned to the Mexican bureaucracy.27
—Brief History of the Mexican Revolution—
Historian Alicia Hernández Chávez characterizes the Mexican Revolution as a large
popular movement with “a confluence of regionally based movements sustained by a strong
federalist tradition that never lost control of its territories.”28 By the end of the nineteenth
century, new ideologies were spreading throughout all of Mexican society, generating desire for
transformations in traditional structures.29 The revolution was a manifestation of more than just
economic demands, but demands for social and political rights, such as universal suffrage and
social assistance. Lasting from 1910 to 1920, the Revolution was a long and bloody struggle
among several factions with constantly shifting alliances, which ended in the establishment of a
constitutional republic. There is a plethora of history behind the different leaders and factions of
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the Mexican Revolution, but I will not divulge too deeply into those backgrounds. This section
provides a very brief and nowhere near complete history of the Mexican Revolution.
The Mexican Revolution was initiated within a context of widespread dissatisfaction with
the elitist policies of Porfirio Díaz, that had favoured wealthy landowners and industrialists.
Frustration was embodied by worsened living conditions and nascent workers movements.
Between 1900 to 1905 there were twenty-nine strikes, while from 1906 to 1910 there were 106
strikes recorded. In 1906, textile workers in Veracruz, copper miners in Cananea, and mechanics
on the main rail lines, began to mobilize against the government. They protested low salaries,
poor conditions, and the favoritism shown to foreign workers. Workers also demanded political
rights, such as the recognition of constitutional guarantees to freedom expression and
association, and full equality before the law for all citizens.30
Pressured to retire, Diaz eventually allowed Francisco Madero, a wealthy Coahuilan to
run against him. However, after imprisoning Madero a few days before the election, Diaz rigged
the elections in his favor. For the anti-reelectionist Party including Madero, this was the final
straw. On November 20th, 1910, Madero incited rebellion against the Diaz regime through the
Plan de San Luis Potosi.31 The Plan de San Luis Potosi, called for the nullification of the
elections and the eradication of Diaz's authoritarian government. Madero called upon the nation
to rise, with the plan for a revolutionary junta to capture a handful of state capitals and railroad
centers. Madero did not single out the Chinese in his writings but various factions included antiChinese positions as they joined his revolutionary cause.32 Ricardo Flores Magon of the PLM
(Mexican Liberal Party) challenged Madero’s bourgeois revolution with an anarchist platform.
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The official party newspaper, Revolucion, called the Chinese “Porfirian lackeys.” 33 The radical
proletarian strain of the Revolution expressed mixed feelings for the Chinese, as Pancho Villa
told his troops to kill any Chinese they encountered.34
The federal government initially suppressed the rebellion, but the insurrection would
advance and transform beyond Madero’s purview. Though a national phenomenon, the
Revolution’s intensity varied from region to region.35 From December 1910 until the end of
March 1911, rebel bands attacked bridges, railroads, telegraph lines, and small towns with only
local defense. In the North, Pascual Orozco and Pancho Villa mobilized their ragged armies and
began attacking government troops. In the south, Emiliano Zapata waged a bloody war against
the local caciques. In the spring of 1911, the revolutionary forces took Ciudad Juárez and forced
Díaz to resign. Through the traditional system of single indirect elections, Madero was elected
president after receiving ninety-eight percent of the vote.
The crisis began as the democratic elite failed to understand the magnitude in which the
armed insurrection had accelerated popular demands. After the implementation of universal male
suffrage in 1912, the succeeding election results revealed a society divided in three ways.
Moreover, none of the various factions retained enough power to dominate the political process.
The inflexibility of both blocs created a gridlock, augmenting the power vacuum. Zapata turned
against Madero, angered at his failure to implement the immediate restoration of land to Indians.
While, Orozco expressed frustration with the slow pace of reform and led a revolutionary
movement in the north. The U.S. government also turned against Madero, concerned that civil
war would threaten American business interests in Mexico. Additionally, the U.S. was worried
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that the new president was too appeasing to rebel groups.36 Tension rose as another faction of
rebel forces, led by Félix Díaz (the former dictator’s nephew), fought with federal troops in
Mexico City under the command of Victoriano Huerta. On February 18, 1913, after the ninth day
of La Decena Trágica (The Ten Tragic Days), Huerta and Díaz met in the office of U.S.
Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson.37 They signed the “Pact of the Embassy,” which conspired
against Madero and agreed to install Huerta as president. After arresting and assassinating
Madero, Huerta assumed the presidency.
Protests and rebellions broke out in the northern states and Alvaro Obregon was given
command of the militias in Sonora. Venustiano Carranza took over Madero’s’ position as
commander of the Revolution and moved to ratify a new constitution. His faction was therefore
named the Constitutionalists. Pancho Villa and Emiliano Zapata broke off from the conservative
party and formed an alliance at a conference, gaining them the name of the Conventionists.
Eventually, opposition to Huerta’s despotic government grew in the north and a precarious
alliance formed between Pancho Villa, Álvaro Obregon, and Venustiano Carranza. They
formulated the Plan de Guadalupe, in which called for Huerta’s resignation. In the spring and
summer of 1914, the rebel alliance converged on Mexico City, forcing Huerta into exile.
Carranza declared himself president on August 20th, despite Villa’s objections.38
In the crossfire between the various factions, Chinese people became a crucial wartime
asset.39 Constant war and instability crippled the Mexican economy, therefore the survival of
soldiers on the battlefield often depended upon their ability to sustain their own forces. The
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broad distribution of Chinese people across the country made them reliable sources of supplies
for looting. Moreover, their presence throughout contested territories made them routine targets.
The transnational commercial orbit of Chinese merchants and diasporic credit networks allowed
Chinese general-merchandise stores to continue operating even during times of turmoil. At times
the Chinese were even protected from violence, to ensure some form economic activity and tax
revenue. For example, in March of 1915, Villa issued orders to his commanders in Chihuahua to
not attack Chinese residents, so that the Chinese could continue to supply people with goods,
who might revolt should they be driven to desperation by hunger.40 In this way, Chinese-owned
grocery stores simultaneously performed the role of provider and adversary.
A state of turmoil continued until Villa, Obregon, and Zapata held a convention at which
it was agreed that the rivalry between Villa and Carranza made civil order impossible to
maintain. Therefore, Eulalio Gutiérrez was elected as interim president. Villa retained the
support of Zapata and backed Gutiérrez. However, Obregon re-allied himself with Carranza and
conquered Villa in a bloody battle on April 1915 at Celaya, weakening both Zapata and Villa’s
forces. Villa blamed his defeat on U.S. President Woodrow Wilson’s support of Carranza, and
launched a vendetta against Americans in Mexico and in U.S. border towns.
Carranza, now president again, secured the legitimacy of the new regime by writing the
1917 Constitution. The constitution gave the government the authority to confiscate land from
wealthy landowners, guaranteed workers’ rights, and limited the authority of the Catholic
Church. Moreover, the 1917 Constitution contained Articles 27, 33, and 123, that made Mexico
the first nation with a constitution that aimed to protect its citizens from foreign exploitation.41
However, the 1917 Constitution retained much of the 1857 Constitution, illustrating how the
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Revolution of 1910 was a reaffirmation of the La Reforma, which had brought liberals to power
in the 1850s.42 Alan Knight, admits the Mexican Revolution lead to major structural changes
Mexican society, but it was not a revolution in the sense that it was not repudiation of the past or
a utopian vision. Revolution was justified as a “restoration of a preferred status quo ante”, it was
a myth, created from above.43 Moreover, Knight suggests the Revolutionary myth has not been
as successful as most believe, as a common revolutionary myth has been compromised by intraRevolutionary conflicts.
It would be much easier for the post-Revolutionary regime to develop institutions than a
national ideology.44 Carranza generated mass political integration through social rights and selfcolonization through collective land rights. In the three years until his assassination, Carranza
distributed 132,639 hectares of land to 59,846 campesinos.45 Villa and Zapata criticized these
handouts, and sought more immediate and transparent redistribution of land. Eventually Villa
was defeated in the North and Zapata in the South allowing the Sonoran Constitutionalist
generals, Calles and Obregon to claim victory. Zapata was assassinated in 1919, since Carranza
retained power by eliminating those who opposed him. However, by 1920, Carranza was
abandoned by almost all his supporters including Obregon, and was killed while attempting to
flee the capital. Adolfo de la Huerta became interim president until Obregon was elected in
November.46
—Violence and Revolution—
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The Massacre of Torreon from May 13-15th, 1911 in Torreon, Coahuila was the most
brutal and violent materialization of the anti-Chinese campaign. The massacre occurred in the
context of the Revolution but was a manifestation of intense economic transformation and
regional growth.47 Yet, the massacre is often absent from Mexican history, dismissed as a oneoff event, or relegated as an outburst of xenophobic nationalism. The motivation for this violent,
almost genocidal, attack on the Chinese residents of Torreon, is still for the most part unknown.
Located at the junction of railroad lines, Torreon’s economy had experienced explosive
growth in agricultural exports such as cotton. Madero’s family was at the center of Torreon’s
transformation, as he was heir to land holdings in Coahuila, Durango and Chihuahua. The
previous decade of development had replaced peasants land with foreign-owned estates that
often hired or contracted Chinese workers. Landless Mexicans were a consequence of Porfirian
positivism, which prized economic development over all else. In Torreon, the Chinese population
had grown to about 600-700, who lived in both residential areas and urban centers. Visible
Chinese success became equated with Porfirian positivism, and therefore the enemy.48
During the beginning of the Plan de San Luis Potosí, Madero sent his brother Emilio
Madero to ensure the appointment of senator Carranza as Torreon’s governor. Carranza’s
appointment would secure the rebel’s control of the north. Emilio Madero’s battalion, lead by
five lieutenants, arrived on the rural periphery of Torreon on May 13th. Advancing from the
countryside to the city’s edge, various Chinese farms were attacked and pillaged by rebel troops.
Lieutenant Ugalde entered through Lim Ching’s farm, robbing and killing eleven Chinese
residents. Another Maderista unit advanced across another farm owned by Ching, robbing and
killing three workers. The other twenty-one Chinese workers at Ching’s farm, were gathered and
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forced to run to Torreon. The adjacent farm owned by Dan Kee and Wong Sam, was ransacked
and its eighteen Chinese workers were murdered. At a large farm owned by Wong Foon-Chuck,
Ugalde’s men forced Foon-Chuck’s superintendent and thirty-eight workers to serve them food
while they fought against federal forces.
Outnumbered, General Emiliano Lojero’s forces defended the city until they ran out of
ammunition and were forced to flee on second night of battle. The next morning, the victorious
rebel troops entered the city, looting and destroying Chinese shops and businesses. Soldiers
forced their entry into Chinese establishments, shot the inhabitants, and destroyed what they did
not take.49 The soldiers continued to the central plaza, where thousands of people gathered to
celebrate the Maderista victory. At the plaza, a Torreon man named Jesus Maria Grajeda
delivered a zealous speech encouraging civilians to sack Chinese businesses. The mob entered
the prominent Yah Wick building, murdering seventeen bank employees. Similar scenes were
repeated at other establishments, such as Yee Hops where 18 were killed. Side by side,
uniformed Constitutionalist troops and civilians looted various establishments and killed any and
all Chinese inside. By the afternoon, the streets were covered in corpses. The report prepared by
lawyers for the Chinese government described the horrifying events:
In one instance the head of a Chinaman was severed from his body and thrown
from the window into the street. In another instance, a soldier took a little boy by
the heels and battered his brains out against a lamp post. In many instances ropes
were tied to the bodies of Chinamen and they were dragged through the streets by
men on horseback.50
A total of fifty-nine establishments were visited and 303 Chinese individuals were killed.
What is most puzzling, is why even after the Maderista soldiers had secured the city, the Chinese
were still violently targeted. Many have argued that the attack was prompted by Jesus C. Flores,
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a stonemason and supporter of Francisco Madero, who gave an anti-Chinese speech on May 5th,
in the neighboring city of Gomez Palacio, Durango. Flores complained that the Chinese had
monopolized women’s work, depriving them of their livelihood and declared that “it was a
necessary… even patriotic duty, to finish with them.”51 However, Flores’s speech was one of
many examples of anti-Chinese discourse that was circulating throughout the north.52 Other
historians compensate for the extreme violence by pointing to the yearlong drought and the
mining recession. Other’s blame Madero’s lieutenant Benjamin Ugalde, who was previously
affiliated with the PLM and may have encouraged his troops to loot and murder.53 The
testimonies from soldiers and witnesses give conflicting reports, generating more questions than
answers.
Later that day, General Emilio Madero arrived at the devastated colonia china (Chinese
district) and ordered his troops to remove any surviving Chinese residents. Many of the Chinese
that did survive, had been protected by Mexican residents, who had hid Chinese in their homes
during the massacre. After the massacre, Mexicans buried their dead in the cemetery, and refused
to allow the Chinese to be buried along with them. Instead, naked Chinese corpses were thrown
into an open trench. Although this atrocity brought immediate international attention. Locally, it
was eclipsed by the rebel victory.54 After the massacre, representatives from the Chinese, United
States, and Mexican governments investigated the events. General Madero appointed a Mexico
City deputy to investigate his soldiers’ role in the massacre and the U.S. consular agent George
Carothers, reported on the event while acting as liaison for the Chinese government. Various
reports were made, all of which focused on liability and interpreted the event as an outburst of
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mestizo nationalism.55 However, the accounts of various Mexican locals risking their lives to
protect hundreds of Chinese, destabilizes the notion that this was the result of mestizo
nationalism. The Mexican reports blamed the Chinese residents for their own murders and
argued that armed Chinese fired upon Maderista rebels, but there was no conclusive proof of
this. Some thirty accused Maderista soldiers were detained, but none were convicted.
Persuaded by Carothers, the Chinese officials sought monetary restitution and adopted a
U.S. State Department legal team. U.S. lawyers issued a legal brief that outlined the breach of
treaty stipulations and international laws, which calculated indemnity at $1 million for loss of
life. In 1934, the Mexican government told Chinese officials that it would not pay the indemnity
until the economy was better; it seems to never have been paid. The legal team defined the
tragedy as a consequence of lawless war where the “malicious spirit” of Mexicans was to blame.
The incrimination of Mexican maliciousness misses important economic and political conditions
which may have accounted for the violence.56 Rebel volunteers were frequently recruited from
conditions of poverty through promises of land and wages. Moreover, this legal framework
substituted individuals and rebel soldiers for nations, which hid offenders within the apparatus of
the nation state.57 At the time both the Chinese and Mexican states were in the middle of
revolutions, therefore the assumption that the nation represented a unified populous falsely
associates the aggressors as nationals. Most historians emphasize the class dimensions of the
Torreon massacre and the preeminence of class over race in Mexican politics.58 Yet, material
conditions can become racialized.59 For example, during the massacre the Chinese bank was
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looted and its employees were killed. Yet, the American, British, and German banks in Torreon
were spared, despite the fact that these banks held far more capital and were visible imperial
forces.
The Torreon Massacre highlights how the absence of Chinese from Mexican history, has
created various inconsistencies in understanding anti-Chinese violence. Between 1911 and 1919,
814 Chinese were killed by disgruntled revolutionary soldiers or unknown individuals. Most of
the violence and looting occurred in Coahuila, Chihuahua, Sonora, and Sinaloa. Even before
Francisco Madero was elected president, several large-scale anti-Chinese demonstrations had
already taken place. Throughout 1911, three major uncoordinated protests erupted in boomtowns
with a visible Chinese presence that emerged during científico colonization: Torreon, Coahuila,
Tapachula, Chiapas, and Pilares de Nacozari, Sonora.60 Violent widespread attacks throughout
the Mexican Revolution were often initiated by revolutionary soldiers, who were accompanied
by civilian members.
Protests and violence were at times directed at the other foreigners in Mexico, as the
revolution often saw many anti-United States demonstrations. Yet in these cases never resulted
in humiliation or homicide.61 During the Revolution the Chinese abstained from entering the
military, while the Japanese were prized combatants, racialized as martial arts experts.62 The
consequences of the assignment of nationality began as early as 1903, when the Raigosa
Commission endorsed preference of Japanese immigrants over the Chinese for colonization
projects. Preference for Japanese over Chinese could be attributed to the fact that the Japanese
population was minuscule compared to the Chinese population, therefore less visible and less of
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a target. However, Chang argues that the preference for Japanese was linked to a specific
Mexican Orientalism, that was concerned with a state organized racial order. Chang’s argument
is convincing, but antagonism towards the Chinese during the Revolution was a consequence of
the imagined Chinese role in Porfirian colonization, rather than a state endorsed racial order.
During June of 1911, the President of the Chinese colony in Tapachula, Chiapas
requested asylum from the U.S. consulate, fearing that the lower classes would massacre the
Chinese. The U.S. ambassador Henry Lane Wilson, wrote to the Mexican government informing
them of the imminent massacre and requested protection of U.S. lives and property. After postTorreon anxieties lessened, Wilson wrote to the Mexican government, “the Embassy has no
intention of asking for protection for Chinese citizens.” Later in July of 1911, shots were fired
and a bomb exploded at Kwong Say Tay’s store in Salina Cruz, Oaxaca. Given the central
governments instability and weakness throughout the first phase of the Mexican Revolution, its
ability to prevent violence was limited, especially when local authorities and revolutionary
soldiers were often the instigators.
By the fall 1912, Maderistas held the northern Pacific coast by means that included the
destruction and looting of Chinese establishments from Guaymas to Culiacan and Mazatlan.
Under the leadership of Macario Gaxiola Urias, the rebel hold on the region was strengthened
once he arrived in Mazatlan in December. Urias announced orders for the city's Chinese people
to leave. In response, more than 570 Chinese residents of Mazatlan sought protection with the
U.S. consulate. Although Urias rescinded the order, many Chinese departed anyway. Reasons
for why the U.S. consulate would claim protection for the Chinese, is unclear. It may have been
in the best interest of the U.S. to keep the Chinese in Mexico, instead of fleeing to the United
States. More likely, is that the U.S. was trying to protect U.S. business interests that were reliant
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on Chinese labor. The next year, 600 Chinese residents of Guaymas fled the city onto the USS
Pittsburgh and USS Glacier.
During February of 1914, while Villa surged Cananea to retake the North from
Constitutionalists, a group of miners organized a protest against James Douglas of the Americanowned Consolidated Copper Company. Mexican miners believed the Chinese and the American
company had artificially raised prices for basic staples, in order to rob Mexicans of their wages.
In solidarity, The Women’s Union, a group of miners’ wife, held a rally the Chinese district and
called for the expulsion of Chinese residents. The mob attacked a Chinese laundry store and its
two employees, later driving the Chinese residents into the streets and out of Cananea. The U.S.
consulate noted that images of executed Chinese people contributed to the agitation. A postcard
of two Chinese men, one lynched and the other on the ground, was widely circulated among the
residents. 63
Not only were visible Chinese communities the targets of violence, but vital individual
economic agents were also singled out. Competing revolutionary factions frequently identified
Chinese functionaries for assassination in order to disrupt their opponents’ ability to acquire
resources from Chinese businesses. The affiliation of Chinese with money and business was
accentuated during the years of intense fighting because of the severe shortages of money, food,
and basic necessities. The persistence of Chinese stores amid the economic depression reinforced
their images as unnatural and greedy abarroteros (grocers).64 This violence was an opportunistic
response to vulnerable Chinese communities during wartime conditions. For example, motivated
by speculation that a Chinese truck farmer would have cash on hand from door-to-door sales,
Monico Rodriguez, a Carrancista soldier, murdered Joe Wong in Durango. Rodriguez’s attack
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and so many others, took advantage of the soldiers’ possession of the means of violence and the
probable impunity of his actions.65
After Madero’s assassination in 1913, Villa and Zapata broke away from
Constitutionalists and began a new wave of violence began. Attempting to secure vital railroad
sites, mines, and ports, Porfirian colonization and development concessions became strategic
targets.66 In 1914, an American colony near Tampico became a target for Constitutionalist forces
as they stormed the oil-rich coast. Pleas by U.S. consular agents to Huerta, convinced him and
his forces to spare the American residents and the Chinese laborers in their colony. The next day,
an unnamed Chinese cook was singled out, kidnapped, and executed by Constitutionalist
soldiers. In Veracruz, rebel soldiers also killed a Chinese employee in an American settlement.
Porfirian use of Chinese labor required co-ethnic subordination under a labor contractor,
therefore Chinese cooks often held the position of a labor contractor or general manager.67
Chinese managers were recruited as a link between capitalists’ employers and the Chinese
laborers, serving a mediators and translators.
During February 1916, Constitutionalist soldiers under General Prieto stopped at the
Hotel de Nueva York in Jiménez, Chihuahua. The hotel was a favorite with foreigners, owned by
Charley Chee, a Chinese merchant. On the 24th, after monitoring the hotel for some days,
Carranza soldiers stormed the hotel and took five high-profile prisoners. The prisoners were all
agents of large companies and each from a different nationality (British, American, Spanish,
Turkish, and Chee as the Chinese). They were then all taken to the railroad tracks and locked in a
freight car. In the morning, the American and Chee were taken away, the American was spared
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and Chee was executed.68 Specifically terrorizing and targeting of the Chinese reveals how
violence cannot be attributed to simple economic insecurity, but rather how their identities had
been racialized by Porfirian colonization.
Collective violence against the Chinese population was also an expression of the existing
tensions of Indian-state conflict. Yaqui attacks on Chinese stores were a response to the
governments collapse and limited means of survival. Northern States such as Sonora had
experienced food shortages and inflation, but the economic situation in the Rio Yaqui lands was
even worse. Governor Jose Maria Maytorena, who had played a key role in supporting Madero’s
revolt, also acted as an intermediary for the for-Yaqui tribe leaders, Pedro Garcia and Jose
Valenzuela. Maytorena offered the restitution of lands and the return of those deported to
Yucatan in exchange for their military support.69 The Yaqui’s had no interest in the political
agenda of the Revolution and sided with whomever negotiated with them.70 After Madero’s
assassination, Maytorena sided with Villa and the Conventionists, putting him at odds with
Obregon and Sonoran general Calles. The fragmentation of the rebellion resulted in competing
promises to the Yaqui people, which explains why they participated in so many different factions
of the Revolution. Raiding Sonoran colonies had been a method of Yaqui survival for decades.71
However with the outbreak of the Revolution, Chinese stores came to be a dependable source of
supplies for the Yaqui people.
During January of 1915, Yaqui troops under the command of Constitutionalists crossed
their ancestral lands and looted the Chinese community. In the lower Yaqui River valley, the
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deployment of Indian troops triggered Mexican locals to ransack the Chinese stores in Torin and
Cocorit. Leaving Chinese franchise retail stores in ruin. In the economic context of war-torn
Sonora, the looting of Chinese stores garnered supplied for soldiers, effectively denying those
same resources to the Indians.72 Later, during the summer of 1915, Maytorena’s troops returned
to the Yaqui River Valley to secure more resources, killing two Chinese. Chinese stores
therefore played a role in the Yaqui-Conventionist alliance, not because of mestizo nationalism
but because of their stockpiles of supplies.73
The Sonoran mining country and the Sonoran coast constantly suffered from war-related
scarcities, as multiple sovereignties struggled to grab power. Thereby Sonora became a
particularly intense location for violence directed at the Chinese. Calles ordered Colonel Michael
Samaniego and his troops to lay waste to the Chinese communities from Agua Prieta through
Arizpe, Moctezuma, Cumpas, Nacozari, and Fronteras. Although the soldiers encountered no
Conventionist resistance, they used the military expedition to obliterate the Chinese presence.74
The Chinese structural position as motores de sangre and a dependable source of supplies made
them valuable nonmilitary assets. Whether the orders were intended to capture supplies or keep
supplies from their enemies, or rid the region of the Chinese; they succeeded. In none of these
previously mentioned acts of violence were the murderers convicted or arrested.
In Guaymas, Constitutionalist forces rioted against Chinese people, destroying sixty
percent of their stores. Wai Chiao Pu, the president of the Guaymas Chinese association asked
the U.S. consulate and Chinese legation for protection. In Cananea during the summer of 1915,
Conventionist forces looted Chinese stores inspiring an anti-Chinese mob. For two days during
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July 2015, looters pillaged forty-four Chinese stores in Cananea, taking over half a million
dollars in merchandise. Calles who was gaining ground in Sonora, knew it was essential for the
Chinese to return and for the strikes to end.75 Without the Chinese, food shortages would ensue
and economic instability would threaten his campaign. Calles would later use the Chinese as a
source of capital, by increasing their taxes in 1916. Chang argues that by experimenting with
racial governance as a tool to ameliorate tensions with unions, Calles institutionalized the
violence practiced by soldiers under the authority of the state.
The murders of Chinese immigrants provided a populist enemy in which revolutionary
leaders could extract material benefits, without major repercussions. By extracting wealth from a
minority community, political actors appeared socially and economic benevolent toward an
increasing urban peasantry.76 Moreover, centrally organized campaigns and ritual violence
bonded various Mexican actors through participating in anti-Chinese violence. Chang argues that
anti-Chinese violence was not entirely a side effect of war, “antichinismo allowed Mexican
people to experiment with new political identities and associations.” Participating in anti-Chinese
violence, obscured the populous from differences in their beliefs, social class, and political
identities.
—The Beginning of the End—
Cast as untrustworthy, greedy, and diseased, the Chinese came to symbolize the
consequences of Porfirian liberalism.77 The Mexican Revolution revealed a country deeply
divided by social class, which resulted in distinct class-based anti-Chinese campaigns. This
section is concerned with the final years of the Revolution, in which anti-Chinese violence took
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on new political forms. Some members of the Mexican lower class responded violently to the
Chinese presence in Mexico. They voiced their hostility through murders, lootings, robberies,
and by anti-Chinese rallies and protests.78 The Mexican lower middle class expressed
antichinismo through campaigns, clubs, organizations, periodicals, boycotts, protests, and
sporadic violence. Merchants in this class sought to end the Chinese commercial monopoly, by
expelling the Chinese merchants in Northern Mexico.
As previously discussed, the Chinese had prospered because of their transnational
networks, yet the antichinistas understood Chinese prosperity at the expense of the national
economy. The Chinese were blamed for the depreciation of Mexican currency and rising food
costs. Anti-Chinese campaigns claimed that the Chinese merchants were only successful because
of illegal business practices, such as storing their merchandise in the back rooms of their
businesses. In order to maintain profits and save on costs, Chinese businessmen usually stored
their extra merchandise at their shops, instead of in storage spaces and tended to live at their
businesses. Anti-Chinese campaigns would later push for legislation to criminalize Chinese
business practices. Antichinistas also highlighted that many Chinese sent remittances to China,
as justification for their claim that the Chinese were unpatriotic and harmful to the Mexican
economy. Even those Chinese who worked in menial jobs, were admonished for filling
occupations traditionally reserved for Mexican women.79
During March of 1916, representatives of the Chinese community in Cocorit Sonora
wrote to the governor to complain that municipal authorities had ordered their removal to the
outskirts of town. They also petitioned to U.S. consul for assistance, which demonstrates the
power held by U.S. representatives in Northern Mexico. Utilizing various legal and extralegal
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tactics, the Chinese claimed their rights as guaranteed in the 1899 Treaty. During the years of the
Revolution, Chinese filed 608 property claims of up to $1,137,227.04 U.S. dollars in losses.
Chinese immigrants often appealed to U.S. consular officials for protection because there was no
Chinese diplomatic representation in Mexico. One U.S. consular official claimed that Mexican
soldiers’ favorite past time was robbing Chinese merchants, stripping them and tying them to a
tree in a desolate area.80
In Sonora, revolutionary violence was agitated by Jose Maria Arana, a Magdalena
schoolteacher and businessman. Over the next fifteen years, Arana would lead a large network of
anti-Chinese organizations. Arana traveled throughout Sonora, pushed his anti-Chinese agenda
and published a newspaper Pro-Patria (pro-fatherland), under the banner “Either them or us.”
He gave one of his most stirring and famous anti-Chinese speeches in Cananea, a mining town
with pre-existing anti-foreigner sentiments.81 Pro-Patria was a campaign dedicated to exposing
Chinese abuses, ousting the Chinese from positions of economic power, and uplifting Mexican
businesses. However, by asserting that Mexicans and Chinese were simply culturally
irreconcilable, Arana engaged in more than just economic nationalism.
The Revolution had disrupted the agricultural and industrial sectors, but according to the
antichinistas the presence of the Chinese was to blame. During February 1916, the Mexican
businessmen of Magdalena organized a campaign to oust the Chinese from the state. They
established the Junta Comercial y de Hombres de Negocios (Commercial and Businessmen’s
Junta), aiming to uplift the Mexican merchant from competition with Chinese businessmen.
Unlike the early years of the Revolution, supporters were urged to carry out the imperatives of
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the anti-Chinese campaign within the dictates of law.82 They specifically targeted the Chinese
and welcomed all other foreign businessmen. The Junta blamed the exodus of young
unemployed Mexican men into the United States on corrupt Chinese and insinuated that the
Chinese had bribed Sonora’s governors during the Porfiriato. The Junta’s list of demands also
include abolishment of the possibility of naturalization for Chinese and the outlawing of
Chinese-Mexican marriages. While it was true that Sonora had the highest population of Chinese
in the country, there was only 15,000 Chinese immigrants, which was less than 2% of the
population.83 The Junta asked for the immediate expulsion of the Chinese, but met resistance
from Chinese and Mexican officials. Mexican officials may have publically supported the antiChinese campaigns, but privately they recognized the economic importance of Chinese
businesses.
Conditions only worsened for the Chinese, even as revolutionary violence decreased.
During the fall of 1917, Arana’s campaigns finally materialized once Governor Plutarco Elias
Calles approved new discriminatory regulations against the Chinese. The first of these
regulations was a special taxation of Chinese farmers and merchants in the agricultural areas
around Hermosillo, Sonora. In Guaymas, Juan Lung Tain and Company and Fon Qui, the two
largest Chinese firms in Sonora, protested the increase in taxes, as others paid the old tax rate.
The municipal president of Guaymas claimed that the taxes were not discriminatory, but imposed
on all importers. Municipal officials defended high taxes, since the Chinese were wealthy and
monopolized commerce. Angered that Arana was campaigning for municipal president, Tain
protested to the governor that Arana’s campaigns incited violence against the Chinese in Sonora
and was using antichinismo to further his candidacy in the upcoming elections. Tain argued that
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even if Arana won, he could not legally oust them, relegate them to a separate barrio, or close
their stores. Their rights had been guaranteed in the federal and state constitutions, the penal
code, and the 1899 treaty with China. Arana replied that his crusade was virtuous and claimed he
had a moral obligation to broadcast the views of his five thousand supporters.
Calles and interim Sonoran governor Cesareo G. Soriano both favored the anti-Chinese
campaign, yet Soriano tended to oppose the more explicit illegal tactics. Although Sonoran
governors supported Arana’s anti-Chinese campaigns publicly, they also knew it was essential to
protect Sonora’s national image and Mexico’s international reputation.84 Soriano issued a
circular to all municipal presidents, ordering them to grant the Chinese protection, which has
been guaranteed to all foreigners by the Constitution. In a letter to Arana, Soriano agreed that the
Chinese held an economic monopoly, but denounced his use of Pro-Patria propaganda.
Additionally, he expressed concern that Arana’s tactics took advantage of hard-working
Mexicans.85 Soriano conceded that anti-Chinese activity could continue under the condition that
municipal authorities could control and maintain order. Even Calles tried to persuade Arana to
use less violent methods in his anti-Chinese campaigns. However, during the municipal elections
in Magdalena City, in which Arana was a candidate, he repeatedly incited local crowds to engage
in anti-Chinese violence. Therefore, Arana was arrested and imprisoned in prison in Hermosillo,
before the elections. Arana, of course, blamed the Chinese for his imprisonment, claiming they
had bribed Sonoran officials.
After Arana was released from prison, he again ran for the position of Magdalena’s
municipal president. Once again, campaigning on an anti-Chinese platform. Elected in 1919,
Arana immediately increased the monthly taxes of Juan Lung Tain from 250 pesos to 400 pesos.
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Despite complaints from Sonoran Chinese, Arana defended his activities as legal and necessary
in dealing with the poor financial situation. His campaigns bore fruit again with the passage of
the state’s Organic Law of Internal Administration in March of 1919. During this time, Sonora
had passed Laws 60 and 61, which ordered municipalities to create ghettos for the Chinese. This
removal was part of a more general call to create ghettos for the Chinese in order to contain their
supposed diseases and prevent mixing with the Mexicans. Article 60 of this law ordered that all
municipal councils, for reasons of hygiene and health, to relegate all Chinese houses and stores
to special barrios, and Article 61 allowed each municipal council to establish its own procedures
to carry out this law. The second command by Calles, denied reentry permits to Chinese who had
left Mexico for China and desired to return through the border town of Nogales, Sonora.86 Calles
defended that the law was passed for the good of the state. He argued that since the Mexican
constitution did not allow for discrimination based on race, as the U.S. and other advanced
countries could, the state legislatures were obligated to do what they could to stop the spread of
the Chinese.87 Adding that Sonora suffered more than other state from the errors of Porfirio,
especially from the influx of Chinese immigrants. Chinese had dominated in some forms in
commerce, but what alarmed officials was their increase in numbers from 859 in 1900 to 4,486
in 1910, and to an alleged ten to fifteen thousand in 1919.
Articles 60 and 61 were clearly discriminatory, but it was Article 106 that would have
profound and detrimental effects on Sonoran Chinese. In 1919, the Sonoran legislature passed
the Labor and Social Provision Law or Article 106, most commonly referred to as the 80 Percent
Law. The law mandated that Mexicans must constitute at least eighty percent of the workforce in
foreign owned businesses. During the same time, the leadership in Hermosillo appointed a group
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of doctors to report on the health of Chinese merchants and laborers as well as the sanitary
quality of their buildings. The strict implementation of the law varied throughout the state;
municipalities such as Cananea, Magdalena and Hermosillo threatened harsh punishments if
Chinese businesses did not comply. Whereas Guaymas made no attempt to enforce the law, but
relied instead on stringent tax measures against the Chinese merchants.
Upon his ascension to the governorship of Sonora, Adolfo de la Huerta actively pursued
an anti-Chinese agenda, consistently supporting the efforts of Arana. P. Calles and de la Huerta,
were both barred from political power under Diaz, rose from the middle class to dominance in
Sonora, and disliked foreign interest.88 De la Huerta advocated amending Mexico’s 1899 treaty
with China, to limit Chinese immigration and their rights in Mexico. The subject of the treaty’s
renewal introduced a new facet of the anti-Chinese campaigns. Tensions increased especially in
Cananea, where residents violated De la Huerta’s request to voice their sentiments peacefully.
Cananean’s residents would instigate some of the most intense anti-Chinese violence throughout
the 1920s. The discriminatory attitudes that led to the passage of the 80 percent law became a
tangible part of de la Huerta’s state-building, as he recommended at all Chinese merchants in
Cananea be expelled as of January 1, 1920.
Facing impending expulsion, Chinese merchants appealed both to their own advocates
and to their Mexicans associates in various positions of power. The Chinese legation in Mexico
City appealed to Mexican President Carranza, voicing their outrage at the injustice labor law.
In defense of the Chinese and at the urging of the Chinese consul general in Mexico City,
President Venustiano Carranza instructed de la Huerta to prevent local officials from expelling
the Chinese and ordered their protection. The writ of amparo suspended the Cananea decree and
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the Chinese remained, although not without ongoing harassment. Fifty Chinese left Sonora in
December of 1919 and an average of thirty or more left each month until the end of 1920.
However, an influx of new arrivals from Sinaloa stabilized the Chinese population at an
estimated 5,000. Attempting to compromise, de la Huerta suggested that the Chinese forsake
business and go into agriculture or that a number of Chinese leave Sonora monthly until all were
gone. The Chinese rejected both suggestions.
— Conclusion —
Arana’s death in 1921 marked beginning of the anti-Chinese campaigns. Arana had
established the method of legal persecution that anti-Chinese campaigns would begin to employ.
A new publication called La Pulga, continued to advance the anti-Chinese campaign. The
newspaper asserted that government officials only protected the Chinese because they sought tax
revenues. Moreover, poverty-stricken Mexicans allowed the Chinese to prosper by shopping at
their businesses. The editor further claimed that Chinese money lured Mexican women to
Chinese beds, ruining the Mexican race. To combat the Chinese, La Pulga proposed various
methods of discrimination such as special barrios, an anti-Chinese police force, a designated
sanitary inspector to visit all Chinese residents and stores, and that the government should only
allow Chinese immigrants into Sonora if they had 1000 pesos. Moreover, despite criticizing the
government for collecting Chinese revenue taxes, the publication proposed the creation of a head
tax on every Chinese resident.
In June of 1919 Obregon announced his candidacy for the presidency, a period of
increased Chinese immigration and Mexican repatriation from the United States. Throughout his
presidency, Obregon faced augmented opposition to Chinese immigration and increasing
demands to nullify the treaty with China. In his annual public address, he announced his plan to
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revise the treaty with China to limit immigration, in the interest of reducing competition with
recently repatriated Mexican workers. Thereby, Obregon equated antichinismo with worker
advocacy.89 Obregon sought a compromise with China, although he desired Chinese laborers he
did not want to afford them rights. China wanted to preserve Mexico as a destination for
immigration and to maintain access to the country’s mineral wealth. After long diplomatic
negotiations, China and Mexico signed an amendment to the treaty on November 21, 1921,
prohibiting the immigration of Chinese laborers to Mexico. The contention of the treaty reveals
how antichinismo intersected issues of racial nationalism, state authority, and economic
development. Chinese immigration to Mexico declined after 1921, but Chinese often used U.S.
border crossing cards to circulate between Mexico and the United States. Almost 10,000 Chinese
employed this method, leaving Mexican officials confused about who were legitimate merchants
and whether crossing should be regarded as immigration.90 Antichinista pressure brought the
Chinese question to the highest levels of government, but forced uneasy compromises. In 1923,
Obregon advised Secretary Pani that continual immigration of Chinese laborers to Mexicali was
vital for economic development. Obregon also wrote to Lew Chun, Lee Wing, and Wong Charm,
prominent agriculture and mercantile operations managers in Mexicali, that their requests to
bring two thousand Chinese would be approved.91 Comprises such as these frustrated antiChinese associations, as continued Chinese immigration gave the illusion of inept government
regulation.92
Chinese comprised 12.49 percent of all immigrants from 1911 to 1915, and 6.69 from
1916 to 1920, but their numbers fell to 2.61 percent of all entrants from 1921 to 1924. Despite
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official and unofficial harassment, the Chinese survived into 1922 and continued to excel in the
retail trade and wholesale retail grocery businesses. The end of the violent phase of the
Revolution remolded how anti-Chinese campaigns manifested. Resentment of the clearly
privileged status of foreign individuals during the Diaz regime would laid the foundation for
restrictive immigration laws that would be used to expel the Chinese. Violent attacks decreased,
but legal restrictions proliferated.
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Chapter VI
A More Perfect Union, A Cosmic Race:
Post-Revolutionary State-building and Nationalism (1920-1940)

—Introduction—
On March 15th, 1932, three Chinese men were marched in the middle of the night to the
border in Nogales. Mexican officers fired shots and ordered them to crawl through a hole in the
fence. However, a U.S. Border Patrol officer “jumped from behind the bushes and shoved the
Chinese back through the hole.”1 Later that night, Border Patrol officers turned back more than
twenty Chinese, including the three who had been shoved through the hole. In 1930 the Chinese
population of Mexico was 15,976, but by 1940, the population had decreased to 4,865. The
decline in the Chinese population is largely due to the organized anti-Chinese movement in
Mexico, which targeted the Chinese populations of various states such as Sonora, Sinaloa,
Nayarit, and Tamaulipas, and culminated in the expulsion of virtually the entire Chinese
population from the state of Sonora in August of 1931. The bodies of Chinese being shoved back
and forth across the border epitomizes a system of nations and nationalism that relegated the
Chinese as alien. The borderlands had served as a middle ground where the Chinese could find a
home in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but by the 1930s it had been reduced to
a fence separating two nations, neither of which wanted the Chinese.2
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—The Post-Revolutionary State—
When Obregon claimed to be the Revolutions victor, the Mexican state was in shambles.
The following decades would be preoccupied with forming a national ideology and building a
competent state. In order to survive the post-revolution, the Mexican state would have to
consolidate the populations of swelling urban centers, patchworks of rural agricultural zones, and
rebellious or disinterested peasants and Indian people.3 The result would be a constitution shaped
by revolutionary nationalism. The Constitution of 1917 restored national sovereignty, not only
over resources and property but also over process of representation.4 The constitution maintained
various safeguards for Mexicans but placed severe restrictions on immigrants. It was much easier
for the revolutionary elite to generate new institutions than formulate a new national identity.
Mexican nationalism thus became a struggle to formulate a collective postcolonial identity.5
Post-revolutionary leaders repositioned national identity within “cosmic mestizo race”,
propagated by Obregon’s Secretary of Education Jose Vasconcelos. However, the modern
mestizo people, came at the cost of cultural assimilation of all ethnic groups, or depending on
who you were, liberation of the indigenous population.
In order to successfully foster a mestizo national identity, the post-revolutionary state
would have to mold and bind the nation’s imagined collective identity. Therefore, Mexican
national identity or mexicanidad would require a narrative of the nation contingent on the
miscegenation of Spanish conquistadors and Indian women. The appropriation of Mesoamerican
people would be employed to articulate notions of “original” peoples so that political culture
appeared to be a natural progression of history. Thus, Mexican national history worked to unify
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the nation through foundational myths, but these narratives of the nation privileged a particular
community and excluded the Chinese. As mestizo nationalism sought to rebuild the nation by
integrating the Indian, it would have to cleanse the nation of the Chinese. The post-revolutionary
ideology which now deemed “Indians” virtuous and worthy of racial mixing, was simultaneously
employed to construct narrow racial and ethnic boundaries of mexicanidad.
In order to achieve a cohesive Mexican state, the post-revolutionary government would
create a constitution that guaranteed various safeguards for Mexicans but placed severe
restrictions on immigrants. Article 33 of the 1917 Constitution not only prohibited foreigners
from participating in the domestic process, but granted the president the right to expel
immigrants without a trial. Article 33 would be frequently invoked to deport Chinese. By 1940
Mexican presidents had signed 1,185 orders of expulsion under Article 33. The use of Article 33
as a tool for antichinismo legitimized the government’s ability to act on notions of race.6 Article
8 denies foreigners the right to petition on political matters, and Article 9 does the same with
respect to the rights of association and assembly.7 These new restrictions may be understood as a
way for post-revolutionary Mexicans to process their own history and construct their own
identity. Pablo Yankelevich contends, “As part of a rhetoric aimed at addressing social injustice
and celebrating the supposedly essential values that the Mexican mestizo was presumed to
possess, Mexico nurtured an exclusionary ethnic consciousness in which intolerance to
indigenous diversity was projected onto certain foreign communities.” Thus, national identity
was created on the basis of resistance to foreign invasion.8
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The post-revolutionary project continued as the Mexican presidency passed from
Obregon to Calles in 1924, a time historians refer to as the Sonoran Triangle.9 President Plutarco
Elias Calles (1924-1928) centralized power, obtained diplomatic recognition of the U.S, and
built a one-party state through mestizaje. Conscious of his political reputation he warned
antichinistas from pursuing illegal methods. Historian Grace Delgado argues “In their advocacy
for civil rights, Calles and his cadre of officials placed themselves in a small minority of postrevolutionary politicians who insisted on maintaining constitutional guarantees for naturalized
Chinese Mexicans and Chinese nationals.”10 Others argue that though he never lead an antiChinese campaign, his vocal support was enough to encourage anti-Chinese activists to continue
their activities without state interference. It is unknown if President Calles believed in the antiChinese movement, but his competing policies display the revolutions contradictions between
nationalist aspirations and capitalist reality.11
The turning point for the anti-Chinese campaign occurred when Obregon was
assassinated upon being elected for president.12 In seeking to ensure political stability, Calles
choose one of his supporters, Emilio Portes Gil as interim president (1928-1930). During the
next six years, known as the Maximato, Calles exercised behind-the-scenes control over Mexican
politics through the following three presidents. Antichinismo campaigns were most intense
during the Maximato under president Pascual Ortiz Rubio (1930-1932), who was often impeded
by a Congress still loyal to Calles. However, Obregon’s death was an opportunity to reset
national politics and create unification among the republics rival sovereignties. In seeking to
9
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foster stability, Calles formed the National Revolutionary Party (Partido Nacional
Revolucionario or PNR), the “official” party of the revolutionary regime. The PNR was formed
as a permanent organization run by Calles as jefe máximo (supreme leader), through which he
acted as de facto president.13 The PNR brought together many factions and gave local party
branches substantial discretion to run their own affairs. Additionally, antichinistas formed
political blocks within the nascent PNR, such as the Comité Directivo de la Campaña
Nacionalista Antichino.
Antichinismo coincided with repatriation of hundreds of thousands of Mexicans from the
United States. Between 1929 and 1939, 1.6 million Mexicans and Mexican Americans returned
to Mexico. Synchronized anti-immigrant measures throughout North America indicate how a
global economic crisis had resulted in a transnational xenophobic movement.14 Antichinistas
could now make a case for Chinese greed, as transnational connections allowed Chinese
businesses to survive through the depression. Within this economic context, a group of
congressmen formed the BNR (Bloque Nacional Revolucionario) to lobby for the Campana
Nacional (National Campaign). The Campana Nacional promoted the purchase of only Mexicanmade products and pushed for immigration restrictions, anti-miscegenation laws, anti-foreign
labor laws, and strict enforcement of public health measures.
— Federal Government Immigration Policies —
Mexican National courts impeded much of the local anti-Chinese harassment in the early
1920s, but this was no longer the case by end of the decade. Internationally, governments began
to increase the control of their borders and restrict immigrants deemed as undesirable. By the
1920s, due to rising antichinismo and pressure from the United States, the Mexican government
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began to tighten visa requirements for Chinese wishing to travel to Mexico. The visa system was
created during this time to determine in advance, whether a prospective migrant would be
eligible to enter. After 1930 it became increasingly difficult to enter Mexico, since the
government required visas and approval from the Interior Ministry. The Mexican consulate in
Yokohama, Japan served as the outpost for Chinese wishing to migrate and therefore had great
latitude in determining which Chinese would be granted visas. Those that were suspected of
traveling to Mexico to then travel clandestinely to the United States were refused visas.15
In effort to gain control over migration, President Calles implemented the Migration Law
of 1926. The new law expanded the list of those barred from entry such as old and infirm people,
women under twenty-five, illiterate men, drug addicts, anarchists, and foreign laborers without a
one-year contract. The 1926 law also expanded the list of medical reasons for which immigrants
could be refused entry. The law was interwoven within concerns that immigrants would bring
down the morality of the Mexican people, but was also part of the government’s desire to create
institutions to improve and discipline national population as a mestizo race.16
Mexican government established the Registry of Foreigners for those older than fifteen
years of age, under the Ley de Migración de 1930 (Immigration Law of 1930). All foreign
nationals were obligated to appear before the proper authorities and show their personal
identification papers. The registry created standardized identity cards for both immigrants and
emigrants in order to compile immigrant data. The registration cards documented an immigrant’s
physical condition, height, and hair and eye color, as well their religion, occupation, nationality.
The law also gave the Public Health Service the power to admit or reject immigrants. ID Cards
were frequently used to apprehend Chinese, if they were caught without one. However, this
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registry was unable to effectively keep account of the growing Chinese population, which
counted only 14,000 Chinese in Mexico between 1926 - 1950. This number was even lower than
the number of Chinese recorded in the National Census, which itself undercounted the number of
Chinese.17 Revealing how although the federal government desired to control and limit
immigration, it often lacked the bureaucracy to effectively do so. Moreover, Chinese continued
to cross illegally into Mexico, due to the corrupt officials charged with enforcing immigration
laws. In 1929, the Mexican consul in Nogales reported that immigration officers at the border
smuggled Chinese into Mexico for $300 per person.18
The census not only undercounted the Chinese, but changed previously recognized
localities with ethnically suggestive names such as La Campo Chinesca, Ching Yeip, Kui Coo,
Rancho Chino de Tecalote to “Does not exist.”19 In lack of better data, scholars have had to rely
on the Mexican Census and the registry, which has led to inaccuracies in understanding how
many Chinese remained after the anti-Chinese campaigns. There are large doubts about the
accuracy of both sets of data, as the anti-Chinese campaigns encouraged the Chinese to avoid
Mexican officials.20 When the Chinese were counted in the census, they were targeted. Yet when
they were not counted, it paved the way for their physical erasure.21
Anti-Chinese activists had wanted to abrogate the 1899 Treaty of Amity and Commerce
since 1919. Obregon had previously amended the treaty to block the entrance of Chinese laborers
in 1921, but allowed small groups of merchants, intellectuals, diplomats to enter. However, in
July of 1927, President Calles abrogated the treaty with China, revealing how influential the anti-
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Chinese campaigns had been on all levels of government. Although the treaty consistently failed
to protect the Chinese, they had frequently invoked it when demanding fair treatment in Mexico.
Mexico and China would not possess diplomatic relations until a new treaty was formed in 1943.

—Chinese Resistance and Asociaciones Chinas—
The spread of the antichinismo campaign, rising economic nationalism, and antiimmigration reforms were detrimental to Chinese communities across Mexico. Yet just as the
Chinese had circumvented U.S. exclusion laws decades earlier, they continued to resist
sinophobia in Mexico. The proliferation of anti-Chinese campaigns led to various
countermeasures by the Chinese, including consolidating and organizing Chinese communities
across Mexico. The first major Chinese organization was the Fraternal Union in Sonora, a
registered Mexican association, that pooled resources to defend the Chinese community. Chinese
also formed native place associations, which linked Chinese migrants who were from the same
towns in China. While, Surname and clan associations brought migrants together from similar
families. Asociaciones china’s such as Zhonghua Huiguan (Chinese Association), Zhonghua
Shanghui (Chinese Chamber of Commerce), Huaqiao Tuantihui (Overseas Chinese Group), all
served as umbrella organizations. These organizations typically handled migrants’ remittances,
took care of elderly Chinese, arbitrated disputes, and negotiated conflicts between Chinese and
Mexicans natives. The formation of politically oriented Chinese associations began after the
Xinhai Revolution (The Chinese Revolution), since the Chinese government wanted to
strengthen its ties with Chinese diasporic communities.22 These transnational organizations that
were based on political ideology were the KMT (Guo Min Dang) and the CKT (Chee Kung
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Tong).23 The ideological and political conflicts of the Mexican branches of the Guo Min Dang
and Chee Kung Tong unfortunately lead to a series of violent altercations between the years of
1922 and 1924, known as the “tong wars.”24 Political Chinese associations added fuel to the fire
as they were poorly understood by Mexicans. However, political associations articulated a
Chinese expression of Mexican nationalism and how they imagined themselves as legitimate
liberal citizens.25 Moreover, these organizations demonstrated that Chinese migrants had
interests beyond illicit activities or mutual aid.26
Tensions emerged between the two political factions during the Xinhai Revolution in
1911, as both competed for control over illicit activities such as opium and gambling, as well as
political transformation in mainland China. The Xinhai revolution divided Chinese Mexicans and
Chinese diasporic communities around the world.27 Although both factions advocated for the
overthrow of the Qing dynasty, the CKT advocated for the restoration of the Han Ming Dynasty
and objected to KMT-driven economic policies in China. In 1922, twenty-five Chinese were
killed when KMT members fired at the Mexicali CKT branch.
Already misunderstood, the headlines of Tong Wars allowed anti-Chinese activities to
portray the Chinese not only as an abstract threat to Mexican mestizo nationalism, but as an
immediate threat to post-revolutionary stability. Mexicans were unaware of the political and
economic differences between Chinese, therefore it was assumed KMT-CKT violence was the
result of clashes over opium or gambling. Despite the fact that both organizations registered
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themselves with the government and were in contact with Mexican people. Public protests
demanded that all Chinese involved in tong wars be deported. President Obregon invoked
Constitutional Article 33 to detain and deport the “pernicious” Chinese.28 The month-long
detention of KMT leader Francisco Yuen lead to a relationship with the Obregon administration.
Yuen was a prominent businessman, political leader, and naturalized Mexican citizen, who
consolidated the Chinese in Sonora to counter Arana’s Pro-Patria campaigns. Yuen, his lawyer,
and other top KMT members cast the CKT as violent thugs and the KMT as civil capitalist
victims that aligned with the ideals of the Mexican Revolution. They fed vital information about
the CKT to Obregon, leading to the expulsion of CKT members from Mexico. Over five hundred
Chinese were deported in 1922, through the use of Article 33. Yuen was well positioned in the
northern Mexican economy and maintained close relations to the ruling party in China.
Therefore, by secretly collaborating with the KMT, Obregon was able to maintain relations with
Chinese capitalists and the Republic of China, while catering to the antichinistas. However, by
acting as government informants, the KMT confirmed the fear that the Chinese were a threat to
post-revolutionary order.29
The KMT expressed Mexican belonging and more importantly sought to portray
themselves as rightful Mexican citizens through their condemnation of the CKT.30 For example,
in a public circular distributed by KMT, which explains their name change to El Partido
Nacionalista Chino, also includes descriptions of the immoral, unsanitary, violent CKT
members. Even for the Chinese, distancing themselves from the “bad” Chinese became a tactical
mode of expressing Mexican nationalism. By the end of the tong wars both leaders of the
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Guomindang and the CKT were killed. However, the CKT - KMT rivalry did not define the
political landscape for all Chinese, as the Chinese (including CKT members) regularly fought for
their rights in state and federal courts. Throughout 1917 to 1931, naturalized Chinese Mexicans
brought twenty-five cases to the Mexican Supreme Court.
Chinese communities frequently made use of local, national, and transnational
connections to help convince local officials to safeguard their presence. They sought protection
in Mexican courts, used connections with local and federal officials, and encouraged friendly
Mexican organizations to intercede on their behalf.31 Chinese migrants persuaded authorities in
several states to break up anti-Chinese marches, shut down meeting halls, and confiscate
propaganda. In 1926, a group of Chinese businessmen in the state of Veracruz wrote President
Calles complaining about the anti-Chinese activities of the Liga National Pro-Raza, defending
themselves as law-abiding and honorable merchants. Diplomatic protests by the Chinese legation
had some effect, at least on the federal government who was concerned with its international
reputation. In 1925 President Elias Calles sent a memorandum to all governors blaming the antiChinese associations for creating “a serious danger for the tranquility of the interior of the
country.”32
Although Mexico’s radical liberals, anarchists, and communists originally expressed antiChinese sentiments, by the 1920s they found solidarity with Chinese workers. The evolving
position of the radical left is surprising because of the universal animosity among socialists
toward Asian immigration in the United States.33 Despite original popular anti-Chinese attitudes,
by 1911 the radical Mexican Liberal Party (PLM) radically veered left, articulating anarchist
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principles and supporting class solidarity over racial divisions. Their periodical, Regeneracion,
called on its readers to recognize that all ethnicities and nationalities faced the same enemy of
hunger and poverty. The most vigorous defense came from Communist Party, in the early 1930s
their newspaper El Machete, ran a series of articles condemning the movements xenophobia as
distracting Mexican workers from true class interests.34 Mexico’s Communist Party called for
class based unity, “For us, there should be no nationals and foreigners, only exploiters and the
exploited. The struggle of Mexicans against foreigners should be substituted by the struggle of
all workers against all capitalists, without distinction of nationalities or races”. El Machete
argued that the government and capitalists sought to distract Mexican workers from their own
exploitation by making them think that the Chinese “degenerate our race” and “take work from
Mexican laborers.”35 The Communist Party claimed that the Mexican government was using
same tactics as in Russia, in which the czar used the police to provoke massacres of Jews in
order to redirect the anger of the masses.

— Antichinistas: Por la Patria Por la Raza —
A decade of revolution led to a contentious scramble to redefine legitimate state authority
and national identity. The Mexican nation was never monolithic and the formation of mestizo
nationalism was never inevitable; it required manufacturing by the state. Antichinismo offered a
versatile form of nationalism that gave Mexicans permission to enact a state-endorsed identity of
racial superiority.36 The history of anti-Chinese organizations overlaps both the revolution and
reconstruction, since antichinismo intervened during a process of national identity formation.
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Antichinismo became an active outlet for discussing collective identity and new relations of state
power. By tracing the history of antichinismo within the process of state-building, destabilizes
mestizo nationalism. By framing issues in terms of public health, workers rights, and economic
restructuring, anti-Chinese activists developed a political ideology that transcended class. By
generating a coherent sense of nationalism, antichinistas were able to achieve their ultimate goal:
Chinese expulsion.
The exodus of 20,000 Chinese from Mexico throughout the 1930s was the result of
decades of violence, active campaigning by antichinistas, and support from state and federal
level officials. By the early 1920s, the anti-Chinese campaign crystallized into a coordinated and
institutionalized movement, that was recognized as both legitimate and national. In addition to
their usual methods of popular protests and spreading racist propaganda, anti-Chinese
organizations worked to pass state laws that would give legal sanction to their demands.37 The
anti-Chinese movement became a multistate organization with grassroots affiliates and statelevel elected politicians. State-level officials were key architects of the anti-Chinese movement,
as it allowed Mexican elite men, such as Alejandro Lacy Jr., left out of post-revolutionary
scramble for political office to re-enter the public sphere as antichinistas.38 Moreover, the
organization of the anti-Chinese campaign was part of a larger public desire to participate in
political institutions, for both men and women.
The growth of anti-Chinese organizations ran parallel to the growth of sociedades
mutualistas (civic societies), spaces that enabled people to experiment with the social life of
citizenship.39 The transition of violence into organizations demonstrates a national desire to
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participate in political institutions. Chang argues, that anti-Chinese organizations were distinct in
that they engaged in ideological debates about the role of the state.40 Antichinistas helped
develop a regionally contingent understanding of state authority, as they demanded government
action to enforce a newly imagined racial profile of the republic - a mestizo nation.41 The
antichinista movement was centered in Sonora, but anti-Chinese clubs formed throughout all
northern states including Nayarit, Durango, Veracruz, and even Chiapas in the south. By 1932,
there were 215 anti-Chinese clubs, such as the Junta Nacionalista (Nationalist Group), the Liga
Nacional Pro-Raza (Pro-people National League), El Club del Pueblo (Club of the People), that
claimed membership of 2 million people. These organizations spread their message through
periodicals such as Pro-Patria, La Palabra, El Malcriado, Nuevos Horizontes, and El
Nacionalista. Women as well found that engaging in anti-Chinese campaigns allowed them to
participate in civic life. In 1925, the members of the Sonoran Comite Pro-Raza Femenino
(Women’s Pro-Race Committee of Sonora) traveled throughout the state to plead with
government officials to prohibit Mexican women from marrying Chinese men.
Even states that did not harbor anti-Chinese organizations, were forced to engage in
conversations about the presumed Chinese threat to national identity. Anti-Chinese campaigns
lobbied across state lines, attaching their racial desires to a variety of reconstruction issues.
Chang contends, “No other political party or political cause sought to organize ideological
consistency and political discipline across state lines.”42 In 1926, the Sonoran and Coahulian
antichinistas traveled to Tamaulipas to promote their campaign. The state congress
opportunistically used antichinismo to satisfy agrarian discontent in the region, by shifting blame
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to the Chinese. Through use of the Constitution’s Article 11, encouragement by antichinistas,
and petitioning by the state legislature, twelve Chinese were deported in 1928. Deporting and
scapegoating the Chinese, enabled state governments to construct a facade of moral governance.
The history of anti-Chinese campaigns primarily focuses on the north-western Mexican
states, but they were conducted in all corners of the country.43 Historian Fredy Gonzalez sheds
doubt on the notion that anti-Chinese membership was composed of 2 million citizens, but
instead proposes that the strength and success of the campaigns was due to their ability to spread
their influence beyond the place of their founding.44 The anti-Chinese organization in Torreon,
Coahuila, was one of the most active, petitioning at least ten states around the country to pass
anti-Chinese legislation. Therefore, “Even cities without anti-Chinese associations, then, could
come under the influence of the racist rhetoric coming from neighboring states.”45 Antichinistas
ability to establish a national network through linking actors in different states, overcompensated
for their small membership.
By 1926, Chinese were the second largest immigrant group in Mexico, with numbers
totaling 24,218. The vast majority of Chinese immigrants were male, with the largest population
of Chinese women recorded at 2,711 in 1930. Most Chinese males maintained transnational
marriages with women from their home villages in China, while wealthier Chinese males
brought their wives from China to live with them in Mexico. Unlike the Chinese diasporic
community in the United States, Chinese men often intermarried with native Mexican women.46
In the United States, anti-miscegenation laws prohibited Chinese men from marrying white
women until the 1960s. For working-class males, unable to return to China or arrange an
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overseas marriage, it was more feasible to find a spouse in Mexico. Additionally, Chinese
immigrants may have been attracted by the possibility of becoming part of Mexican society.47
Though there was frequent intermarriage between Chinese men and Mexican women,
mainstream Mexican society strongly condemned these marital unions. Moreover, Mexican
women who married Chinese men were shamed as lazy, dirty, and unpatriotic. These
relationships were seen as a threat to Mexican womanhood and the nation as a whole.48
Perhaps more opportunistic than racist, state governments manipulated antichinista
discourse to ameliorate their own local concerns. Whether or not Mexican officials believed in
antichinismo, it’s versatility allowed antichinistas to successfully push their racial agenda into
state and eventually federal legislatures. When the Liga Anti-China of Torreon came to Colima’s
public assembly in 1926, the provincial government was in the midst of a Cristiadas Rebellion.49
Despite the small Chinese community in Colima, the Liga Anti-China warned the municipality
of the moral threat and danger of Chinese and Mexican intermarriage. Colima’s congress moved
to charge the Committee on Constitutional matters to enforce medical exams on the Chinese and
to review all marriages. Colima’s officials recognized the compelling secular rationale for
claiming governments exclusive secular authority to regulate marriage.50 Antichinista
characterization of the Chinese-Mexican race mixture as a threat to Mexican prosperity offered a
racial logic that would reinforce the government’s secular claims to state authority.51
Intermarriage concerns were asserted frequently throughout the campaigns, subsequently
gendering and racializing the movement. The next section will elaborate further on how
47
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miscegenation fears reinforced the mestizo as the new Mexican identity and Mexican women as
guardians of race.
Antichinistas commonly used the trope of degeneration to characterize the Chinese as
racial poisons to differentiate themselves as worthy mestizo citizens.52 If posturing the Chinese
as racial poisons was not enough, antichinistas poised the Chinese as public health threats,
perpetrators of vice, and a thorn in the Mexican economy. For example, an antichinista poster in
Nayarit warned, “The Chinese: Are the vilest measure of our race and the greatest danger for our
dear country, are the most terrible threat to our health because of their natural infections:
Bubonic Plague, Yellow Fever, Black Vomit, Syphilis, Trachoma, etc.”53 These fears were
voiced by some of the most notorious antichinistas at the “Grand Anti-Chino Convention” in
1925. The Sonoran Liga Nacionalista Anti-Chino asked newly elected President Calles for
30,000 pesos to host the organizing of 30 groups. President Calles agreed probably because he
was keener to support legal activities than endorse their full agenda.54 From Sonora, Baja
California, and Sinaloa delegates gathered to mobilize racial discourse and to shape the public
landscape. They developed a proposal that envisioned a broad-based popular movement to
undermine the economic basis of Chinese communities and to shame Mexican women who
married Chinese men. Their goal was to protect a racial future through state intervention in
sexual and economic reproduction. There was not one, but two Great Conventions in Hermosillo.
The second convention was held to increase cooperation with state legislatures and with
organized labor.55
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Championing the conventions was Jose Angel Espinoza, one of the main intellectual
proponents behind the anti-Chinese campaigns and some even claim the ideological leader of
anti-Chinese activists. Espinoza book’s El Ejemplo de Sonora and El Problema Chino en
México, justified the Torreon Massacre and also included a sample charter for anti-Chinese
associations to use.56 El Ejemplo de Sonora and El Problema Chino en México written in 1932,
provide a history of the movement and compilation of what the campaign had already developed
over the decade.57 El Ejemplo de Sonora claimed that even if a Chinese immigrants obtained
Mexican naturalization they would remain permanent foreigners, “The government may judge
him as Mexican, the Secretaria of Foreign Relations may judge him as Mexican, but to the
people he continues to be Chinese; a doubly dangerous Chinese exploiter.”58 More importantly,
his books included caricatures that constructed the Chinese as racial poisons, public health
threats, and perpetrators of vice. To combat degeneration of the Mexican people, Espinoza
proposed that the government should prevent the Chinese from nationalizing or assimilating.
Proposals were justified by a Eugenics ideology that claimed the children of Mexican and
Chinese unions would inherit the worst “vices and degeneration” of both races and would
ultimately destroy the mestizo formation.
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Figure 4: “La Mestización” (Miscegenation), José Ángel Espinoza, 1932. The panels translate as, “Twelveyear-old mixed Euro-Indian” (left) and “Fourteen-year-old product of Chinese-Mexican mixture” (right). Espinoza,
El Ejemplo de Sonora.

Espinoza’s cartoon (Fig. 4) titled “Mestizacion”, contrasts a strong, healthy, and tall
“Indo-Latino” hybrid boy of twelve and a scrawny and sickly looking Chinese Mexican boy of
fourteen. The drawing of the Indo-Latino boy depicts the archetypal blanco-criollo Sonoran man
of white distinct Spanish descent. This image employs Chinese and their offspring to
differentiate against the desired Eurocentric whiteness of an imaginary Mexican mestizo, further
solidifying the boundary between blanco-criollos and a racial other.59 Another Espinoza cartoon
depicts a smiling Chinese man secretly adding cats to his sausages and another illustrates
Chinese men with gaping and puss leaking wounds. These images serve a specific process in
which the Chinese identity was produced and reproduced through action and speech.60 Moreover,
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his cartoons speak to the newspapers circulating throughout northern Mexico that linked the
Chinese to disease and presented them as a public health threat. They warned the public that
even if Chinese appeared healthy, they carried hidden ulcers that would transmit disease to
unsuspecting Mexicans who bought food from them.61 Espinoza’s representations in El Ejemplo
de Sonora served to solidify a racial boundary between the Chinese and imagined mestizo
identity.
Mexico had been traditionally divided into the “Creole north”, the “indigenous south”,
and “central mestizo.”62 In Sonora, where the male “blanco-criollo” ethnic identity dominated,
Chinese-Mexican intermarriages were especially heinous. Miscegenation fears manifested in
government reforms such as Law 31, that was passed by the Sonoran Legislature in 1923. Law
31 prohibited the marriage of Mexican women to Chinese men, even if the man was a
naturalized Mexican citizen, and punished free unions with a 500 peso fine. Law 31 and the
antichinistas focused solely on Mexican women’s vulnerability to Chinese men and ignored
potential sexual mixing between Mexican men and Chinese women. Although Law 31 was
inconsistently enforced throughout Sonora, anti-Chinese newspapers shamed Mexican women by
regularly publishing the names and photographs of Mexican women who had relationships with
Chinese men. Antichinistas and Law 31 concentrated on Chinese men, because Mexican men
feared contamination of what they saw as vessels of Mexican nationhood: Mexican women.63
Fear of Mexican women’s relationships with Chinese men may have resulted from anxieties
about the changing role of women in society during the revolution. Despite Law 31, Mexican
women and Chinese men continued to form unions and families, resisting state intervention in
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their private lives. Chinese men married Mexican women at high rates, as in 1930, there was a
35% intermarriage rate in Chihuahua and 12% in Hermosillo.64
Law 31 highlights integral facets of the history of the anti-Chinese campaign; the role of
women, Chinese resistance, and the legitimization of antichinismo through state and federal
laws. Francisco Gin a naturalized Chinese Mexican, was fined 200 pesos for attempting to marry
a Mexican woman. When Gin sought to have this ruling overturned, his case went all the to the
Mexican Supreme Court. The Mexican Supreme Court denied his request, thereby refusing to
uphold the basic rights of naturalized Mexican citizens. They were Chinese, and neither
naturalization nor birth in Mexico could change that.65 Gin case further reveals how antichinismo
did not stay within the confines of Sonora, but proliferated throughout all levels of government
and society.

—Chineras—
In addition to engaging in conversations about state authority, antichinismo was distinct
because it acknowledged that women occupied a vital role in bio politics.66 As mentioned earlier,
women had become integral to the legitimation of the anti-Chinese campaigns, but not as its
authors. As women in Mexico ventured from traditional roles they found that anti-Chinese
campaigns offered them a space for political influence and fuller citizenship otherwise denied to
them.67 Female anti-Chinese activists could be found in rural pueblos, white-middle class
households, and working-class cities. Such as Maria de Jesus Valdez, a university-educated
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Magdalena school teacher, who was an active participant in the sinophobic campaigns and a
follower of antichinista, Jose Maria Arana. Valdez was part of a group of white Mexican settlers
that had colonized what had been, and continued to be the site of indigenous Yaqui resistance.68
Since 1917, Valdez frequently delivered her own speeches and lectures on the evils of Chinese
influence. Valdez declared that the Chinese were the source of Mexican degeneracy and
economic stagnation, and advocated for the physical separation of Chinese from Mexican:
The people of Sonora need to rid themselves of these noxious weeds - the Chinaman. These
people have become the master of our progress… [They] cultivate our soil like a vampire
squeezing the blood of our people. [They] must be removed to a place where [They] no
longer will hinder our society.69
Read in the context of an enduring Indian war, Valdez’s anti-Chinese campaign shifted
public discourse away from the indigenous insurgency and Yaqui genocide, to the Chinese threat
on Mexican colonization.70 According to Valdez, a true Mexican woman would disdain from the
advances of corrupt Chinese men, thereby furthering the Mexican cause and enhancing its
national identity. Although Mexican women could neither vote nor run for office, women were
deemed the moral guardians of Mexican racial purity.71 Valdez gave frequent speeches
concerning the dangers of Mexican-Chinese unions, which accompanied the very real
consequences of the 1886 Law of Alienage and Naturalization, which made a married women’s
citizenship dependent on that of her husband.
Valdez may have been attracted to Arana’s campaigns amidst the revolutionary turmoil,
as Arana identified an “other”, a people with whom all Mexican social classes had some
complaint. Moreover, by claiming the Chinese “cultivate our soil like a vampire squeezing the
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blood of our people”, Valdez speaks to the very real agrarian displacement and economic
hardships Mexico was experiencing at the time. Women found that they could make compelling
demands for their welfare when situated within the frame of antichinismo. Women were more
effective at gaining male support because the framework of antichinismo reinforced dominant
gender roles and the patriarchy.72 In 1932 the Cooperative Mexicana de Lavandería Anti Asiatica
(Anti-Asian Mexican Laundry Cooperative) in Sonora pleaded with Mexicans to boycott
Chinese laundries and to bring them their clothes instead. They blamed competition with Chinese
laundries for undermining their ability to work and thereby making their children suffer.
Ironically, Mexican women who were pressured to do their part for the anti-Chinese campaigns
would in fact gain no benefits.73 Moreover, the appropriation of women’s voices morally
justified anti-miscegenation statutes and supported antichinistas conceptual boundaries of the
Mexican mestizo racial form as thing to be protected.74 The state could claim anti-miscegenation
statutes were in defense of local Mexican women, but men were clearly the ideological architects
and beneficiaries of antichinismo.
Mexican women were simultaneously some of the fiercest proponents of the anti-Chinese
movement, but also its targets. Below is an excerpt of an anonymous poem written in 1910
condemning Mexican women who become involved with Chinese men, titled “El destierro de los
chinos” (Exile of the Chinese).75
We hold the government responsible
Even though you may think me unwise
They should exile
Three types of people [ Chinese, Mexican women who marry them, and Arabs]
The first should be the women
72

Delgado, Grace. Making the Chinese Mexican, 104–129.
Ibid.
74
Ibid.
75
Romero, Robert Chao, The Chinese in Mexico, 66–96.
73

129
Who make unions with Chinese men
They know no shame
Because they are staining the nation
The inflammatory poem later claims that all Mexican women who have relationships
with Chinese men are deserving of being burned with hot oil, firewood, and tar. Not only were
Mexican women seen as shameless but unpatriotic.76 This poem as well as the song “Los chinos”
composed by Eduardo Tavo were written at the onset of the Mexican Revolution. The song
recalls the anti-Chinese violence in Mazatlan during the Revolution, in which mob violence
forced many Chinese to flee the city. Throughout the corrido (ballad), women are chastised
through familiar antichinista discourse,
Many Mexican women love the Chinese
Because they have no shame
And they aren’t ashamed to make a Chinese bun in their hair.
They both make the braid together
There goes the angry mob
So, pay close attention
Only God knows what will happen
Here comes the big news
I don’t know what will happen
But there will be no more silk outfits
I am saying this in reference to many young women
Young women of Mazatlan.
Antichinismo simultaneously depicted Mexican-Chinese intermarriages as relationships
of wealth and laziness, but also of abuse and slavery. Another cartoon by Jose Angel Espinoza.
depicts a Mexican bride and Chinese husband on their wedding night and then five years later
(Fig.5).
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Figure 5. “El Matrimonio” (Marriage). The panel translates as “The night of the wedding” (left) “and five
years later.” Source: Espinoza, El Ejemplo de Sonora (México City, 1932).

The Chinese husband is shown abandoning his wife and children after just five years,
while the wife who was previously beautiful and lavish is wearing rags and in a decrepit state.
The sexualized image of a young beautiful Mexican women in the hands of a weak Chinese man
was a frequent trope used by anti-Chinese crusaders.77 The periodical El Toro de Once, referred
to women who had relationships with Chinese men as “chineras”, demanding radical measures to
protect the health and the moral safety of the Mexican race.78 Even more crude is the illustration
of their offspring, who are drawn as reflections of their Chinese father without any physical
characteristics of their mother. Romero describes the children in the cartoon as “gangly,
degenerate Mongoloids”, further illustrating how Espinoza did not view the progeny of
intermarriages as Mexican.
Antichinistas employed a primordialist understanding of ethnic identity, in which certain
social categories are natural, inevitable, and fixed by human nature.79 Espinoza, Arana, and their
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followers believed that human characteristics, physical and mental, are determined by hereditary
factors passed from parent to offspring. Antichinistas had integrated eugenics theory into their
discourse since 1917. Their rhetoric was strikingly familiar to the eugenics discourse Diaz had
employed when promoting European settlers to whiten Mexico. Eugenics allowed antichinistas
to assert pseudo-scientific rationale for what amounted to racial cleansing, while also reconciling
with their desire to create a racially homogenous nation from the mestizo and indigenous people.
Indigenista nationalism functioned to perpetuate Sinophobia. Antichinismo and antiintermarriage laws reveal that though the revolution had transformed official thinking concerning
race, racism was far from gone.
The gendered nature of antichinismo employed sex as a racial technology that could be
molded into policy, revealed in the use of policy tools such as the 1930 Census.80 The Mexican
National Census of 1930 categorizes the offspring of Chinese nationals and Mexican women as
ethnically Chinese. On the other hand, if Chinese fathers were nationalized as Mexican citizens,
the children were then designated Mexican nationals for purpose of the census. Despite having
the legal classification of Mexican ethnicity, society did not view children of intermarriages as
Mexican. Chinese-Mexican children were not only seen as a threat to Mexican national ethnic
formation, but a “step backward in the anthropological search for the prototypical [Mexican]
man.”81
In San Luis Potosi, antichinista campaigns and propaganda saturated the public discourse
with anxieties of Chinese racial miscegenation and economic domination. Illustrating, how
antichinistas often associated economic production to biological reproduction in their rhetoric. In
an attempt to defend Mexican manhood, anti-Chinese laws were oriented within a framework of
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economic nationalism. The municipal government passed a decree forcing the Chinese to
abandon their homes and businesses within 5 days. Thirty to forty Chinese left including grocery
store owner Benjamin Chow, who was forced to leave with his Mexican wife and their three
young children.

— Sonoran Expulsion and Chinese Exodus —
In 1929, Mexico experienced an economic depression and government revenues fell
34%.82 Additionally, the U.S. began deporting Mexicans from the Southwest, which augmented
high unemployment rates. Chinese more than ever represented unwanted competition and antiChinese activists pushed for overtly racist laws. Hu-DeHart argues that economic interactions
fundamentally conditioned Chinese-Mexican relations, as the rise of a dominant Chinese “petite
bourgeoisie” produced a class-based persecution.83 Anti-Chinese propaganda, the formation of
anti-Chinese clubs, the federal Campana Nacional, and the passage of discriminatory legislation
all created the conditions for the expulsion of Chinese. In 1931, Sonora Governor Rodolfo Elias
Calles declared victory over the Chinese problem, “The Chinese problem has been completely
finished in Sonora; what bothers us now over there is a new problem: that of vagrant Chinese.”84
However, by the time Governor Calles had sent expulsion order, antichinistas had already
forced most of the Chinese out of Sonora. In 1923, the Sonoran Congress passed Law 27, which
allowed Sonoran officials to relocate the Chinese to barrios chinos (Chinese ghettos), under the
auspices of the Constitution’s Article 40, “It is the will of the Mexican people to be constituted in
a representative, democratic, federal Republic composed of free and sovereign States in all that
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concerns their internal affairs but united in a Federation established according to the principles of
this fundamental law.”85 Law 27 reflects a strong tradition of localism and blanco-criollo
dominance in Sonora, further illustrated in the deportation of Yaquis and Apaches. Government
officials justified barrioization in terms of public safety and health, but in reality, they were
motivated to stop intermarriage. Calls for barrios chinos were not only found in Sonora, a union
of small grocers in Tampico, also pleaded with officials to segregate the Chinese in 1925.86
Instead of physically attacking the Chinese, antichinistas attacked their rights to settle,
run businesses, and marry; rights that the Chinese were entitled to as foreign nationals and
naturalized citizens in Mexico. Antichinistas hoped that if they increased restrictions enough, the
Chinese community would eventually leave. In 1930, Sonora Governor Francisco S. Elias,
pressured by the Union Nacionalista (Nationalist Union), issued a series of circulars about public
health, intermarriage and labor that strengthened the existing anti-Chinese laws. In framing the
Chinese as racial poisons, public health officials legally sanctioned sinophobia. Governor Elias
cancelled all marriages between Chinese and Mexican women, and punished women harshly if
they were caught having relations with Chinese men. These laws signified the consequences of
deviating from the patriarchy but also revealed the misogyny within a mestizo racial identity.87
Commonly unenforced laws such as the 1919 80% labor provision, were reformed by
Sonora’s legislature in 1932. Moreover, the revised Article 106 treated even naturalized Chinese
Mexicans as foreigners. Chinese grocery stores again came to symbolize a racially contested
terrain, especially once the 80% labor law was incorporated into federal labor laws.88 These
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policies devastated Chinese workers and businesses, and led to their rapid closure. By June of
1931, municipalities throughout Sonora and Sinaloa began to inspect Chinese businesses to
monitor their compliance. Some Chinese merchants responded by shutting their stores thus
leading to a scarcity of basic goods. Governor Elias ordered them to reopen their stores to sell off
inventory or vacate the premises so Mexicans could take their place. The 80% labor provision
provided anti-Chinese activists and the Mexican government a way to gain support from
unemployed Mexicans by promising them future employment.89 Constructing an antagonistic
Chinese identity enabled the political elites to pass discriminatory laws, gain public support, and
therefore strengthen their hold on power.
Anti-Chinese associations encouraged people to boycott Chinese businesses not in
compliance with the 80% Labor Law through the use of speeches, leaflets, and sometimes by
even physically blocking the entrances of Chinese businesses. Antichinistas began to fine
Chinese store-owners, confiscated merchandise from those who were unable to pay, and
eventually began stealing Chinese property. In Ciudad Obregon, even when Chinese
businessmen tried to comply with the law by hiring Mexican laborers, the Nationalist AntiChinese committee insisted that the owners be counted as employees, and that at least four
Mexicans be hired in every Chinese establishment. Additionally, outside of the cities, Chinese
were robbed and forced off state farmlands, as owners begin to evict the Chinese or cancelled
their leases. In Ciudad Obregon and Bacanuchi, hacendados forced Chinese off their farmlands,
suggesting that it was due to pressure from authorities.90 In Arizpe, Chinese farmers were
stripped of their properties and pushed off of the lands they were planting.
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Antichinistas finally declared a deadline for Chinese businesses to settle their affairs and
leave the state. However, there was nowhere in the Federal Labor Law or the Mexican
Constitution that subjected foreigners to deportation for failing to comply with labor
legislation.91 Antichinistas began deporting Chinese migrants on their own. Other times,
deportations were carried out by small vigilante groups, state officials, and large mobs. In Agua
Prieta and Nogales, 27 Chinese were detained, beaten, and forced to cross the border. For lack of
better words, Mexican and U.S. officials literally shoved the Chinese back and forth across the
border. The issue was not whether to deport the Chinese, but who would be responsible for
paying the cost of deporting them back to China.92 Once in the U.S., Chinese could either pay for
temporary residence or were charged with illegal entry and deported. In October, a new decree
allowed for the detention of Chinese who still ran their businesses in Sonora. The Chinese in
Nogales and Navojoa were thrown in prison without explanation. In 1932, Governor R. Calles
gave an order to arrest and deport all Chinese from Sonora, any remaining Chinese had their
homes ransacked. These drastic illicit measures taken by antichinistas in Sonora, were inspired
by immigration and labor laws that the Mexican Federal government had implemented.
Official statements from the government said that the Chinese were leaving by their own
free will.93 Sonoran Chinese appealed to Mexican officials and leadership in mainland China,
while also organizing themselves for protection. Chinese diplomatic officials, Zhang Tian Yuan
and Peng Yaoxiang pleaded with Mexican state officials to at least give Chinese businessmen
time to sell their goods and farmers enough time to harvest their produce before deporting
them.94 Governor R. Calles refused to meet with Chinese officials and when the federal

91

Young, Elliott. Alien Nation, 196–247.
Ibid.
93
Ibid.
94
Ibid.
92

136
government asked for an explanation, he claimed the Chinese were not obeying the 80% Labor
Law and evading taxes. The Mexican consul official in Yokohama, Manuel Tellez, told the press
that “he was exerting his utmost efforts” to try to stop the expulsions. Whether or not Tellez was
sincere, there was little the federal government or Mexico’s diplomatic corps could do to stop the
anti-Chinese movement in the northern states.95
Although Chinese deportations were at times forced, most Chinese fled the state even
before official expulsion. Those with assets moved to a different state or went back to China,
while poor Chinese snuck into the U.S., with the hope that the U.S. would deport them to China.
Those who had the means fled quickly, such as Juan Lung Tain, one of the wealthiest men in
Sonora. Lung Tain lost over a million pesos during the expulsions, and over eight million pesos
left Sonora along with the Chinese. The loss of Chinese businesses was disastrous to the Sonoran
economy, wholesale merchandise was left unused and Mexicans did not take over Chinese
businesses.
The Chinese exodus from Sonora inspired similar events in Sinaloa. Once an antiChinese governor was elected, the Sinaloa state government increased taxes on Chinese
businesses several times over 1932, in hopes that the Chinese would close their businesses and
leave. In 1933, local authorities and antichinistas in Los Mochis, Mazatlan, and Culiacan
rounded up Chinese residents and loaded them on trucks for removal to the state Nayarit.96 They
then sacked Chinese homes and businesses. Some were expelled to the border, where they were
detained by INS and deported. The governor eventually suspended extrajudicial detentions, if the
Chinese community agreed to leave the state. As a result, most Chinese left, even long standing
Chinese Mexican citizens. By the end of the campaign almost 4,000 Chinese had left Sinaloa.
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The deportations of Chinese from Sinaloa and Sonora made international headlines. U.S.
newspapers claimed that there was a difference between what Mexico was doing to the Chinese
and what the U.S. was doing to the Mexicans.97 While Mexican newspapers deemed the
expulsions were progress.98 Jose Angel Espinoza argued that since the United States could deport
Chinese immigrants, Mexico should have the same right.99 By the end of September, the Chinese
who had been expelled from Mexico were arriving back in China. Chinese newspapers ran
sympathetic stories about them while city officials provided them with basic necessities. When
they arrived in China, the Chinese found themselves in a place that was unfamiliar and foreign, a
place they could no longer call home.

—Conclusion—
Despite constant terrorism, thousands of Chinese continued to live throughout Mexico.
They managed to survive because of transnational networks that linked their communities
throughout the Americas. Anti-Chinese violence continued sporadically in Mexico throughout
the 1930s, and the perpetrators generally acted with impunity.100 By 1940, there were only 520
Chinese left in Chihuahua, 283 in Sinaloa, 256 in Coahuila, and only 92 in Sonora. However,
these numbers are most likely inaccurate, as the campaigns had scattered Chinese migrants
across Mexico. One Chinese consul found that the Chinese from Sonora had fled to the
neighboring states of Chihuahua and Sinaloa and some fled much farther to Nayarit and
Chiapas.101 A few Chinese even fled as far as Guatemala. Expulsion from Sinaloa and Sonora
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was a traumatic event that challenged Chinese integration into Mexican society and their sense of
belonging.102
Displacement had forever changed the demographics of the Chinese community in
Mexico. After the campaigns, those who remained were mostly middle-class Chinese
businessmen. Anti-Chinese activities had targeted the vulnerable working class Chinese
population, who lacked the means to resist expulsion. Moreover, the 1931 Labor Law limited the
ability for businesses to hire Chinese workers. Additionally, Mexico had adopted a system of
annual quotas through the 1936 Ley General de Población. The new quota system limited new
entrants from countries outside of the Americas and Spain to just one hundred per country per
year. While also requiring new immigrants to invest at least 10,000 pesos in Mexican businesses.
Mexican quota laws indicate that the government was taking steps to respond to the immigration
quotas of the United States. The law aimed to resolve the perceived demographic problems of the
nation, by introducing a range of documentable and demonstrable criteria for admission to
Mexico. The law prohibited the entrance of alcoholics, drug addicts, prostitutes, anarchists,
salaried foreign workers, and banned the exercise of commercial activities by foreigners. In
seeking to define such standard criteria, the U.S. and Mexico also sought to centralize immigrant
registration and to thereby better control their national compositions. This new legislation altered
the demographics of the Chinese in Mexico, as it meant new arrivals were exclusively
businessmen who had the means to invest.
Finally, returning to Mexico for those who were deported back to China became much
more difficult. Many had left without the proper documentation to return and those with modest
means were unable to afford the costs of travel. Many longtime Mexican residents petitioned the
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Chinese and Mexican government to return to Mexico. Although they did not claim a sense of
Mexican nationalism, they did assert their rights as Mexican citizens to return.103 Some Chinese
petitions to the Secretaria de Gobernacion that explained they had been forced out by the antiChinese campaigns were granted permission to return. The Mexican government was usually
willing to grant re-entry to those with businesses and wealth.104 The practice of admitting
immigrants with means to invest, parallel the Porfirian development model. Revealing, how as
hard as the post-revolutionary government tried to distance itself from the Porfirian regime,
Mexico could never escape its past.
Due to a law that had preceded the anti-Chinese campaigns many Chinese Mexicans lost
their Mexican citizenship and therefore their ability to return. Any Naturalized citizen who spent
more than two years in their country of birth lost their Mexican citizenship according to the
Immigration and Naturalization Law of 1886. Most were unable to return within this two year
limit due to the difficulty of obtaining proper documentation. Individuals who petitioned the
Mexican government after the two-year limit were labeled as “Chinese citizens” or foreigners, as
the government claimed they had lost their Mexicaness.105 When all other methods were
exhausted, Chinese Mexicans petitioned the Chinese delegation. Eighty-two Chinese from the
Guangdong Province petitioned the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to seek help in
returning. These Chinese Mexicans wrote that they “were now unfamiliar with China, and
uncertain about their prospects for the future”.
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— Conclusion —
After I rang the doorbell of the La Asociación China de Mexicali, a young ChineseMexican woman opened the door and greeted me with a smile. In Spanish, she told me to wait
for the Associations president. Lining the hallways walls were countless photos of the
organization's members over the years, old Chinese calligraphy, the associations original
building from 1919, and new photos of recent community events. At the end of the hallway stood
a floor to ceiling mural that depicted the history of Mexicali’s Chinese. The right corner held the
silhouettes of a Chinese fisherman, memorializing the Chinese fisherman who frequented Baja’s
shores in the early twentieth-century. In the opposite corner are silhouettes of various Chinese
farming Mexicali’s cotton plantations. The murals warm colors and various scenes reminds one
of Diego Rivera’s frescoes and the Mexican murals painted throughout the 1920s. Mexican
murals were often infused with social and political messages in effort to reunify the country
under the post-revolutionary government. In the center of the mural held a golden Yin and Yang
symbol, symbolizing a blazing sun. Additionally, Chinese characters and a Mexican poem
surrounded the faces of a boy, a young woman, and two older men. Their identities were as
blended as the painting. As much as the mural was Mexican, it was Chinese too. This MexicanChinese mural celebrates the long presence of Chinese in Mexico and claims a place in Mexican
history for the Chinese.
In my conversation with the president of the Chinese association, Lee explained to me the
history of the organization and the transformations the group has undergone. The organization is
welcome to all those of Chinese descent and is an instrument for the Chinese community to save
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certain values, origins and traditions. The association established a primary school from first to
sixth grade to teach Mandarin, and offers Spanish classes to new Chinese immigrants.
On October 29th, 1961 in Mexico City, members of a Chinese Mexican dance group
wore qipao dresses, carried Mexican and Republic of China flags as well as banner of the Virgin
de Guadalupe, and performed lion and dragon dances on the pilgrimage route to the Basílica de
Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe, Mexico’s holiest Catholic Shrine.1 These celebrations reveal that
despite antichinista violence during the 1930s, by the 1960s Chinese Mexicans claimed a sense
of belonging in Mexico. Mexico had become home. These images of the long standing Chinese
presence are absent from Mexican archives, which suggests that the Chinese community had
been completely driven out of the country in the 1930s. In the aftermath of the revolution, postrevolutionary leaders worked to build a cohesive state though the mestizo. Thus, Mexican
national history worked in tandem with mestizo nationalism to expel the Chinese from Mexico,
and Mexican history. Mestizo nationalism was employed to unify the nation by integrating the
Indian, while simultaneously constructing narrow racial and ethnic boundaries of mexicanidad.
The national imaginary associated the Chinese with Porfirian colonization, and therefore the
enemy. Thus, nationalist backlash lobbied for legislation, boycotted Chinese business and over
four thousand Chinese were forced, some at gunpoint to cross into the United States.
Some scholars have examined the fate of the refugees after the anti-Chinese campaigns,
but it is difficult to reconstruct the histories of those who remained after the anti-Chinese
movement by using only Mexican sources.2 In addition to Chinese absence from Mexican
archives, that which has been recovered concerning the Chinese in Mexico is often inaccurate or
inconsistent.
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Although this research does not speak to the Chinese of Mexico after 1940, Freddy
Gonzales in Paisanos Chinos, traces the racial formation and political participation of Chinese
Mexicans through WWII and the Cold War. Gonzales contends that transnational ties did not
prevent integration, but rather formed an alternative path to integration. Most scholars argue that
extensive ties between Chinese and foreign diplomats erected barriers to immigrant’s integration
into the host society. Chinese integration into Mexico could have never followed a traditional
path, as this route was precluded by the anti-Chinese campaigns, which denied the Chinese a
place in the Mexican nation.3 For the rest of the century, the community was committed to
guarding itself against another expulsion campaign. But appeals to the Mexican government
would not guarantee their safety, the anti-Chinese campaigns success demonstrated that Mexican
citizenship provided little protection.
Few Chinese sought to assert their rights as Mexican nationals, and instead strengthened
their attachments to China. Rather than keeping them separate from Mexican society, Chinese
Mexican’s participation in transnational politics made Chinese migrants visible.4 Bringing them
in contact with Mexican neighbors, other Mexican civic associations, and local and federal
politicians. From 1937 to 1971, most Chinese were largely unable to travel to China and were
thus cut off from parents, spouses, and friends. Unable to return, they set down roots in Mexico,
married Mexican wives and fathered Chinese Mexican children.5 Chinese Mexican political and
ethnic identity in the context of local, nation, and international forces, follows Jeffrey Lesser
assertion that identity “is multifaceted and simultaneously global and local.”6
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Uncovering the history of Chinese immigrants in Mexico complicates previous
understandings of the U.S.-Mexico borderlands. United States and Mexican national histories
obscures how the Chinese developed vibrant communities and were crucial protagonists in the
development of U.S. and Mexican immigration policies. In the United States, the dominant
image of Chinese Americans’ rose and fell from unwanted laborers to wartime allies to
dangerous Communists.7 Chinese Americans political standing during 1930 -1960 shifted
alongside American foreign policy and war interests.8
Exclusionary nationalism was some of the most powerful forces of identity making on
both sides of the border.9 Deportation and repatriation became strategies to deal with the effects
of the Great Depression, in which both Mexicans and the Chinese underwent simultaneous
exoduses. Increasingly stricter immigration policies reinforced U.S. nationalism and structured
the future shape of Mexican nationalism. U.S. immigration policy continued to be contradictory
and politically opportunist when it abolished Chinese exclusion laws, through the signing of
1943 Magnuson Immigration act. Which was more so a political strategy to reinforce an alliance
with Chinese during WWII, than progressive step forward. During this time, the U.S. had also
passed its quota restrictions, which limited the number of immigrants of each nationality to three
percent of the number of foreign-born persons of that nationality living in the United States in
the 1910 census. Therefore, the actual number of Chinese immigrants who could yearly enter the
U.S. was only 105.
This research has endeavored to tell the forgotten history of thousands of Chinese who
immigrated to Mexico, and capture their perseverance in the face of historical, socio economic,
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and political circumstances. Beyond unraveling the history of the Chinese in Mexico, this
research challenges traditional notions of mestizaje, nationalism, and the nation-state. Despite the
presence of tens of thousands of Chinese in Mexico, Mexican culture is depicted as resulting
from the racial mixture, or mestizaje, of the indigenous and the European. Moreover, historical
nationalism has also permitted scholars from thoroughly understanding the relationship between
Mexico and the United States in regard to immigration policies. Instead, foundational myths of
United States and Mexico have overshadowed their shared histories. Further research is needed
to understand how Chinese illegal immigration fundamentally changed the relationship between
the United States and the Mexican border. Moreover, there needs to be a creation of new
intellectual spaces to explore the historical and contemporary interactions between Asians and
Latinos in both Latin America and the United States. New fields of study may further uncover
and analyze often overlooked Asian contributions to Latin America, Latino culture, identity.

“History is the fruit of power, but power itself is never so transparent that its analysis
becomes superfluous. The ultimate mark of power may be its invisibility; the ultimate challenge,
the exposition of its roots.” - Michel-Rolph Trouillot
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